Fahrenheit
9/11 and The Great Asymmetry
by
Siegfried Othmer, Ph.D.
OpEdNews.com
Stephen
Jay Gould, the late paleontologist, once wrote an essay for Science titled
“The Great Asymmetry.” It reflected on the fact that if an event
happened precipitously, it was likely to represent bad news. Good things
took time to happen. One could destroy the Alfred P. Murrah building in
the blinking of an eye, but it takes a long time to construct such a
building. The only exceptions to this dichotomy relates to information.
Discovering that an asteroid is bearing down on earth, we could suddenly
be issued the good news that it will miss us. Or an election could turn
out favorably for one’s cause. On the other hand, if the election
outcome was not a foregone conclusion, unhappiness with the outcome in the
community at large would nearly match happiness. Concrete events appear to
all fit the pattern suggested by Gould. Even intrinsically good things,
such as the discovery of the Salk vaccine against polio, take a long time
to become accepted, and to reach the point where they have a practical
impact.
There
is another asymmetry developing that may have even greater policy
implications. As our society progresses further in the direction of
globalization and in laissez faire capitalism, we are constructing
a system that is ever faster in its dissemination of information, and
faster in its financial and economic transactions. This is deemed to be an
unalloyed good, but in fact we are also building in hazards to ourselves.
Little attention is paid to the fact that our whole world-wide economic
system is operating as a kind of self-regulatory feedback system, one that
is quite capable of making excursions into major collective instability.
We got a preview of what is possible in the crash of the Asian Tigers, and
in the stock market collapse in 1987. The faster the reaction times of the
elements of the system, the greater the potential for a collective
excursion into instability. Once such an instability has been kindled, it
is very difficult to rein in.
Those
who are professionally engaged with the stability of control systems,
namely industrial, civil, and electronic engineers, and also architects,
are aware that this issue demands explicit attention. They are also aware
that the laws of nature are universal in this regard. The stability of
systems is something that can be investigated in its own right. Stability
criteria must be met in any enterprise of our own construction. Even those
who are aware of this issue can get it wrong, as we found out with the
collapse of the new wing of the Charles de Gaulle airport (absent any
provocation), and with the intrinsic instability of the Millennium Bridge
in London in 2000. One can also mention the much more dramatic collapse of
the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940.
The
other side of this asymmetry is that as the world becomes more complex,
the major constituents are less and less capable of acting collectively in
their mutual interest. There is a great need in particular to build up the
mechanisms of stabilization, to buffer the world community against sudden
collapse into an economic black hole, or excursion into the infrared
catastrophe of runaway inflation. But this problem is not yet even on the
public agenda. More ominous is our failure to act prospectively when the
danger is well recognized---for example, the terrorism threat.
One
of the most revealing moments of the film Fahrenheit 9/11 was the Florida
photo op of the President sitting in the second grade classroom on 9/11.
As I watched President Bush sitting passively for seven minutes after
having been told of the crash of the second airplane into the World Trade
Center, it became clear that he was completely unprepared for what he had
been told. Not knowing how to react, he decided to act as if nothing had
happened. I compare this to my own reaction on hearing radio reports about
9/11 as I was making my way to the airport in Edmonton, Alberta, for a
return flight to the states that never got off the ground. The first
flight into the towers reminded me of a much earlier such incident in
which a small plane flew into the Empire State Building. I treated it
initially as an ordinary news item. When news came of the second plane,
however, my whole physiology viscerally reacted. Thoughts raced. Scenarios
were played out in my mind. Every word over the radio was plumbed for
possible implications. Calmness at that moment was not in my inventory.
And I was sitting in an airport van in Alberta!
It is not possible for me to imagine how calmness was possible for
our President. The disconnect was palpable. The demands of a photo op had
the President rooted to his chair, utterly expressionless, and revealing
no productive mental activity.
Over
the last months, we have been wrangling over the issue of whether this
specific terrorist incident could have been anticipated by the
intelligence agencies. Much worse is the fact that we did not recognize
the event for what it was even after it happened. And the problem did not
just lie with the President, but with the whole administration, from the
White House staff to the FAA to the military.
