A small number of commentators were quick to point out the initial errors committed in a hastily prepared, strategically flawed and morally indefensible operation meant essentially to impress domestic audiences. As time went on, the sequence of strategic, political and psychological errors became increasingly evident even to some of the traditionally "obedient" mainstream international media, while those who had the dubious privilege of being physically close to the events could easily observe how the leaders of the operation themselves were swiftly becoming victims of their own propaganda.
As the drumbeat of wilfully misleading slogans rolled on, and words of advice were either scorned or ignored, the inevitability of disaster loomed ever closer, and yet no concrete, credible steps were taken to modify the situation and to give -- albeit belatedly -- an aura of credibility and legitimacy to the foreign presence on Afghan soil.
One the one hand, of course, ISAF and NATO military forces are still on the scene, and in considerable numbers. There has never, however, been a coherent political agenda for them, and now all energies appear directed at hastening their departure. These are the forces, it has to be remembered, who repeatedly assured world public opinion that the enemy was "on the run".
In the course of the long occupation -- perhaps the longest in post-colonial history -- one of the most important tasks for the NATO forces and their civilian collaborators was to have been "reconstruction" (hence the creation of several "PRT's" or "Provincial Reconstruction Teams", sagely distributed throughout the Afghan territory). There have been some modest, yet encouraging successes on a local level, but the formation and training of Afghan military, police and security forces has had lamentable results, and there will lie the core of most future problems.
The Afghan Government certainly has a vital role to fulfil, and there can be no doubt of the fact that a number of Afghans -- men and women -- have rallied in good faith to serve their country, either in Parliament or in public positions which have often put them at risk. Legitimate doubts can be expressed, however, on the capacity, the competence or even the real political will of Afghan ruling political forces to undertake their difficult and potentially dangerous mission, once the foreign military presence will no longer be there to give them protection and assistance. There is ample and justified reason to worry about the safety of those -- particularly women - who have attempted to serve their Country, for they will be considered as "collaborators" by future administrations.
The third actor, of course, is the "Insurgency". Who the insurgents really are, whom do they represent and what are their real numbers are all unanswerable questions. It would be much more encouraging if a real insurgent force could be identified, with credible leadership from whom, even at this late stage, specific guarantees could be asked for the future.
As things appear to stand now, the alternatives to a renewed civil war in Afghanistan are rapidly diminishing, and the allied efforts should concentrate on attempts either to prevent this outcome or to limit its deadly results, rather than on the elimination of presumed "militant" groups in Pakistan by actions which, in the long run, can only encourage the potential destabilization of what used to be an important ally.
now, it has been evident that urgent, audacious solutions should have been
sought in the attempt, if not to solve, at least to alleviate the epochal