C.The Ministry has capabilities to provide skill based short-term and long-term vocational trainings on a need basis that may help ex-combatants, whether they choose domestic and international jobs or prefer self-employment.
D.The ministry has enriched funding capabilities for pre to post employment phases and can introduce chain welfare investments for the potential candidates among the ex-combatant Maoist guerrillas.
E.In addition, the ministry have many contingency possibilities to rehabilitate ex-Maoist combatants through social safety net programs and also could include them into jobs such as in the transport management sector. However the government as well other related stakeholders must be careful to consider the integrated community-based reintegration approach rather than the ex-combatant based targeted approach of reintegration. The worlds experience has proved that most DDR programs have failed because the community and relevant stakeholders were ignored in pre to post phases of the entire process.
Therefore, the Ministry could be a principle means to deal and resolve the ongoing dilemmas of the peace process on the reintegration and rehabilitation issue of ex-Maoist combatants since it has a strong, and broader nationwide network and many collaborations with the respective community as well as to the stakeholders. Sometimes, it is judicious to resolve the problem from outside the horizon, especially if the given framework is unable to resolve the problem or adding more and more difficulties in the name of searching for solutions within a limited framework.
Furthermore, it has been observed through a survey report that they will be happier to jump inside the explored options of the Ministry. The illustrated options are financially, technically and legally viable and can also be quickly implemented to address the reintegration and rehabilitation crisis of cantonment-based guerillas, as well as for those deviated combatants who are running in search of socioeconomic reintegration and rehabilitation.
Except for the Maoist party, most of the stakeholders in the peace process want to minimize the number as much as possible of ex-combatants to integrate into the Nepal Army or any other national security system. Because the existing Maoist guerrillas neither meet any professional standard and norms of "State Security" nor is this possible after the merger as international factors and recognition are important for the state security system.
Secondly, Maoist Guerrillas are obvious political extremists, biased and infected with extreme Maoism and prachnadpath, and naturally deviate towards a specific political ideology of its party. Thirdly, similar questions might emerge when another existing insurgent group asks for a similar type of reintegration.
There are more than two dozen other rebellion groups who have also been fighting against the State in various parts of Nepal. It is my observation that the political reintegration model of the Nepalese peace process (accepting Maoists as lawmakers, giving enough places in parliament and directly appointing them into various senior policy level posts in the name of political integration) has become one of the major motivational factors for existing ethno-regional insurgent groups who have started fighting with a hope that they will also get chances to be member of parliaments or some other appointment while they enter in the peace process like the Maoist rebellion.