integrity and security issues in Maricopa County AZ during on and
around the Feb. 5th 2008 Presidential Preference primary election.
- Discrepancies in data reporting (between mail-in and precinct
voting) has left confusion over results and data analysis. (See full
report, Items 1, 1a and 1b, page 2)
- Issues regarding precinct access, pollworker staffing and long
lines. (See full report, Item 2, page 2)
- Issues regarding operations, security And transparency at the
central tabulator. (See full report, Item 3, page 3)
concerns and suggestions including obvious threats to the integrity of
the process. (See full report, Item 4, page 3)
- Issues regarding overall system transparency and observation – an
electronic voting cannot be observed using only basic human eyeballs;
rather, the observation process in existing law must be electronically
revamped. (See full report, Item 5, page 6)
- The processing of mail-in votes has been outsourced. A conflict of
interest arises: if a private company owns the mail-in vote handling
process, and it goes wrong in any way, employees will be pressured to
cover up. (See full report, Item 6, page 7)
- Operations of the Sequoia voting machines at election headquarters
has been outsourced to Sequoia employees. There is another conflict of
interest: Sequoia employees would be required by their employer to
conceal glitches or evidence that the Sequoia system had been
subverted. (See full report, Item 7, page 7)
- Disturbing pollworker reports. (See full report, Item 8, page 7)
- Physical access security – one of the doors has been left without an
access record trail. (See full report, Item 9, page 8)
- Party access to the oversight process. (See full repport, Item 10,
page 8)
- Comments and conclusion. (See full report, Page 9)
- Appendix A covers the legal and practical issues surrounding the
Sequoia "BPS" and "Bridge Tool" software modules. They are
uncertified; this section analyzes the legal conflict surrounding
these materials. National Importance (See full report, Page 11)
- Appendix B covers the process for permanent early vote list
assignments. (See full report, Page 28)
The reports draws on several sources:
- Detailed study of the Sequoia voting systems by way of internal
Sequoia documentation, the California Secretary of State's 2007 "top
to bottom" security review of voting systems and conversations with a
former Sequoia employee.
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