Those who argue for retention of levers seem to be content with the idea that the ballot marking devices that they criticize would be deployed for those that need them, so long as those without special needs can use levers. This shows a lack of concern for the genuine accessibility required by democracy.
Their arguments use rhetorical devices aimed to rouse the public in ways that ignore, for example, the actual experiences of persons with disabilities with the ballot marking devices. For example, Ms. Novick says that it is “a worthy goal but the most able-bodied person in the world wouldn’t vote unassisted on these pieces of crap.”[6] She cites no evidence from trial use by persons with disabilities, who in many cases have found the AutoMARK highly usable and the Image-Cast BMD adequately so. [7] Some election officials think that at least some of the current “failures” with the new machines actually are caused by management’s lack of experience with them.
3. The articles ignore practical, managerial, and legal problems embedded in their recommendations:
The suggestion that the ballot-markers purchased for 2008 be used to provide accessibility to persons with special needs while the levers are retained for most voters ignores the huge financial investment in new machines that were intended to be the single machine replacing the lever machine. In addition, new lever machines would be needed. Because of expecting the replacement of the levers, some counties have been functioning with a minimal number of working lever machines, rather than buying new ones. In addition, wastefulness is apparent in that most of the new machines are tethered to a scanner that sits on a ballot box; the ballot marker cannot be separated from the scanner but, apparently, would not be used in the proposal to retain the levers. Shouldn’t we instead focus on making these new machines work?
This plan ignores the election management problems involved in deploying not only enough lever machines, but the Image-Cast ballot marker. To do this in 2008 will require much effort; it seems hardly feasible as a long term plan. Additional stress for counties would be caused by continuing the need to store the levers as well as the new equipment.
In addition, a closer look at NY’s Election Reform and Modernization Act (2005) is required to determine whether such a plan would violate the rule that no more than two voting systems be deployed in any polling place. Most county Boards of Elections would need to manage (1) the lever machines, (2) the ballot marker/scanner Image Cast, and (3) paper ballots for absentee, military, emergency, and provisional use.
4. The articles ignore limitations of lever machines: While some of the criticisms of levers are acknowledged, scant weight is given to not only their failure to comply with ruling interpretations of HAVA, but to additional problems many voters find with them.
· Not only do voters with disabilities object to using a completely separate system, many voters know that levers have a history of stalling as the counters role over to the next 100. They have learned to want a record of their individual votes, which the EAC says HAVA requires and which the lever machines cannot provide. Often voters realize only after pulling the large levers to register their votes that they missed a race. If they had been marking a paper ballot in a privacy booth, they would have taken time to check the ballot and even get a new ballot if needed. In a primary, the voter sometimes finds only after having entered the machine and having started to vote that it is set for the wrong party. With paper, a wrong ballot can be perceived immediately and can be returned, voided if necessary, as the voter receives the right one. In addition, write-ins are particularly difficult on lever machines and nearly impossible for those who are short or who have visual limitations.
· The authors present false information about lever machines, claiming, e.g., that “Our lever voting system does create a piece of paper that can be audited.”[8] Some of NY’s lever machines provide an imprint of the counters at the end of the election. Many do not. When available, the imprint is only of the totals. Current discussions of audits of elections assume the recounting of individual votes. There is no record of individual votes with a lever machine.
· The 2007 Voluntary Guidelines from the National Institutes of Science and Technology (NIST) recommend a software-independent verification process. An analogous requirement for levers would be for some kind of independent verification system that would reveal any errors in the lever machine tabulation. None exists. New York’s Election Reform and Modernization Act requires that NY follow the EAC voluntary guidelines. If the NIST recommendation is incorporated in the EAC guidelines, as is usual, the requirement for independent verification might become mandatory.
· While one lever advocate acknowledges that “if the lever machine fails or is tampered with there’s no trace of how the voter voted,” she plays down this invisibility of the counting of the ballots in the lever machine in order to stress what she calls “the unseen calculation of the optical scanner.”[9] She does not explicate the efforts to establish careful pre-election testing of machines and post-election protection of ballots through New York’s bipartisan election administration.
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
