This piece was reprinted by OpEd News with permission or license. It may not be reproduced in any form without permission or license from the source.
Document 21
L/SFP - John H. Pender to L - Mr. Abram Chayes, "Atomic Stockpile," 16 July 1961, Top Secret
1961-07-16
Source: DNSA
With the State Department role still unresolved, Pender briefed Chayes on two Defense Department papers, one by Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering Marvin Stern on electronic devices to control weapons, and one by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the custody problem. To prevent the problem of accidental detonation, which Stern saw as a "finite probability," he proposed mechanical and electronic "interlock" to keep weapons in an "untriggered" mode. An electronic interlock could prevent premature or unauthorized detonation, but it was years away from development. A mechanical interlock could prevent unauthorized use and contribute to greater safety, but it would not prevent premature nuclear use by commanders in the field.
While Stern believed that the interlocks would safeguard custody and control, Pender was not wholly persuaded because the devices could "not preclude seizure of, or unauthorized access to, the weapon and consequently may not resolve our custody dispute with the Joint Committee even though the device would probably remove the primary motive for seizure."
The gist of the JCS paper was that everything concerning custody, control, and security of nuclear weapons was satisfactory: it "reflect[ed] suspicion of anything which could make it possible to circumvent the established chain of command." Consistent with that, Pender wrote that he was not surprised to "find the JCS memorandum concluding that all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes, even such as that posed for consideration by Dr. Stern." Pender was most disconcerted by the "feeling one gets from its general tenor that units in the field equipped with the weapons are going to use them [in a conflict situation] when and how they see fit ... without awaiting a decision by the President."
Pender saw "nothing in either paper " which would warrant a change in our previous position that we should insist on having a voice in at least certain of these matters before action is taken."
Document 22
Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, "NATO Nuclear Safeguards," 31 October 1961, Secret
1961-10-31
Source: DNSA
President Kennedy remained concerned about the control of nuclear weapons, especially as the Berlin Crisis intensified. On 31 August 1961, he sent Secretary of Defense McNamara a memorandum asking that General Earle Partridge's National Command and Control Task Force "give urgent attention to measures to strengthen control over nuclear weapons in NATO Europe during the Berlin crisis."
The Partridge report found that arrangements to safeguard weapons under U.S. control were adequate but recommended steps to prevent seizure of weapons assigned to non-U.S. forces. While Partridge found that nuclear weapons deployments authorized by General Norstad were "appropriate to the situation," Rusk advised Kennedy that the Partridge Task Force had not focused on the problem of weapons security, and that the Defense Department should be encouraged to look into this issue further.
As a security measure, commanders of units armed with nuclear weapons "have been directed not to fire (or to make final preparations for firing) nuclear weapons without specific authority emanating from CINCEUR. The report also noted that "permissive links" would strengthen effectiveness of controls against unauthorized use, and that the AEC and the Department of Defense needed to give priority to developing and producing such devices.
Next Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).