26 Stanley I. Kunsler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War, Hill & Wang, New York, 1982, pp. 232234. The core issue of the pre-trial maneuvers was the constitutional right of the defense to call witnesses and produce evidence from North Korea and China to substantiate the BW claims. However, the US did not recognize the CCP as the legitimate government of China, and therefore had no "judicial assistance" agreement with China which would have permitted Chinese citizens to testify in US courts. This became a political football for the US government drop the charges against the Powells, or require the passport office to provide A.L. Wirin with an unrestricted passport to travel to China to collect depositions. See also: Neil L. O'Brien, An American Editor in Early Revolutionary China: John William Powell and the China Weekly/Monthly Review, Routledge, 2003, Chap. 11.
27 The prosecutor attempted to submit emotion-laden testimony from a POW which the defense objected was not relevant to the sedition charge. Judge Goodman sustained the objection explaining to the prosecutor that the evidence would sustain a guilty verdict of treason, but not sedition. Kunsler, op. cit., p. 238, and O'Brien, op.cit., pp. 279280.
36 Ibid., p. 125, Langer quotes H. Ridgely Warfield, director of Johns Hopkins Institute for Cooperative Research, and she quotes at great length Melvin Calvin, Nobel-prize winning professor of the University of California, Berkeley, member of the Board of Directors, Dow Chemical Co., manufacturer of napalm.
38 The effectiveness of the US BW claim is still debated. During the war, BW casualty figures were considered top secret war information by PVA and KPA command to prevent the US from appraising the effectiveness of the BW campaign. The casualty and mortality numbers have not been released by China and North Korea.
39 Nixon's 1969 statement renouncing all future biological weapons development in the US is quoted in: John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "The US Biological Weapons Program", Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds., Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006, p. 35.
40 Ed Regis provides an inventory of 10 BW pathogens and 6 deadly toxins kept in storage vaults for the CIA's private stock just prior to the 1972 Convention on BW. Ed Regis, Biology of Doom: the History of Americas Secret Germ Warfare Project, Henry Holt and Co. New York, 1999, pp. 211216.