Neocon "regime change" in Syria or Iran -- even if "successful" -- would surely have devastating consequences for those two societies beyond even their current unpleasant circumstances.
So far, the limited U.S. intervention in Syria -- supplying the alleged "moderates" with light weapons and Obama's demand that "Assad must go" -- has only exacerbated the civil war and created more opportunities to be exploited by the radical jihadists in al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda's affiliate) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (a group so extreme that even al-Qaeda renounced it).
The neocon solution to the Syrian crisis has been to demand that Obama supply the "moderates" with more advanced weapons and undertake an aerial bombing campaign to destroy Assad's military capabilities. The most likely outcome of that approach, however, would be either an outright extremist victory or bloody anarchy.
Regarding Russia, the neocons seek growing tensions between Moscow and Washington, with the Ukraine crisis serving as the biggest irritant and with follow-on plans for destabilizing Russia politically and economically, eventually to get rid of President Vladimir Putin in favor of a compliant leader like Boris Yeltsin who let "free-market" experts plunder Russia's economy in the decade after the Soviet Union's collapse.
As neocon National Endowment for Democracy President Carl Gershman wrote last September in a Washington Post op-ed, Ukraine has become "the biggest prize." But Gershman added that Ukraine was really only an interim step to an even bigger prize, the removal of Putin, who, Gershman added, "may find himself on the losing end not just in the near abroad [i.e. Ukraine] but within Russia itself."
Of course, Gershman and other neocons ignore the risks of creating violent disorder in nuclear-armed Russia, transforming it into something like a giant-sized Ukraine. The end result of that "regime change" could be thermo-nuclear war.
The Peaceful Path
Without doubt, Official Washington would find the more peaceful path less gratifying, with its pursuit of imperfect compromises reached with adversaries who have been thoroughly vilified in the mainstream U.S. media. Indeed, there would be much moral outrage over any suggestion that these "enemies" have their own legitimate concerns or that they can make significant contributions toward a less violent world.
But that is the choice facing Obama: Can he get off his moral high horse and recognize that Putin is not entirely in the wrong about Ukraine, that the European Union and the U.S. State Department helped provoke a political crisis in Kiev which led to the violent overthrow of elected President Viktor Yanukovych; that most residents of Crimea did want to secede from the ensuing chaos and rejoin Russia; that Moscow has reasonable fears about NATO pressed against its borders; that Russian-speaking Ukrainians should have rights, too, and not just be slaughtered as "terrorists" for resisting the right-wing overthrow of Yanukovych whose political base was in their eastern territories.
Theoretically, a compromise solution to the Ukraine crisis would be relatively easy: a second referendum on Crimea's secession to verify that the earlier vote reflected the popular will (with plenty of international observers); a federalized system to grant significant self-rule to eastern Ukraine; an agreement to stop further expansion of NATO; and resumed economic ties between Ukraine and Russia.
Once the Ukraine crisis is in the past, Obama could shift from ostracizing Putin to enlisting him as a partner in reaching a reasonable settlement with Iran to guarantee that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only and in finding a political solution to the Syrian civil war.
Based on the recent Syrian election, Assad appears to retain the allegiance of many Alawites, Shiites, Christians and other sects, including some Sunnis. If Obama backs off his insistence that "Assad must go," then a power-sharing arrangement could be within reach with Assad staying through some transition period.
A political settlement would allow the Syrian government to concentrate on driving foreign jihadists and other violent extremists out of its territory. If the jihadists could be defeated in Syria, the stability of neighboring Iraq would be enhanced.
Pressure on the Saudis
However, ultimately the defeat of Sunni radicals -- whether al-Nusra or ISIS or al-Qaeda -- will require cracking down on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and other Persian Gulf states that have poured fortunes into financing and arming these extremists.
The Saudis, in particular, have backed the jihadists swarming into Syria with the goal of overthrowing Assad, an Alawite, a Shiite-related sect. The Saudis see Assad as an important ally of Shiite-ruled Iran and thus their geopolitical enemy. But only the United States and the West can apply the necessary financial pressure to get Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states to relent in their strategy of supporting Sunni terrorism.
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