Another key factor in evaluating the pressure of the Patriots' footballs compared to those used by the Colts was the timing of the balls being tested inside the referees' locker room at halftime. The scientists found that footballs, especially dry ones, regain their pressure fairly quickly once in a warmer environ, so the timing of those comparative tests represented another key variable.
But Wells compressed the gauging sequence as tightly as possible to make the discrepancies between the lost pressure of the Patriots' balls and the lost pressure of the Colts' balls more supportive of his case against the Patriots. Thus, he told the scientists that the NFL officials who tested the balls at halftime didn't start immediately although they knew they had only a very short time to examine the footballs, only 13.5 minutes.
Instead of getting started immediately, according to Wells, the NFL officials waited a couple of minutes. Then, Wells claimed that after testing the 11 Patriots' footballs -- and finding them under-inflated -- they didn't add air to them right away but rather turned to the Colts' footballs, which also turned out to be under-inflated though not as much, according to the one gauge that accurately measured the pounds per square inch, or psi. The second gauge gave readings that were between about one-third to nearly one-half psi too high.
But the NFL officials only got through four Colts' balls before running out of time. Then, according to Wells's chronology, they added air pressure to the 11 Patriots' balls. There are, however, doubts about Wells's sequencing. According to the report by Exponent, the scientific consultants hired by the NFL, "there remains uncertainty about the exact order and timing of the other two events," i.e., gauging the Colts' balls and re-inflating the Patriots' balls.
In other words, there are doubts about something as critical as the timing of when the Colts' footballs were tested, whether at the end of the 13.5 minute halftime break or in the middle.
And there is evidence and logic that suggests that Wells flipped the chronology to better serve his purposes, since the records show that the two officials handling the two gauges switched gauges between the time they measured the Patriots' balls and the Colts' balls. That suggests that something happened between those two sets of measurements, possibly the re-inflation of the Patriots' balls.
Also, the NFL officials only tested four Colts' balls, having to stop because they ran out of time and had to rush the balls back to the field for the second half. That would suggest that checking the Colts' balls was the final step, not a middle one.
But why is there uncertainty about this sequencing, as Exponent says? In a report that plays gotcha with McNally over whether he used a urinal or a toilet, why isn't there certainty about something as crucial as the timing of the measurements when there were several NFL officials conducting the tests?
There are a number of other head-scratching aspects to Wells's report, including why he didn't just call up McNally if Wells really wanted a final interview, rather than insisting that the Patriots arrange it with McNally who only worked for the Patriots on game days. Wells had McNally's cell-phone number and likely other contact information, but chose to make a point about the Patriots not arranging this additional interview.
But perhaps the biggest danger represented by this extraordinary report and the ensuing punishment is the idea that a theoretical offense can be alleged using "more probable than not" standards and that real punishment can be enforced on individuals and groups -- despite no hard evidence that they knew anything or that the offense even occurred.
And, if it can happen to Tom Brady, it can happen to anyone.
[For more on this topic, see Consortiumnews.com's "Holes in NFL's Deflategate Report" and "Why Write about NFL's Deflategate."](Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).