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predator drone by unknown
"A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm." -- Isaac Asimov's "First Law of Robotics"
Among the most intriguing questions that modern technology poses is the extent to which inanimate machines might be capable of replacing human beings in combat and warfare. The very idea of armies of robots has a certain appeal, even though "The Terminator" and "I, Robot", have raised challenging questions related to the capacity for machine mentality and the prospect that, once they've attained a certain level of intelligence, these machines might turn against those who designed and built them to advance their own "interests", if, indeed, such a thing is possible. In an earlier article, "Intelligence vs. Mentality: Important but Independent Concepts" (1997), for example, I have argued that, while machines may well be described as "intelligent" because of the plasticity of behavior they can display in response to different programs, they are not the possessors of minds and therefore may be capable of simulating human intelligence but not of its possession .
From a philosophical point of view, there are at least three perspectives that could be brought to bear upon the use of the specific form of digital technology known as "predator drones", which are pilot-less aircraft that can be deployed with the capacity to project lethal force --perhaps most commonly, by missile attacks, primarily -- with or without any intervention by human minds. The first is that of metaphysics, in particular, from the perspective of the kinds of things they are, especially with respect to the question of autonomy. The second is that of epistemology, in particular, the question of the kind of knowledge that can be obtained about their reliability on missions. And the third is that of axiology, in particular, the moral questions that arise from their use as killing machines, where, as I shall suggest, there is an inherent tension between the first and the third of these perspectives, which is considerably compounded by the second.
As a former artillery officer, I can appreciate the use of weapons that are capable of killing at a distance with considerable anonymity about those who are going to be killed. In traditional warfare, artillery has been used to attack relatively well-defined military targets, but has not infrequently been accompanied by civilian casualties, which today are often referred to as "collateral damage". An intermediate species of killing machine arises from the use of controlled drones, where human minds are an essential link in the causal chains that produce their intentional lethal effects. The use of predator drones, of course, is distinct from surveillance drones in this respect, because surveillance drones can acquire information without bringing about death or devastation. Without those capacities, however, there would be scant purpose in the deployment of predator drones, the existence of which is predicated upon their function as killing machines.
Ontology and Autonomy
The important metaphysical -- more precisely, ontological -- question that arises within this context is the applicability of the concept of autonomy to inanimate machines. The traditional philosophical conception related to issues of moral responsibility concerns whether arguments by analogy apply. Moral responsibility for human actions typically requires a certain basic capacity for rationality of action and rationality of belief, combined with an absence of coercion and of constraint. When humans are unable to form rational beliefs (responsive to the information available to them, because they are paranoid) or take rational actions (which promote their motives based upon their beliefs, because they are neurotic), they may be exonerated from moral responsibility for their actions. Similarly, when their actions are affected by coercion (by means of threats) or constraints (by being restrained), degrees of responsibility may require adjudication.
While human actions result from a causal interaction of motives, beliefs, ethics, abilities and capabilities, counterparts for predator drones do not appear to exist except in an extended or figurative sense. If capabilities represent the absence of factors that inhibit their abilities from being exercised -- as is the case when they cannot fly because their batteries need recharging -- then their incapacity to perform their intended tasks could not be said to be their own responsibility. But insofar as they are designed and built to conform to the programs that control them, it is difficult to suppose that analogies with humans properly apply. Since analogies are faulty when (a) there are more differences than similarities, (b) when there are few but crucial differences, or (c) when their conclusions are treaded as certain rather than merely probable, absent mentality, it is difficult to conclude that they are capable of the possession of beliefs, motives, or morality.
From the perspective of epistemology, the kind of knowledge that can be acquired about these machines is not akin to that of pure mathematics, which acquires certainty at the expense of their content, but rather than of applied mathematics, which acquires its content at the expense of its certainty. The complex causal interaction between software, firmware, and hardware makes the performance of these systems both empirical and uncertain as the product of evaluating their success in use against the properties of their design. If they are not engineered in accordance with the appropriate specifications, for example, then the result of their deployment can be fraught with hazard. The reliability of these systems in delivering their lethal force to appropriate targets can be completely unknown without testing and study, where the conditions of their use in Iraq and Afghanistan makes their probability of success unpredictable.
