But of all the articles that have been published by "experts" and academics refuting Brzezinski's claims, none comes close to a recent article by University College Dublin scholar Conor Tobin, titled "The Myth of the Afghan Trap."
In his article Tobin argues that based "almost solely" on the Nouvel Observateur interview the Brzezinski "trap" thesis doesn't hold up and complains that it has filtered uncritically into the works of several reputable historians. He even cites our work as an example of this uncritical acceptance while failing to note that our use of the interview is but one piece of a wealth of evidence of Brzezinski's involvement in the Afghan issue.
Tobin discounts Brzezinski's life-long "reputation," for ideological bias against all things Russian then moves on to base his debunking mandate solely on the veracity of the interview, declaring: "That if this one unreliable interview is discounted there is very little legitimate evidence to back up the trap thesis-- and then concludes that "This article will demonstrate that the 'trap' thesis has little basis in fact."
Based solely on his wish fulfillment rather than the facts, Tobin rejects the very idea that Brzezinski would ever advise Carter to actively endorse a policy that would risk SALT and de'tente, jeopardize his election campaign and threaten Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf to future Soviet infiltration-because to Tobin "it is largely inconceivable."
As proof of Brzezinski's belief in the Soviet's long term ambitions to invade the Middle East through Afghanistan, Tobin cites how Brzezinski "reminded Carter of 'Russia's traditional push to the south, and briefed him specifically on Molotov's [supposed] proposal to Hitler in late 1940 that the Nazis recognize the Soviet claims of pre-eminence in the region south of Batum and Baku.'" But what Tobin fails to mention is that what Brzezinski presented to the president was a well-known misinterpretation of what the Nazis had proposed-not Molotov-and which Molotov rejected. In other words, the very opposite of what Brzezinski had presented.
To others who had a personal experience in the events surrounding the Soviet invasion, there is little doubt that Brzezinski wanted to draw the Soviets into an Afghan trap and had been doing it since April of 1978 through a program of destabilization. The record indicates that U.S. Afghan ambassador Adolph Dubs and Brzezinski came to blows over Brzezinski's destabilization program at least a year before the Soviet invasion if not sooner. Afghan expert Selig Harrison, who'd gone to Kabul and interviewed Dubs in the summer of 1978 writes in his book with Diego Cordovez Out of Afghanistan, "Brzezinski emphasized in an interview after he left the White House that he had remained strictly within the confines of the President's policy at that stage not to provide direct aid to the Afghan insurgency. Since there was no taboo on indirect support, however, the CIA had encouraged the newly entrenched Zia Ul-Haq to launch its own program of military support for the insurgents. The CIA and the Pakistani Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) he said, worked together closely on planning training programs for the insurgents and on coordinating the Chinese, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Kuwaiti aid that was beginning to trickle in. By early February 1979, this collaboration became an open secret when the Washington Post published an eyewitness report that at least two thousand Afghans were being trained at former Pakistani Army bases guarded by Pakistani patrols."
David Newsom, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs who'd met the new Afghan government in the summer of 1978 told Harrison, "They struck me as very ideological but they were still Afghan nationalists" From the beginning, Zbig had a much more confrontational view of the situation than Vance. He thought we should be doing something covertly to frustrate Soviet ambitions in that part of the world. On some occasions I was not alone in raising questions about the wisdom and feasibility of what he wanted to do." CIA Director Stansfield Turner for example "was more cautious than Zbig. Zbig wasn't worried about provoking the Russians, as some of us were."
To some members of the Carter White House who interacted with Brzezinski during his four years at the wheel from 1977 to 1980 his intention to provoke the Russians into doing something was clear. By early 1979 events had grown so unstable in Afghanistan, the ambassador had to confront his own CIA station chief and demand answers about CIA interference. According to John Helmer an NSC staffer who was tasked with investigating two of Brzezinski's policy recommendations to Carter, Brzezinski would risk anything to undermine the Soviets and his operations in Afghanistan were well known.
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