To speak of preparedness in this case would be to exercise one’s
imagination.
If
this state of preparedness is what one may expect of our government when a
threat is known and anticipated, how much worse when the threat is
ambiguous and remote, such as in the case of global warming and other
climate change, the coming decline of the oil age, the threat of
opportunistic viral infections of epidemic proportions, the danger of
ecological catastrophe, and the hazard of economic runaway conditions. We
are witness to a colossal inability of our government to take anticipatory
action in pursuit of long-term societal objectives. We are incapable of
incorporating long-term cost-benefit considerations into policy.
So
the second great asymmetry is that as our world more fully becomes a
global village, through information, economic and people exchange, the
potential for collective excursions into calamity increases at the same
time that the collective means for anticipating events and for preventive
action is diminished. The short-term orientation of capital markets has
already been widely lamented. By recruiting the instrumentalities of
government more exclusively to their purposes, the economic centers of
power spread the contagion of short-term thinking across our society. Add
to this the propensity of the press to concern itself only with current
events, and the inevitable uncertainties we have about our societal future
are compounded needlessly. Beyond the propensity to cover events rather
than process is the new willingness of the media to serve as mouthpieces
for the economic elite, which results with potential problems that are
submerged until they reach crisis level.
One
recent scientific advance enables us to understand interacting systems
through the analysis of networks. It is becoming understood how easily
interacting systems move into oscillatory behavior, and for oscillatory
behavior to escalate until it hits up against natural (read external)
boundaries. On the good side, we can see our economic systems giving rise
to the formation of new networks of various kinds, and on various scales.
An ecological argument can be made that the proliferation of such systems
contributes to complexity, and complexity in living communities
contributes to stability. At another level, however, when we consider how
these networks interact with information, the overall propensity may be
for them to contribute to destabilization under any kind of unusual and
sudden challenge—to the equivalent of a seizure or disabling migraine of
the body politic. The fact that networks contribute to economic stability
in good times, under “laminar flow” conditions within the economy,
gives false assurances. Their contribution to a potential instability—to
turbulence—must be explicitly assessed before it is experienced.
Grover
Norquist wants to shrink government to the point where it can be drowned
in a bathtub. Well before that happens, we will encounter destabilizing
events that only governments can manage. We have seen precursors of this
in the Savings and Loan crisis, among
other such events. So one may ask, where are the economists to be found at
this moment? They seem to be cheerleading the approach of our economic
system toward the precipice of instability. Paraphrasing what John Kenneth
Galbraith said about economists: “We can be thankful that we are never
held accountable for malpractice.” The failure of economists to build
stability into our economic affairs overtly, and the failure to recognize
that it takes government to do so, constitutes flagrant malpractice. The
failure of economists to raise this issue to prominent debate in public
policy is a dereliction of responsibility. Economists also seem to have
been recruited as acolytes of our emerging plutocracy, and they may end up
serving as its pallbearers.
Finally,
we return to the issue of terrorism. The great asymmetry is bad enough
when we face the uncertainties of natural developments such as epidemics,
global warming, meteorite impacts, and ecosystem collapse. In terrorism we
face an adversary that is deliberately trying to induce instability into
our affairs. The attack on the World Trade Center took advantage of
weaknesses existing in our defenses. Such weaknesses are everywhere. What
does one plan for? This is where the great asymmetry has frightening
implications. Significantly, our adversary has also “evolved” in the
perspective of the science of networks to achieve a status that is least
subject to disruption. At the same time that our vulnerability to
cataclysmic events is escalating, our adversary is increasing in
resistance to extinction. There seems to be no alternative but to raise
the issue of the stability of institutions to the first rank of our
concerns. Unfortunately there is no glory in this task. There will be no
accolades for calamities forestalled. We simply have to do it.
Siegfried
Othmer, Ph.D.
www.eeginstitute.com
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