And even conservative
justices embrace unenumerated rights, evident in the 2010 holding that a
federal constitutional right of gun owners limited the power of states to regulate
guns. Unable to rely on the "right to bear arms" protection of the Second
Amendment, which limits only the federal government, McDonald's majority needed
to go beyond constitutional text to find specific meaning of general text for the
Fourteenth Amendment's very general limits on states.
That is, the
Bill of Rights--beginning with "Congress shall make no law"--was originally intended,
and has always been read, to impose restrictions only on the federal government,
not states (which the Court documented in 1833). With a few exceptions, such as
the prohibition of ex post facto laws, the 1788 Constitution generally did not
restrict the states in dealing with their inhabitants until the post-Civil-War
amendments, the Thirteenth through Fifteenth. The most-comprehensive of those,
the Fourteenth Amendment, limits states in terms much less particular than the
Second Amendment or most other Bill of Rights provisions. The Fourteenth
Amendment expressly prohibits states' only from denying "privileges or
immunities," "equal protection," or "life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." Thus forced to look outside text for the specifics of what
those general concepts mean, the Court's conservatives found in history and
tradition a fundamental constitutional right to possess guns, a liberty states
could not deny.
Accepting that
some inalienable rights must be identified through sources beyond original
constitutional text changes the tone of the debate, but not necessarily the outcomes--rational
grounds for conservative skepticism remain:
Liberal Stereotype: Abortion restrictions violate constitutional rights.
Conservative: Granted there are some unenumerated (extra-textual) rights, but declaring a right to control procreation displays too much discretion by unaccountable judges.Before elaborating the debate on limits of the judicial discretion necessary to interpret out constitution (part IV), I return to and debunk what most impairs discussion of such genuine issues even starting--the two myths, textual infallibility and strict construction.
II. Transcending Textual Infallibility, the
Popular Myth of Law in General
Many think that societies
can craft clear, complete, and coherent legal texts--statutes, constitutions, et
cetera, that anticipate all disputes without vagueness or inconsistency. That fallacy,
embraced by French revolutionaries, rejects our founding principles. One
aristocracy the French overthrew was judicial, and they hoped to subordinate future
judges to being mere automatons under new legal codes. Our revolutionaries,
instead, asserted rights of English citizens that independent judges had exercised
discretion to elaborate and protect for centuries. The French, having mistaken that
a new system could deprive judges of all power to "make law," failed to create such
an infallible code--mirroring prior failures of such attempts, including Justinian's
Sixth-Century codification of Roman law and Frederick II's 17,000-part Prussian
code. Unlike the French, our founders embraced the English model, in which
judges have articulated common law for nearly a millennium and for centuries
have exercised interpretive discretion to resolve the limitations of legislatively
codified law.
Reflective lawyers know uncertainty infects all legal
systems. And legal codes falter for many reasons, including the limits of language;
complexity of societies and human interactions; difficulty of foreseeing disputes
within complex societies; legislators' disagreement on how even foreseen issues
should resolve; and lawmakers' failure to understand and translate their intent
on issues into effective codes. History disproved the ideal of a system that
requires no future judicial elaboration, and the common law avoided the codification
fetish of civil law countries (most of the world). So the genius of the American
legal tradition springs not only from an innovative constitutional text but
also from continuing the common-law method and the independent role of judges
applying it.
That inherent need for legal texts to be interpreted
displays throughout our 1788 Constitution. The words "due process" alone never prescribe
what a hearing requires. "Equal protection" did not decide segregation cases. Nor
does "freedom of speech" tell when one may shout "fire." And "regulate Commerce
. . . among the several states" does not specify Congress's power with any precision.
Generations ago, the Court held that imposing labor standards on local
manufacturing that affected the national economy fell within that power. And similar
precedent established a scope of commerce power that, if closely followed, would
cover the Affordable Care Act.
Hard cases cannot be decided by "applying the
Constitution as written." Rather, they trigger the question of proper sources to
remedy textual shortcomings--should it be: outside evidence of original "public
meaning" of the text or of its ratifiers' intent? precedent? tradition? ideas
implied in the text? social facts? Where, not whether, to look beyond text is
the issue. Even liberal justices start interpretation with text; but no justice
ends there except in trivial cases.
III.
The Myth of Strict Construction; the Real Constitutional Status of Precedent
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