OpEdNews - Page 7 of Article: What The Commission Missed: Ex-Green Beret Built 9/11 Network

Mohamed told the FBI about the plot around the same time he was negotiating his plea agreement in 2000, according to Cloonan.[34]

The plot should not have come as news to the FBI. In spring 1993, informant Emad Salem told the FBI all about it. He even testified about the scheme in open court.

Emad Salem was an Egyptian national who infiltrated the Brooklyn group on behalf of the FBI. He had served in the Egyptian army around the same time as Mohamed. (During Rahman's 1993 trial, defense attorneys attempted to ask Salem if he had met Mohamed in Egypt, but the line of questioning was cut off as irrelevant.)

In 1993, Siddig Ali asked Salem to help the pilot find "gaps in the air defense in Egypt so he can drive to bomb the presidential house, and then turn around, crash the plane into the American embassy after he eject himself out of the plane (...) ."

Salem was also asked to assist the pilot in escaping. Salem testified that he informed his contacts in the Egyptian government of the threat. It's unclear whether the pilot was ever arrested, or whether the plot ever went beyond the discussion stage.

AFTERWORD

Despite the web of linkages between Ali Mohamed and the September 11 plot, it's very difficult to properly evaluate the scope of the intelligence failure. Many of the connections can reasonably be characterized as ambiguous, but some clearly cannot.

There are a number of outstanding questions that remain to be answered. The primary obstacle is that full view of the case has been hopelessly obscured by the level of government secrecy around Mohamed and his dealings with U.S. intelligence services.

Additional complications arise from Mohamed's relationship with the Justice Department both before and after his arrest and the valid concerns faced by his custodians in terms of both protecting Mohamed's life and keeping him securely detained.

Finally, the nature of these connections makes it difficult to separate hindsight from foresight. We don't know how much Ali Mohamed told the FBI, but there are several cases in which he provided valuable intelligence -- as early as 1993 -- which was never properly exploited.

For instance, Mohamed disclosed the existence of al Qaeda to the FBI and an unknown intelligence agency in 1993. Yet the Joint Congressional Inquiry into September 11 determined that the earliest reference to al Qaeda in U.S. intelligence documents was 1996. And that inquiry had better access to intelligence material than the independent 9/11 Commission.

Ali Mohamed told the U.S. government about al Qaeda in 1993, but the terrorist organization didn't become known within government until 1996. Ali Mohamed told the FBI about the Egyptian suicide airplane attack -- but the FBI should have known about that plot since 1993, and even after September 11, the story was never widely circulated. Obviously, there are significant problems with the recipients of intelligence -- the FBI and other agencies -- which are compounded by the fact that Mohamed almost certainly withheld some information. The morass becomes virtually impenetrable.

Take Sphinx Trading for example. Even if Mohamed was entirely forthcoming, could the FBI reasonably have expected that a post office box would hold the key to a devastating terror attack? Mohamed himself kept post office boxes in different locations around the country; other terrorists in his cell kept multiple addresses as well. Which addresses do you monitor, how do you monitor them, under what legal authority, how long do you continue to monitor the same site when nothing appears to be happening, and just how much FBI manpower do you devote to watching dozens or hundreds of mailboxes anyway? And even if you watched all of them, day and night, would you necessarily discern which of the hundreds of customers using any particular facility were planning to crash airplanes into the World Trade Center?

Nevertheless, the sheer volume of the linkages and their nature overwhelmingly suggest that Ali Mohamed built a substantial network of prospects, contacts, services and tactics for use by al Qaeda operatives in the United States. And Mohamed has -- without a doubt -- been succeeded by others who now maintain that network.

The bottom line remains. The network wasn't dismantled prior to 9/11, and it's not clear that it has been dismantled even now. The mistakes made in the past -- understandable or not -- must still inform the future. Those who do not remember history are condemned to repeat it.

There is an element of the exceptional around Mohamed. There have been few figures in the known history of espionage to wreak such havoc, and to operate so openly in front of the enemy. He was a prodigy, and his skills help explain his success -- to a degree.

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