What Will We Do Then? The day After We Strike Iran

What Will We Do Then? The Day After We Strike Iran By Gary Leupp  "Counterpunch"

Let us suppose that the Bush-Cheney administration answers the neocons’ prayer and does indeed bomb Iran sometime soon. The plan apparently involves more than the destruction of nuclear facilities, replicating Israel’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. (That attack, by the way was condemned by the whole world, including a furious President Ronald Reagan).

It includes an all-out assault on the Iranian political and religious leadership. Government buildings and officials’ residences will be targeted, guaranteeing collateral damage. Since Iran is a highly complex society, and its government widely unpopular, there may well be some local support for a “shock and awe” campaign.

We know that the administration has cultivated ties with the Mujahadeen Khalq (even though they remain on the State Department’s terrorist list) and the Pakistan-based Balochi separatist group Jundallah (the Party of God). These among other organizations will get their marching orders amid the “creative chaos” produced by the attack.

There can be no large deployment of U.S. troops in Iran, unless they evacuate from Afghanistan and Iraq, which is unlikely. I doubt that administration plans for the construction of a post-attack Iranian polity are any more sophisticated than their plans for post-Taliban Afghanistan or occupied Iraq.

Some have suggested that the neocons’ goal is actually to plunge the Muslim Middle East into prolonged pandemonium, insuring that all foes of Israel are off-balance and terrorized by the might of Israel’s protector for generations to come.

“Neocons,” writes Paul Craig Roberts, “have convinced themselves that nuking Iran will show the Muslim world that Muslims have no alternative to submitting to the will of the US government.”

They are “total Islamophobes” who believe that “Islam must be deracinated and the religion destroyed. . .” Others note that Cheney is obsessed with the imagined threat of a rising China and the need to establish permanent U.S. bases in Central and Southwest Asia to “contain” the world’s most populous nation.

The desire to control the flow of oil, the urge to check China, the passionate drive to destroy Israel’s enemies (alongside this neocon Islamophobia) are all reflected in U.S. foreign policy since 9-11. Surely a lot of Iranians know this. And they can look over their northern border into Afghanistan and their western border into Iraq and see what disaster U.S. imperialism has wrought in these neighboring countries.

Bush calls them “democracies” and boasts of having gifted them with the universally applicable model pioneered by America’s founding fathers. But I’d imagine Iranians seeing in Afghanistan a regime dominated by warlords more reactionary than their own mullahs, resisted by an equally reactionary resurgent Taliban.

In Iraq they find an emerging regime under the strong influence of conservative Shiite Muslim clerics in an unusual alliance with U.S. occupation forces. Many young Iranians chafing under Islamic law might consider this a step backwards for Iraq, which under the despised Saddam had at least been a secular society. The Iraqi puppet government is of course far weaker than the one in Tehran, and humiliatingly dependent upon the invaders who cannot provide a modicum of security while they demand oil concessions.

So I would think that the Iranian survivors of this planned criminal assault would not appreciate it. Rather, they will resent it deeply, especially if it produces numerous civilian casualties.

As Roberts suggests, the neocons believe that the Iranian people and Muslims around the world will be so terrified that they will capitulate to all U.S. demands and the U.S. will be better able to attain its geopolitical objectives without the use of unacceptable numbers of ground troops.

I have to wonder about this. Perhaps the neocons suppose that there will be no resistance from a shocked and awed Iranian population as America’s Iranian allies---a mix of quasi-left guerrillas, terrorist separatists, monarchists and exiles---create a provisional government.

They may underestimate the social base of the present Iranian government, the sincerity of popular opposition to U.S. policy in the world, the depth of Iranian nationalism and national pride at the accomplishments of the nuclear power program. They probably underestimate the outrage an attack will cause, in Iran and everywhere. Perhaps they overestimate the power of their weapons. The neocons know that nuclear weapons (even dire predictions about nuclear attack) produce fear---and that frightened people may voluntarily give up much of their freedom.

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