Prior to 9/11, the self-proclaimed National Liberation Army (NLA) of Macedonia -- to reiterate, this was a paramilitary army organized and integrated by KLA/alQaeda Mujahadeen commanders -- launched terror attacks in Macedonia, with the help of former senior US military officers (now working for a private mercenary company on contract to the Pentagon) who were advising these terrorists!
A couple of months prior to 9/11, US military advisers were seen mingling with alQaeda operatives within this same paramilitary army. In late June 2001, seventeen US "instructors" were identified among the withdrawing rebels. To avoid the diplomatic humiliation and media embarrassment of senior US military personnel being captured together with "Islamic terrorists" (by the Macedonian Armed Forces), the US and NATO pressured the Macedonian government to allow the NLA terrorists and their US military advisers to be freed and to be quietly evacuated.
The evidence, including statements by the Macedonian Prime Minister and press reports out of Macedonia, pointed unequivocally to continued US covert support to the "Islamic brigades" in the former Yugoslavia. This US support, for terrorists, had not occurred during the Cold War, but was definitely happening in June 2001, barely three months prior to 9/11. These developments immediately cast doubt on the official 9/11 narrative which presented alQaeda as the organization that was solely behind the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. (See Chapter IV, America's "War on Terrorism")
The Mysterious Pakistani General
On the 12th of September, the day after 9/11, a mysterious Lieutenant General with terrorist connections, who was head of Pakistan's Military Intelligence (ISI), just " happened to be in Washington on the day of the attacks." Even more surprisingly, he was on that day called into the office of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. (In confirmation of this, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, in an interview with CBS News 60 Minutes on September 21, 2006, alleged that Armitage called an ISI general immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks and threatened to "bomb the country (Pakistan) back to the stone age" unless they supported the US-led fight against Islamic terrorism.)
The "War on Terrorism" had been officially launched on the night of September 11, and Dick Armitage was telling General Mahmoud Ahmad to help America "in going after the terrorists." Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was on the phone with Secretary of State Colin Powell and on the morning of the 13th of September, a comprehensive agreement was reached between the two governments.
While the press reports confirmed that Pakistan would support the Bush administration in the "war on terror" (the Pakistanis would later give a safe hiding place to bin Laden and his family), what they failed to mention was the fact that Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI), headed by the very General Ahmad who had been meeting with US officials on 9/11, had a longstanding relationship to the Islamic terror network. Documented by numerous sources, the ISI was known to have supported a number of Islamic organizations including alQaeda and the Taliban. (See Chapter IV.)
In reading news headlines on the 13th of September, the first reaction of those who knew of all these connections was to ask themselves the following question: If the Bush administration were really committed to weeding out the terrorists, why would it call upon Pakistan's ISI for "help,' when the ISI was known to have supported and financed these terrorist organizations?