| The Bush administration today is expected to
announce its reluctant endorsement of an “independent”
commission to investigate the intelligence flaws that led the US to
believe that Iraq possessed large stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons and an advanced nuclear capacity. However, in the
period before the war many intelligence experts had warned that Iraq
did not possess an active weapons’ program and that the Bush
administration was operating on spurious evidence.
According to press accounts, George W Bush will name the members
of the commission which, at first blush, must raise questions about
the purported independence of the organization. Additionally, the
press also reported that the investigative body was to be patterned
after the Warren Commission that led the investigation into the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. Many observers have questioned the
independence of the Warren Commission. The Commission ruled that Lee
Harvey Oswald, acting alone, shot and killed Kennedy and that Jack
Ruby had acted alone in the killing of Oswald. Many have considered
these findings dubious or at best incomplete.
However, the Bush administration’s specific claims of Iraq’s
possession of weapons of mass destruction do not even require this
process to be vetted. Many reputable intelligence officers and
analysts have already stated that the Bush administration was
intentionally selective in the intelligence claims it accepted and
quickly discarded contradictory information.
On February 24, 2003 MS-NBC reported that the CIA had warned the
Bush administration that there was “no direct evidence” that
Iraq had successfully reconstituted its banned weapons programs. The
CIA said in its semi-annual report on weapons proliferation that
Iraq may have possessed a “low-level theoretical” nuclear
program. While the assessment states that Iraq may have an active
program, there were no specific claims that supported the Bush
administration’s detailed assessment of the threat.
As former State Department official, Joseph Wilson recently told
Geov Parrish of Working for Change, “[I]t was important for the
international community to persuade itself that Saddam had been
effectively disarmed and to impose a monitoring program to ensure
that he didn't rearm, that was a legitimate international objective.
Now, the real question is whether you had to invade, conquer, and
occupy Baghdad in order to achieve that objective, and I think it's
clear that we didn't.”
Additionally, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
revealed earlier this year that the Pentagon’s Defense
Intelligence Agency released a report in 2002 that equally
questioned the credibility of intelligence on the state of Iraq’s
weapons. The report concluded that there was “no reliable
information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical
weapons, or where Iraq has - or will - establish its chemical
warfare agent production facilities.”
The assessment also suggests that the 1991 Gulf War and
subsequent inspections significantly affected Iraq’s ability to
rebuild its chemical arsenal. “[Iraq’s] ability for sustained
production of G-series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its
stockpile of key chemical precursors and by the destruction of all
known CW production facilities during Operation Desert Storm and
during subsequent UNSCOM inspections. In the absence of external
aid, Iraq will likely experience difficulties in producing nerve
agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert Storm.”
Moreover, the unclassified portion of the report includes
numerous caveats about its allegations and largely draws any
conclusions of the threat posed by Iraq not on intelligence but
based upon the previous behaviors of Saddam Hussein. In fact, the
report states frankly that “we lack any [direct] information”.
The Carnegie Center also reported that the State Department had
reservations about Intelligence in Iraq. The State Department's
Intelligence and Research Department wrote to the White House in
October 2002 that “[w]e lack specific information on many key
aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs.” The report also ranked among
its “low-confidence” findings whether Saddam Hussein would share
any banned weapons with al-Qaeda.
The report, none the less, largely tries to substantiate a risk
posed by Iraq based upon previous efforts by Hussein to develop and
use non-conventional weapons. However, a remarkable dissenting
opinion is voiced within the assessment. Under the title of
“Alternative View of Iraq’s Nuclear Program” that report
states that, “The activities that we have detected do not … add
up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing … an
integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons.”
Furthermore, Scott Ritter, the much maligned former UN weapons’
inspector, declared flatly that Iraq’s weapons’ capacity was
being overstated. In August 2002 he told the New York Daily News,
“They're [members of the Bush administration] lying to the
American people about Iraq's capacity.”
“[Chemical and biological programs] can no longer be viable
unless Iraq reconstituted a manufacturing facility, and there's no
evidence of that,” he added citing the fact that chemical and
biological weapons degrade over time.
Hans von Sponeck, the former UN Assistant Secretary General, said
in May 2001, “Iraq today is no longer a military threat to anyone.
Intelligence agencies know this. All the conjectures about weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq lack evidence.”
Finally, the UN weapons’ inspectors who were readmitted into
Iraq in 2002 found little to support the Bush administration’s
claims. In fact, Mohamed ElBaradei, the UN’s chief nuclear
inspector concluded the converse on March 7 2003. “At this stage,
the following can be stated: One, there is no indication of resumed
nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through
the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected
since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited
activities at any inspected sites. Second, there is no indication
that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990. Three, there
is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes
for use in centrifuge enrichment. After three months of intrusive
inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible
indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq,” he
told the UN Security Council.
Erik Sorensen, Editor in Chief, www.Republicons.org
and a journalist with 20 years professional experience in
investigative reporting. His work has been featured on KPFK,
Los Angeles and he is also the co-author of the recently published
book "The Bush Trinity: Consumerism Secrecy and Jesus
Christ" available from Cafe Press.
|