Unfortunately, this year included the beginnings of an increasingly unrestrained Executive Branch, and the dominance of the Presidency and the President's cabinet; first in foreign, and then in domestic affairs. This was most clearly evidenced by the Federal Government's increasing reliance on the use of the term "National Security," whenever one of its agencies was caught taking part in any illegal or morally questionable operation.
Professor Wills's contention--with which I agree--is that much of this lack of restraint on the part of the Executive Branch was a direct result of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the equation of our constitutionally limited, democratically representative republic. Civilian control was--just barely--maintained over America's growing nuclear arsenal, preventing the de facto creation of a fourth branch of government.
But the psychological pressures inherent in the control of the world's biggest club, has proven too much (so far) for the maintenance of truly co-equal branches as imagined by the Framers. Increasingly, the President is seen--quite wrongly Professor Wills adds--as something like an elected monarch by the American people, through his role as Commander-in Chief. There are too many Americans who believe that to oppose a President's policy is tantamount to sedition, or even treason.
This fact has enabled the American government to suppress disagreement with its policies, both at home and abroad, by simply stating that it is "in the interest of National Security" for the last sixty years. In fact (although Professor Wills does not mention this in his book), some European and Canadian historians argue that NATO was formed as much to put a brake on United States pretensions of hegemony in Western Europe, as it was to counter the Soviet military threat from Eastern Europe.
The idea of America's overbearing pretension was brought into sharp focus in 1948, with our interference in the national elections in Italy. The Truman administration applied pressure on the Italians to outlaw the Communist Party before the elections. When that did not work, millions of dollars were covertly given to non-Communist leftist factions and anti-Communist political parties, in a successful effort to minimize Communist participation in a coalition government.
This unfortunately was also the opening curtain on an American policy to oppose or depose foreign governments and political parties whose make up was not to our liking, a policy that continues to this very day (e.g., the 2009 ouster of the President of Honduras). One hundred-and-fourteen times, beginning with Mossadegh in Iran, the United States has been responsible for the murder, attempted murder, or overthrow of a foreign leader in the last sixty years. (See Greg Kintzer's book, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq; 2007) Like so many postwar intelligence actions, the actions the CIA undertook against these governments and political parties, were illegal under the Agency's charter, not to mention the laws of the United States.
And so, we come back to secrecy.
One of Professor Wills's primary assertions is this: secrecy is the greatest enemy of our modern representative democracy, which relies upon accountability of its elected representatives and appointed bureaucracy--from a member of the President's cabinet to the lowliest clerk at the Department of Motor vehicles--to function properly. I agree with Professor Wills 100% on this matter.
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