Epistemology and Targeting
The most serious problems with their deployment, however, arise from the criteria for determining the targets against which they are properly deployed. In the language of artillery, sometimes targets are designated as "free fire" zones, where any human within that vicinity is considered to be a legitimate target. That works when the enemy is clearly defined and geographically prescribed. In the case of guerrilla (or "irregular") warfare, however, there are neither uniforms to identify the enemy nor territorial boundaries to distinguish them, as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, where virtually any group of individuals, no matter how innocuous they may turn out to be, tends to be regarded as "fair game" for drone attack. In military language, of course, it's all readily excusable as "collateral damage".
How many wedding parties are we going to take out because the drone saw group behavior that it had been programmed to hit? How often do we have sufficient information to know that we are actually targeting insurgents and not innocents? Surely I am not alone in finding our actions repugnant when I read, "Over 700 killed in 44 drone strikes in 2009" taking out 5 intended targets --140 to 1 -- and 123 civilians were killed for 3 al-Qaeda in January 2010. The headlines are ubiquitous: "CIA chief in Pakistan exposed. Top spy received death threats; U.S. drones kill 54", Wisconsin State Journal (18 December 2010), where the American government claims, just as it did in Vietnam, that every dead body was a "suspected militant": none were innocent men, women, or children. Even The Washington Post (21 February 2011) seems to perceive that something is wrong with killing so many people and hitting so few targets.
We are now invading Pakistani airspace in our relentless determination to take out those who oppose us. From the point of view of the countries that we have invaded and occupied, they might be more aptly described as "freedom fighters". Since we invaded these countries in violation of international law, the UN Charter and the US Constitution, we appear to be committing crimes against humanity . And the risk posed by our own technology is now extending to the USA itself. A recent article found in Software 26th August 2010 12:26 GMT , "ROBOT KILL-CHOPPER GOES ROGUE above Washington DC!" by Lewis Page, describes a perceived threat to the nation's capitol as attributable to "software error". No deaths resulted from this infraction, but perhaps the next time a mistake of this kind will lead to the deaths of members of Congress or of "The First Family" on a picnic outing in the Rose Garden, which will make for spectacular headlines. Yet we don't even pause to ask ourselves, "What's wrong with collateral damage?"
Morality and Methodology
We cannot know whether or our conduct or that of our machines is moral or not unless we know the nature of morality. The answer depends upon which theory of morality is correct. There are many claimants to that role, including subjective theories, family-value theories, religious-based theories, and culture-related theories, according to which "an action is right" when you (your family, your religion, or your culture) approve of it. So if you (your family, your religion, or your culture) approve of incest, cannibalism, or sacrificing virgins to appease the gods, such actions cannot be immoral, if one of these theories is true. All these approaches make morality a matter of power, where right reduces to might . If someone approves of killing, robbing, or raping you, then you have no basis to complain on the ground that those actions are immoral, if subjectivism is correct. Similarly for family, religion, and culture-based alternatives. Every person, every family, every religion, and very culture is equal, regardless of their practices, if such theories are true. They thus embody the principle that "might makes right".
As James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (1999), has explained, on any of these accounts, the very ideas of criticism, reform, or progress in matters of morality no longer apply. If attitudes about right and wrong differ or change, if that is all there is to it, even when they concern your life, liberty, or happiness. If some person, family, or group has the power to impose their will upon you, then these theories afford you no basis to complain. While Rachels is correct, as far as he goes, I have sought to establish objective criteria for arbitrating between moral theories that parallel those we have for scientific theories, including the clarify and precision of their language, their scope of application for the purpose of explanation and of prediction, their respective degrees of empirical support, and the simplicity (or economy or elegance) with which that degree if systematic power is attained. And, indeed, as I explain in detail in The Evolution of Intelligence (2005) and in Render Unto Darwin (2007), there do appear to be parallel criteria of adequacy for moral theories.
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