For instance, a registrant is required to submit ''the name and address of each facility at which, and all trade names under which, the registrant conducts business...'' (21 U.S.C. 350d(a)(2)).
Thus it is unclear whether Congress intended all individual private residences at which food is manufactured/processed, packed, or held to be included in the term ''facility.'' Furthermore, the requirement that a facility submit its ''name'' as well as its ''trade names'' raises a question as to whether Congress intended ''facility'' to include private individual residences since it is unlikely that a home would have a name or a trade name.
Where the words of the statute are ambiguous, an agency may make a reasonable Interpretation of the statute. Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984); Brown & Williamson, supra, at 132.
Consistent with the language of section 415(a)(2), the agency concludes that interpreting the term ''facility'' to exclude private individual residences is a reasonable construction for purposes of registration. This interpretation, however, does not necessarily preclude a reasonable construction of other provisions of the FD&C Act to include such residences. Judicial interpretation can change, and easily include residences.