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[Note for TomDispatch Readers: And I do mean readers! A TomDispatch "library" of four popular new books is taking shape for fall 2010. The first is The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo ... Whoops, sorry... I meant, of course, my own thriller, The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's, which the U.S. military has been insistent about publicizing these last months (see below); the second, Chalmers Johnson's Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope, has just gotten a superb review in Foreign Policy Journal ; the third, Nick Turse's The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan, lays out the option that's never on the table when "all options are on the table" in Washington (see below again); and the fourth is Andrew Bacevich's bestselling Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War. All four are connected, some more intimately than others, to this site. All four add up to a view of how our Pentagon-heavy American world now works. All four should be on your bookshelf. And by the way, every time you click on a TomDispatch book link and buy something at Amazon.com, we get a small cut of your purchase (at no cost to you). It's a great way to support this website. While I'm at it, let me offer a deep bow to all TomDispatch readers who have become recurring contributors to this site. Your regularly arriving donations are a real factor in our survival. I wish I could thank each of you individually, but consider this my thanks to all of you at once! Tom]
The War Addicts
2016 and Then Some
By Tom Engelhardt
Sometimes it's the little things in the big stories that catch your eye. On Monday, the Washington Post ran the first of three pieces adapted from Bob Woodward's new book Obama's Wars, a vivid account of the way the U.S. high command boxed the Commander-in-Chief into the smallest of Afghan corners. As an illustration, the Post included a graphic the military offered President Obama at a key November 2009 meeting to review war policy. It caught in a nutshell the favored "solution" to the Afghan War of those in charge of fighting it -- Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Petraeus, then-Centcom commander, General Stanley McChrystal, then-Afghan War commander, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, among others.
Labeled "Alternative Mission in Afghanistan," it's a classic of visual wish fulfillment. Atop it is a soaring green line that represents the growing strength of the notoriously underwhelming "Afghan Forces," military and police, as they move toward a theoretical goal of 400,000 -- an unlikely "end state" given present desertion rates. Underneath that green trajectory of putative success is a modest, herky-jerky blue curving line, representing the 40,000 U.S. troops Gates, Petraeus, Mullen, and company were pressuring the president to surge into Afghanistan.
The eye-catching detail, however, was the dating on the chart. Sometime between 2013 and 2016, according to a hesitant dotted white line (that left plenty of room for error), those U.S. surge forces would be drawn down radically enough to dip somewhere below -- don't gasp -- the 68,000 level. In other words, three to six years from now, if all went as planned -- a radical unlikelihood, given the Afghan War so far -- the U.S. might be back close to the force levels of early 2009, before the President's second surge was launched. (When Obama entered office, there were only 31,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.)
And when would those troops dwindle to near zero? 2019? 2025? The chart-makers were far too politic to include the years beyond January 1, 2016, so we have no way of knowing. But look at that chart and ask yourself: Is there any doubt that our high command, civilian and military, were dreaming of, and most forcefully recommending to the president, a forever war -- one which the Office of Budget and Management estimated would cost almost $900 billion?
Of course, as we now know, the military "lost" this battle. Instead of the 40,000 troops they desired, they "only" got 30,000 from a frustrated president (plus a few thousand support troops the Secretary of Defense was allowed to slip in, and some special operations forces that no one was putting much effort into counting, and don't forget those extra troops wrung out of NATO as well as small allies who, for a price, couldn't say no -- all of which added up to a figure suspiciously close to the 10,000 the president had officially denied his war commanders).
When, on December 1, 2009, Barack Obama addressed the cadets of West Point and, through them, the rest of us to announce the second surge of his presidency, he was at least able to slip in a date to begin a drawdown of U.S. forces. ("But taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.") Hardly a nanosecond passed, however, before -- first "on background" and soon enough in public -- administration spokespeople rushed to reassure the rest of Washington that such a transfer would be "conditions based." Given conditions there since 2001, not exactly a reassuring statement.
Meanwhile, days before the speech, Afghan war commander McChrystal was already hard at work stretching out the time of the drawdown date the president was still to announce. It would, he claimed, begin "sometime before 2013." More recently, deified new Afghan War commander General David Petraeus has repeatedly assured everyone in sight that none of this drawdown talk will add up to a hill of beans.
More, Never Less
Let's keep two things in mind here: just how narrow were the options the president considered, and just how large was the surge he reluctantly launched. By the end of the fall of 2009, it was common knowledge in Washington that the administration's fiercely debated Afghan War "review" never considered a "less" option, only ones involving "more." Now, thanks to Woodward, we can put definitive numbers to those options. The least of the "more" options was Vice President Biden's "counterterrorism-plus" strategy, focused on more trainers for the Afghan military and police plus more drone attacks and Special Forces operations. It involved a surge of 20,000 U.S. troops. According to Woodward, the military commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense more or less instantly ruled this out.
The military's chosen option was for those 40,000 troops and an emphasis on counterinsurgency. Between them lay a barely distinguishable 30,000-35,000 option. The only other option mentioned during the review process involved a surge of 85,000, and it, too, was ruled out by the military because troops in that quantity simply weren't available. This, then, was the full "range" of debate in Washington about the Afghan War. No wonder the president, according to Woodward, exclaimed in anger, "So what's my option? You have given me one option."
It's also important to remember that this round of surgification involved a lot more than those 30,000 troops and various add-ons. After all, the "president" -- and when you read Woodward, you do wonder whether a modern president isn't, in many ways, simply a prisoner of Washington -- also managed to surge CIA personnel, triple State Department, USAID, and other civilian personnel, and expand the corps of private contractors.
Perhaps more significant, that December the president and his key advisors set the Af/Pak War -- to use the new term of that moment -- on an ever widening gyre. Among other things, that escalation included a significant acceleration in U.S. base-building activity which has yet to end; a massive increase in the CIA's drone war over the Pakistani tribal borderlands (a quadrupling of attacks since the last year of the Bush administration, including at least 22 attacks launched this September, the most yet in a month); a recent uptick in Air Force bombing activity over Afghanistan (which General McChrystal actually cut back for a while), an increase in Special Operations activity throughout Afghanistan; and an increase in border crossings into Pakistan.