No doubt, the armed force available to Guaidà ³ could overwhelm anything available to Maduro, if it can all be used. But Maduro has a weapon that Guaidà ³ & Co. lack: political support among the majority of working-class Venezuelans. (If that weren't true, Maduro would already be gone.)
Maduro's fundamental, indispensable strength and potentially-winning advantage will be a mass base of popular support that is both politically-committed and armed (with its own and a critical section of the national army's weapons). Neither is sufficient by itself, and anti-imperialists must reject any attempt by faux-pacifist "leftists" to separate the popular movement from its arms. The strength of the politically-committed armed force backing Maduro will determine how much of the armed force backing Guaidà ³ can be used.
The US and the Venezuelan ruling class know that stopping and reversing Bolivarian socialism will require not only the ouster of Maduro, but massacres of thousands of working-class activists and the violent destruction of social programs and institutions-like the exemplary communal councils-that underlie working-class power. They will have no moral qualms about doing this, with any combination of defected Venezuelan military units, foreign fighters, and fascist militias that is necessary. The only thing that will give them pause is knowing it will be a costly (including politically costly) and risky fight in the streets that will leave a lot of them dead.
Not that the U.S. regime seems to understand enough to care, but a "victory" for imperialism could only result in another devastated nation, in a state of permanent crisis, with an elite more dependent on, and a working-class more infuriated at, the U.S. Another nail in the coffin of the pretense of legitimacy of the "mission."
Because reactionary forces are politically weak in Venezuela now, they know they could only win quickly by instigating a military coup or inviting foreign intervention.
Regarding a foreign invasion, the U.S. and its foreign partners will use whatever level of intervention and whatever degree of armed force they think is politically palatable to their own populations, and nothing will affect that calculus more than how hard the fight will be.
There is no deep support, and in fact, widespread disgust, among the U.S. populace for such seemingly pointless adventures. Still, as with every other war, with incessant, bipartisan, media-wide promulgation of "cakewalk" and "humanitarian" lies, the U.S. regime can manufacture shallow, provisional mass political support in advance. That will disappear if the war goes on too long, is too visibly vicious, and, especially, if it produces too many dead and visible U.S. bodies.
Any neighboring allies who would participate, like Colombia, will face similar considerations, though starting out with less widespread popular support. (One Colombian rebel group has already vowed to fight to defend Maduro.)
So, the prospect of extended fighting against a determined, politically-motivated armed populace, which will produce a lot of dead U.S. and/or Colombian bodies, is the most effective deterrent against foreign intervention.
Regarding a Venezuelan military coup, with a few exceptions, the army so far is sticking with Maduro. I hope Caleb Maupin is right in observing that the army is institutionally committed to defending Bolivarian socialism. And every anti-imperialist should hope that a lot of Venezuelan soldiers, hearing the demands from Washington and seeing the U.S. and Israeli flags being hoisted as the battle ensigns of the opposition, are committed to that simple and righteous Bolivarian nationalism.
But there will be a lot of bribes and threats thrown at the officer corps, and, as a hierarchical institution, the Venezuelan army is susceptible to being undermined by a small number of key defections. The knowledge that they will have not only to grab a few buildings, but to fight in the streets against a politically-motivated armed populace, is, again, what is most likely to deter an internal coup.
This doesn't mean there won't, or shouldn't be, "dialogue" and negotiations. It means the positions of any negotiators and the outcome of any talking will reflect calculations of politically-committed armed forces. Note that the U.S. and the opposition reject such talks, and are issuing ultimatums. They have made a calculation and set the value of the Maduro side in those terms as zero They are presenting (or bluffing) that the threat of their infinitely overwhelming armed power will make the Maduro government surrender without what would be an armed fight. It's the Maduro government that seeks talks, and understandably wants to avoid any scenario of civil war or armed conflict.
But, you call the bet, or you fold. Maduro may very well say "Let's talk" first, may want to buy some time to figure out how to confront the forces arrayed against him, but he better be prepared for the "f*ck off!" pretty quickly, because time is not on his side.
The economic siege will intensify, causing more pain to ordinary Venezuelans in their daily lives. That point of the "make the economy people scream" strategy is to wear people down and peel increasing numbers of them away from their support of the government and the Bolivarian program. Then, step in as the savior with "humanitarian" aid. Marxists would be foolish to dismiss the idea that material deprivation can degrade political commitment.
In order to overcome that pressure, the Bolivarian government will have to take control of the situation. Maduro must start at least persuasively demonstrating that he can change working-class Venezuelans' lives for the better without depending on the United States. That also requires taking more control of the economy. It means eliminating internal economic sabotage by local capitalists in distribution and production chains, and that certainly might necessitate expropriating capital property. It will definitely mean stricter capital controls. It also means changing the country's economic relations with the rest of the world-becoming less dependent on oil and on selling that oil to the U.S., and working with other countries to get free of the U.S.-controlled finance and payment systems.
All of that requires that there be a single clear voice speaking for the Venezuelan government. Like it or not, the Maduro government has to take back the initiative, and assert its control in that regard in every way.
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