The "Kyiv Post's" Survey of German Experts on Ukraine IV: Alexander Rahr

[This expert survey was conducted in May-June 2011, i.e. before the trial and arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko, and later partly updated. Abridged versions of the expert interviews were previously published on the website of Ukraine's major English-language weekly "Kyiv Post."] 

Alexander Rahr is Program Director of the Berthold Beitz Center for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). He is also the coordinator of the DGAP Research Institute's EU-Russia Forum. Before joining the Council in 1994, he had studied history and political science at Munich, and was a senior analyst at the Research Institute of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Munich as well as project manager at the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies, Cologne. He has worked as a consultant for the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, and is member of the executive board of Yalta European Strategy (YES).

At the beginning of 2011, Reporters Without Borders put Ukraine 42 places lower in its annual classification of freedom of the press -- placing the country just behind Iraq , with a world ranking of 131. And the NGO listed numerous cases of physical attacks on journalists, censorship, and political pressure on the media. Freedom House placed Ukraine in the category of "partially free" countries (whereas it had until then been classified as a "free country") as a result of less press freedom, electoral fraud and the judiciary's loss of independence. On April 27, 2011 , Freedom House declared " Ukraine ["]has become less democratic and, if current trends are left unchecked, may head down a path toward autocracy and kleptocracy." This is the difference between 2005 and now.

2. Should the EU use the Association, DCFTA and Visa-Free Regime negotiations as a leverage and conditionality factor to promote political and other reforms in Ukraine, or should these agreements be signed as soon as possible?

Ukraine's oligarchs reportedly support the DCFTA the signing of which is currently threatened by chilly relations between Kyiv and Brussels. If Tymoshenko is criminally charged, the EU's relations with Ukraine will resemble those Brussels has with Belarus and Russia. This is because persecution of Tymoshenko would be seen as politically targeted repression. The current authorities are not impartial and are themselves not free from potential charges of abuse of office. Brussels will change its stance toward Ukraine because Tymoshenko is symbolic as the candidate who received 45 percent (11.6 million votes) in the second round of the 2010 presidential election. Unfortunately in Ukraine as well as in Russia and Belarus, there is no tolerance of the opposition. And those who come to power immediately begin to denounce and seek to destroy their opponents. This has nothing to do with democracy. Yushchenko never undertook repression of Yanukovych and the Kuchma authorities. No serious criminal charges for the organizers of the election fraud denounced by a December 3, 2004, Supreme Court ruling were ever launched, and Yanukovych to this day claims his allegedly free election was thwarted by a "U.S.-sponsored coup."

3. Could and should the current pro-Russian German position be replaced by a pro-Ukrainian position? To which degree may domestic political changes in Germany play a role for its future Eastern policy positions?

Germany has seen that Yanukovych's first year in office featured numerous protests from the opposition, journalists, academics, students, feminists, and businesspeople. The German business community may be interested in doing business with Ukraine's oligarchs, who have remained silent on democratic regression, and they rarely reveal their views to the media. Yet, a Putinist regime which has co-opted, exiled, or imprisoned oligarchs is not likely to be something Germany would welcome. German leaders would not restrict their relations with Ukraine's opposition, but identify and lobby those oligarchs who could be potential allies in halting Ukraine's drift toward Putinism. Ukraine's leaders seem to be intent on moving forward with their plans to establish a "managed democracy," one aspect of which is the removal of the main opposition force led by Tymoshenko. The Yanukovych administration's members' apparent belief that they can successfully merge Putinism with European integration is fatally flawed, and the pending crisis in relations between Brussels and Kyiv in the next two years will dwarf the dilemma faced by the Germans over the failure of its "Ostpolitik".

Ukraine proposed to transform Ukraine's gas transportation network, consisting of large and small gas pipelines stretching for 37,000 km , into a tripartite gas consortium. In addition to Ukrainian companies, it will include Russian and German firms, with each party having a 30% share in the consortium. The idea of establishing such a consortium may be interesting for German investors. The tripartite consortium could jointly modernize Ukraine's pipeline network and subsequently exercise joint control over gas transit to Europe. Had the consortium been established earlier, those past ill-fated gas conflicts could have been avoided. In response to Ukraine's attempts to use its monopoly transit position for political purposes, Russia undertook the construction of pipelines bypassing Ukraine and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Nord Stream pipeline laid across the bottom of the Baltic Sea is nearing completion. Yanukovych immediately realized that the new pipeline would seriously undermine Ukraine's role in gas transit to Europe. Ukraine's budget depends heavily on revenue generated by gas transit. Therefore, when coming to power, Yanukovych tried to persuade Russia to, at least, abandon plans to build the South Stream pipeline. In return, the struggling Ukrainian leader offered Russia a concession for the management of the Ukrainian gas transportation network, in addition to the opportunity of supplying gas directly to Ukrainian consumers. He wants Germany top help him to convince Russia to change her mind.

Yanukovych wants to improve the image of Ukraine in the West -- showing that the current investigation of Tymoshenko is not politically motivated. It was announced one day before allowing a visit of Ms. Tymoshenko to Brussels in March, lifting her travel ban. Ukraine has taken over the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which puts it in the spotlight. Yanukovych wants to divert attention from political demonstrations against social problems and against the politics of the government (demonstrations by teachers, against the tax code etc.) and to take "revenge" against Kuchma. Kuchma, during the Orange Revolution, refused to declare a state of emergency and inaugurate Yanukovych, thus making a peaceful solution possible. He wants to exert pressure on politicians, especially Speaker of Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn, who is also implicated in the tapes.

Ukraine is among those European countries which have been hit the hardest by the economic downturn. Industrial production and exports have fallen by 40% and inflation has increased by 20%. The previous government was guilty of doing nothing and failed to implement the required reforms to ensure a better functioning of the market economy and rule of law. The country has an enormous foreign debt, owing $35 billion to Western nations and Russia. As a result, it cannot pay for expensive Russian gas without resorting to Western loans. In addition, in the past, Ukraine did nothing to diversify its energy sector. Many Western experts believe it is almost a miracle that Ukraine has avoided a default. Nevertheless, the danger of a national bankruptcy remains, and there is a possibility of Ukraine becoming Europe's second Greece. Given Ukraine's geopolitical significance, the West provided Kiev with more assistance over recent months than it did to other countries that found themselves in a difficult financial situation. The International Monetary Fund loaned Ukraine $16 billion. This has happened despite Kiev's failure to comply with the loan conditions due to the difficult social situation in the country. Viktor Yanukovych is short on time. The new government has to make very important and painful decisions in the coming months in order to salvage the country's budget. Yanukovych has very limited space to maneuver. Ukraine, which lacks natural resources, has scanty financial resources of its own. Therefore, Yanukovych has to rely on external assistance, or to be more precise -- assistance from Russia . Kiev can no longer count on the benevolence of its "strategic partner" as has often been the case in the past. Russia will dictate its own terms to Ukraine . The EU membership is not realistic today.

7. Do you think Tymoshenko's arrest will affect the signing of an association agreement between Ukraine and the EU?

Yulia Timoshenko's arrest will not reduce the intentions of the EU to integrate Ukraine into the EU. European politicians are pragmatic in this sense and Timoshenko's case will not abandon negotiations concerning the association agreement. The West doesn't want Ukraine to come closer to Russia . Yanukovych's image will not suffer because of the arrest because many do not believe he is directly connected to it.

Olena Tregub is a GMAP student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Medford, Mass., and works as a freelance journalist, in Washington, DC, and Kyiv, Ukraine.