4. Is the count conducted in a transparent environment, with adequate arrangements for domestic observers?
5. Does the number of registered voters recorded as having voted correspond with the number of ballots cast?
6. Are unused ballots secured, cancelled, or destroyed after being counted?
7. Are invalid ballots properly identified in a uniform manner? Are invalid ballots appropriately segregated and preserved for review?
8. Do the ballots contain any unusual markings intended to violate the secrecy of the vote?
9. Does the number of invalid ballots seem inordinately high?
10. Does the counting adhere to the principle that the ballot is deemed valid if the will of the voter is clear?
11. Are ballots for each party or candidate separated correctly and counted individually?
12. Are any disputes or complaints resolved in a satisfactory manner?
13. Are official counting records correctly completed at the end of the count and signed by all authorized persons?
14. Are domestic observers and poll watchers from political parties able to obtain official copies of the protocol for the polling station?
15. Are the results publicly posted at the polling station?
16. Are there inappropriate activities by police and/or security forces, such as taking notes and reporting figures or results by telephone?
17. Did polling-station officials agree on the vote-count procedures and results, and, if not, what action was taken in case of disagreement?
PRINCETON STUDY: Feldman, Ariel J., J.A. Halderman, and E.W. Felten, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," Center for Information Technology Policy and Dept. of Computer Science, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2006. http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting
The Diebold AccuVote-TS and its newer relative the AccuVote-TSx are together the most widely deployed electronic voting platform in the United States [8]. In the November 2006 general election, these machines are scheduled to be used in 357 counties representing nearly 10% of registered voters (~ 15 million).
In 2004, Rady Ananda joined the growing community of citizen journalists. Initially focused on elections, she investigated the 2004 Ohio election, organizing, training and leading several forays into counties to photograph the 2004 ballots. She officially served at three recounts, including the 2004 recount. She also organized and led the team that audited Franklin County Ohio's 2006 election, proving the number of voter signatures did not match official results. Her work appears in three books.
Her blogs also address religious, gender, sexual and racial equality, as well as environmental issues; and are sprinkled with book and film reviews on various topics. She spent most of her working life as a researcher or investigator for private lawyers, and five years as an editor.
She graduated from The Ohio State University's School of Agriculture in December 2003 with a B.S. in Natural Resources.
All material offered here is the property of Rady Ananda, copyright 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009. Permission is granted to repost, with proper attribution including the original link.
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act." Tell the truth anyway.
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