The cable notes, however that the "secretive nature of the project has prompted concern among constitution committee members," who fear Muammar could change his mind. A small circle of Libyans involved in the process are also keenly aware that "secretly developing a constitution reflects the failure of al-Qadhafi t orealize the importance of robust processes (a key weakness of the Jamahiriya system) as a precursor of durable political results." Muammar is described as "taking the politically expedient route" instead of "investing in a more transparent and slower (but more credible) process."
Is Saif Afraid Army of "John McClanes" Will Bring Libya to Utter Ruin?
Given the role of Islamic extremists in the continued global war on terrorism, it is no surprise that US diplomats have kept tabs on Islamists in Libya, especially ones believed to be engaged in terrorism. The fear Saif expresses in his address to Libyans appears to reflect a knowledge of how fixated US and European officials have been on what has been happening in Egypt and whether democracy will lead to an Islamist state run by the Muslim Brotherhood or some other group that the US might consider to be similar.
The city of Derna, which is ninety-three and a half kilometers east of Bayda, is described in one cable as a wellspring for foreign fighters who are heading off to fight coalition forces in Iraq. Gaddafi's link to the US is alleged to be fueling the radicalization of young Libyans in the area. The cable quotes a Libyan "interlocutor," who likens the young men in Derna to "Bruce Willis' character in the action picture "Die Hard'" because, for them, "resistance against coalition forces in Iraq is an important act of 'jihad' and a last act of defiance against the Qadhafi regime." The interlocutor suggests many of them refuse to die quietly.
Derna is compared to Bayda and other cities like Benghazi:
Benghazi and other parts of eastern Libya had benefited in the last several years from increased government patronage, Derna continued to "suffer from neglect". Citing an indeterminate grudge between Libya's former monarch, King Idriss al-Sanussi, and leading citizens of Derna, xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed that Derna had long been the victim of a deliberate government campaign to keep it poor. He compared Derna's plight to the fortunes of another conservative eastern Libyan town, Bayda. While Bayda had been the summer retreat for King Idriss and was initially shunned in the early years of Qadhafi's rule, its fortunes changed after Qadhafi married Sadia Farkhis, daughter of a prominent citizen of the town. The government subsequently established the Omar al-Mukhtar University in what had been the royal palace and sited a number of government-owned enterprises there. By contrast, Derna had not benefited from any such measures.
The neighborhood of Baab al-Shiha, a "district from which a large number of the Libyan foreign fighters identified in documents captured during September's Objective Massey operation in Iraq had hailed," is described. Of interest in the "lower-middle class neighborhood" is the "number of small, discrete mosques tucked away in side alleys," which are part of a "profusion of "popular mosques'" that has "complicated effective monitoring by security forces."
Just how closely Libya likes to monitor cities comes through in this section of the cable:
4. (C) A number of residents were on the streets; however, they were visibly more wary and less friendly than in other Libyan towns. xxxxxxxxxxxx later noted that some residents were closely questioned by security officials after speaking with a visiting Newsweek reporter in April. Told P/E Chief was an American, xxxxxxxxxxxx jokingly swore and said "there goes my evening". Clarifying, he said he had plans that night, but would likely be detained and questioned by security officials about his interactions with an Emboff. While P/E Chief had not obviously been followed, word would doubtless reach security officials' ears that foreigners had visited and inquiries would be made. He dismissed the idea of parting company to avoid creating problems for him, saying it was important that he, as a son of Derna, not bow down to the central government's authority. "They may have their boot on our throat, but it's important that they know that we are still breathing and kicking", he said.
In 08TRIPOLI120, which appears to be a cable that immensely influenced the aforementioned cable, US diplomat Chris Stevens comments, "[The] ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support for and participation in jihad despite GOL security organizations' efforts suggests that claims by senior GOL officials that the east is under control may be overstated."
It describes the frequent references to "martyrdom" in the mosques in Benghazi and Derna:
(S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx partly attributed the fierce mindset in Benghazi and Derna to the message preached by imams in eastern Libyan mosques, which he said is markedly more radical than that heard in other parts of the country. xxxxxxxxxxxx makes a point of frequenting mosques whenever he visits Libya as a means to connect with neighbors and relatives and take the political pulse. Sermons in eastern mosques, particularly the Friday 'khutba', are laced with "coded phrases" urging worshippers to support jihad in Iraq and elsewhere through direct participation or financial contributions. The language is often ambiguous enough to be plausibly denied, he said, but for devout Muslims it is clear, incendiary and unambiguously supportive of jihad. Direct and indirect references to "martyrdom operations" were not uncommon. By contrast with mosques in Tripoli and elsewhere in the country, where references to jihad are extremely rare, in Benghazi and Derna they are fairly frequent subjects.
The contents of the mentioned cables suggest that in Libya violent revolution is much more possible than it was in Egypt. The area of eastern Libya is filled with Libyans who may seize this moment as opportunity to finally throw off the chains of tyranny that have bound them for over four decades. That they have been repressed for so many years by Gaddafi's regime will likely fuel desires to wage guerrilla warfare for freedom.
Libya's Privatization of State Enterprises Increasing U.S. Oil's Influence?
Saif's nod to "American oil companies" either signals the growing instability worries Saif because it might have a negative impact on his ability to accumulate more wealth from oil operations in Libya or it points to how successful US oil companies have been at convincing the Gaddafi regime to open up its doors in the past few years.
Prospects for U.S. oil companies appear to be relatively good on February 11, 2010. 10TRIPOLI116 features Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) Shokri Ghanem expressing "support for improved Libya-U.S. relations." He explains near-term goals for the NOC that include "plans for increasing oil and gas exploration and production" and "developing a cadre of Libyan experts to replace the expatriate workforce."