The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) agreed with the DOE assessment, concluding "that the tubes are not intended" for a centrifuge program.
David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security and a former investigator of Iraq's nuclear program with the IAEA, released publicly a report noting that, contrary to public declarations by administration officials, "In fact, the intelligence community is deeply divided," and that "ISIS has learned that U.S. nuclear experts who dissent from the Administration's position are expected to remain silent."
The International Atomic Energy Agency became aware of the tubes issue in the summer of 2001 and recognized immediately that Iraq had previously used tubes with identical dimensions in a conventional rocket program. Although the CIA sent an analyst to try to convince the IAEA of its case, IAEA experts pointed out a number of flaws in his analysis. After the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq, Director General of the IAEA Mohamed El Baradei noted that while the tubes were not suitable for a centrifuge program, they were "consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq," which was that they were for a rocket program. He added that no evidence had been found of a revived nuclear weapons program.
These examples were not aberrations in the case for war, but examples of the modus operandi of the US government prior to the invasion. A similar examination of nearly every aspect of the case for war produces similar results, though such a study is beyond the scope of our present purpose. The point is that the notion that there was an "intelligence failure" is a myth, and most everybody knows it, despite popular pretenses to the contrary. To be sure, the emperor has no clothes.
Given these facts, how does Bush's claim of adherence to the principle that force must be a lost resort only hold up? Not very well, to understate the obvious. But let's turn from the Iraq example and test the adherence to the principle elsewhere.
Bush administration efforts at "diplomacy" are also instructive in the case of Afghanistan. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden was presumed to be the mastermind, and the US demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan turn him over. When the Taliban refused, the US began bombing.
But bin Laden had been accused of crimes prior to 9/11, such as the bombing of two US embassies in Africa in 1988. The Taliban offered to put bin Laden on trial and hinted at extraditing him if the US provided the evidence against him. In February of 2001 the Taliban again said it would consider extraditing bin Laden to face trial, an offer which, again, was apparently not pursued. Soon after 9/11, leading Islamic clerics in Afghanistan recommended, in response to a request for a ruling from the Taliban, that bin Laden be encouraged to leave the country. The US rejected the option, demanding that the Taliban surrender him or face military attack. The Taliban said it would not surrender bin Laden without being presented with the evidence that he was involved in the 9/11 attacks. After the bombing began, the Taliban again said that if evidence was offered and the bombing stopped, "we would be ready to hand him over to a third country." Bush rejected the offer, saying "We know he's guilty. Turn him over." Again, the use of force as an alternative peaceful means, rather than as a last resort, is apparent.
Next, take Iran. Iran insists its nuclear program is for energy purposes only, while the Bush administration has declared repeatedly that Iran intends to use the program to build a nuclear weapon. A National Intelligence Estimate put Iran ten years away from being able to construct a weapon. The IAEA has been monitoring Iran's program, and while it has questions, concerns, and outstanding issues, it has so far found no proof that Iran's program is intended for military purposes.
The administration has so far settled for what it describes as "diplomacy." Condoleezza Rice said last year that "Military action isn't on the agenda. The agenda is a diplomatic one." At the same time, she insisted that the use of force was an "option." "The American president never takes any option off the table," she declared.
Needless to say, there is a fundamental inconsistency between declaring the use of force as a final resort and declaring it as an "option." The word "option," by definition, implies a choice; in the present case study, one between violence and peaceful means of settling disputes.
In January of this year, Rice declared that there was not "much room for further discussion" with Iran. While declaring that the US was "committed to a diplomatic course," she reiterated that "The president takes no options off the table."
In April, Bush was asked if "all options" included "the possibility of a nuclear strike" against Iran. He responded simply be repeating that "All options are on the table." In other words, the use of nuclear weapons against Iran to punish it for its nuclear program, despite the lack of evidence that it was intended for military purposes, was a possible alternative to diplomacy that his administration would not dismiss.
When British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that it was "inconceivable" that force would be used against Iran, that there would be "no justification for it", and that the suggestion that nuclear weapons could be used as an option was "nuts", it may have cost him his job, according to several news reports. The Guardian said on May 6 that Straw's "fate was sealed when the White House called Mr Blair and asked why the foreign secretary kept saying these things," an observation also made by the Independent. The London Times reported on August 8 that the White House "had put pressure on Tony Blair to change his Foreign Secretary" and concluded that Straw "was effectively dismissed by an American President."
The Bush administration has repeatedly made clear that the use of force is not a last resort, but an "option"; an alternative to peaceful means to resolve disputes. The corollary is that the reason the US has thus far declined to use military force against North Korea is not because diplomatic efforts have been exhausted; not due to any adherence to the moral principle that regards the use of force as a last resort. Therefore, there must be other explanations.
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