The "Kyiv Post's" Survey of German Experts on Ukraine XI: Winfried Schneider-Deters

Winfried Schneider-Deters graduated from Heidelberg University in economics, and is a political analyst living in Germany. For thirty years, he served as director of various bilateral and regional cooperation projects of Friedrich Ebert Foundation in South America , South Korea , Eastern Germany , Central Asia and in the Southern Caucasus -- and, from 1996 to 2000, in Ukraine . In Germany, he is a frequent commentator on contemporary Ukrainian affairs.

Within a few weeks after his inauguration President Yanukovych succeeded in monopolizing executive and legislative power in his hands, establishing (what he calls) an "effective government", what in reality, however, is a   "presidential regime" -- implemented by constitutionally questionable methods at the expense of democratic principles.

With Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) and Government (the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers) under his control, President Yanukovych is in a position to initiate and enforce reforms that the previous, "orange" leadership was incapable of implementing. But the reform laws which have so far been passed by Parliament, that is to say, by the ruling Party of Regions, are defecient (as for example the law "On the judicial system and the status of judges" and the law "On state procurement") -- or serve only to concentrate power in the hands of President Yanukovych (as the so called "adminstrative reform" or the various changes to the law "On the Cabinet of ministers").

There are two major reasons, why the "orange" leadership was so ineffective -- an objective one, and a personal one: The objective reason: The "political reform", that is to say the constitutional changes of 2004, failed to transform Ukraine into a parliamentary democracy, but created a defective, contradictory "hybrid" parliamentary-presidential system of government with a dual executive. The paralyzing competition between the President and the Prime minister was thus pre-programmed. The subjective factor was personal jealousy and political incompetence of President Yushchenko. Motivated by personal jealousy President Yushchenko instigated an internal opposition within the "orange camp" against Prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and discredited her within and outside the country. Through his political incompetence President Yushchenko resurrected Yanukovych from his political grave (e.g. through the Universal of National Unity of September 16th, 2006 ) and enabled the Party of Regions to regain political strength. He thus created a stand-off between the (split) "orange camp" and the "reactionary" opposition forces in Parliament. As a result, it became impossible for Prime minister Tymoshenko to govern effectively.

The EU faces a dilemma: If it tries to use these negotiations as a leverage to compel the Yanukovych regime into respecting democratic principles it drives Ukraine into the open arms of Moscow, that is to say, into the "Eurasian" Customs Union and the "Single Economic Space". If, on the other hand, the EU does not insist on the respect of these principles in Ukraine, it compromises its fundamental "European" values in dealing with the Yanukovych regime.  

I think, the Association Agreement including the DCFTA as well as an agreement on a visa-free regime should be signed as soon as possible, because the EU will have more influence in Ukraine in general and on the regime in Kiev in particular once Ukraine forms part of the internal market and other regulatory mechanisms of the EU. Nevertheless, Brussels should constantly remind the Yanukovych regime that the EU is not only an economic community, but also a community of political values. If Ukraine strives for full membership in the EU, democracy has to be firmly rooted in the country.  

Germany's present "Russia first" policy does not necessarily imply a subordinate policy towards Ukraine. Germany should pursue a "Greater Europe" policy aimed at creating a "pan-European" supra-structure, which comprises the European Union and the Russian Federation, that is to say, a pan-European economic community (beginning with a pan-European Free Trade Area) -- and a pan-European security architecture.

Simultaneously Germany should support Ukraine's aspiration to full membership in the EU. At present, Ukraine constitutes a power vacuum between the European Union and the Russian Federation. If the EU does not integrate Ukraine then Russia will fill this vacuum with her "presence" -- economically and politically. Only as a member of the EU can Ukraine preserve its political sovereignty and national identity; as a member of Moscow's "Eurasian" integration project Ukraine will be "overwhelmed" by Russia -- economically, politically and culturally.

The recognition of Russia as "the other Europe" and the formation of a pan-European architecture with "undivided security" and a common economy will induce Moscow to renounce its pretention to "priviledged interests" in Ukraine and to acquiesce to Ukraine's membership in the European Union. Ukraine's abandonment of NATO-Membership removed a stumbling block on the road to the formation of a "Greater Europe".

I don't see any fundamental differences in the positions of the various political parties represented in the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament). Therefore a change of government in Berlin will not result in a change of Germany's (shortsighted) "Ostpolitik".

One has to distinguish between "Ukraine" (the country and its people) and the political party in power. The regime of President Yanukovych cannot change its image in Germany for the better, because this would mean a fundamental change of its character. The "presidential government" of Yanukovych is in its essence autocratic -- hiding behind a formally democratic façade.

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