As noted in a July 11, 2008 CNN.com article:
“In April (2008), “Pakistan's National Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a U.N. probe into Bhutto's death -- a move that was not surprising, given that the government and parliament elected in February is dominated by a coalition led by the PPP.”
From the public's perspective, impeachment too might very well keep that comeback door permanently closed. It too would crash his support from the military et al, since impeachment embarrasses the proud Pakistani Army (and his closest ally Gen. Kayani) by having one of their own so publicly humiliated and tarnished. A bridge Musharraf would never burn, and in not burning it, keeping his strongest (asset) support base in his corner for the future.
His situation really being akin to being on the wrong side of the old adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Musharraf being the enemy of each opposition party (themselves enemies) and had become the same to the Pakistani people. So long as he remained the common “enemy” of that collective group (all enemies to each other), he was doomed to ever succeed or last as President. Too, by having him remain as their perfect public bulls-eye target, the government ruling coalition would invariably continue in power.
His strategy then was to remove the one factor (i.e. enemy) that solely united both the opposition parties and that same coalition with the Pakistani people – himself. This the (his chess-like “Check” move) “Hide” (i.e. out of public sight) side of his strategy. He can now watch from the sidelines, as everyone formerly allied against him now in turns on and against each other. Ironically, his departure, thought by the masses as a chance for greater security and stability, instead does quite the opposite (as he knew it would) – in compounded fashion, it further destabilizes the situation and the country.
In removing himself as “the” target (enemy) of everyone, and “no longer there to kick around” so to speak, he unleashed wholesale “fratricide-like” (see note) effects on many fronts. For example, the (current coalition) opposition parties now rabidly turning on their traditional enemy – each other and their opposing agendas. The result being a fragmented, dysfunctional government, yielding a deteriorating Pakistani socio-economic situation; civil war possible without "stabilizing intervention". This has already seen itself manifest with the fracturing of the coalition government since Musharraf’s resignation. More below.
Note on “Fratricide”:
Per Britannica.com, “an extreme plan for protecting the U.S. land-based ICBM force in the middle of the Cold War was designed around “fratricide”, the theory that multiple nuclear explosions cannot occur at the same time in close proximity to one another because the first detonated warhead triggers low-yield partial explosions in the others”.
Merriam-Webster defines fratricide as one that murders or kills his or her own brother or sister or an individual (as a countryman) having a relationship like that of a brother or sister .
Essentially the fratricide “derivative illustration” in the Pakistani situation context is of incoming missiles (i.e. countrymen) “destroying each other” rather than the target. In Pakistan, the fratricide analogy transfers to the assets (e.g. coalition government, etc.) that should be working together to better the country, instead turning on each other and in the process putting politics ahead of the people and instead destroying themselves (i.e. brother and sister analogy) and in doing so, harming the nation. In effect, selfishly destroying the country “from within”.
The other wide card or ace in the hole in Musharraf’s strategy is the powerful Pakistani military (and intelligence/security services), which he remains firmly “their guy”. General Ashfaq Kayani (Pakistani Army Chief) and Musharraf are very close and go back a long way together; Musharraf being the one who elevated Kayani (previously head of the ISI) to the top military post with his Army resignation earlier this year.
A look at Pakistani history since the country’s independence from Britain in 1947, reveals that any Pakistani leader without the support of the Army and having it securely in their corner (pocket), has no real power and will never succeed. Musharraf being the perfect example and knows this better than anyone.
As the popular saying goes in Pakistan, "Power in Pakistan flows from the uniform".
Its leadership (and governing) legacy has not been one that embraced and practiced a democratic constitution and principles but rather what it is traditionally accustomed to - military rule. And keep in mind, Pakistan is just 60 years old, yet military rule has been the more often the norm since its independence from British India. Whereas the benchmark U.S. has never had military rule - neither in its first 60 years nor anytime during its entire 232 years since Independence. Pakistan is therefore very different than the U.S. and must be approached with that keen understanding and with sensitivity to that difference in culture and mindset.
See Author’s article (published prior to Bhutto assassination):
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