D) In parallel with A) the U.S. should conduct a full NSS assessment of Brazil and prepare a comprehensive "Strategic Wooing Plan (SWOOP)", intent on securing greater alignment with Brazil than China/Russia could ever hope for themselves. Leverage and add in too the substantial and growing Brazil/Venezuela friction factor with each other (i.e. enemy of my enemy is my friend aspect) in the Brazil SWOOP development.
As a sidebar comment, this Analyst recommends SWOOP'S for other key strategic players the U.S. needs to align with too, but hasn't either begun or efforts stalled. That will require a fundamental shift in attitude (see Analyst's article on Pakistan Crisis) by the U.S. towards other countries, as outlined above. Bottom line, to maximize U.S. National Security from a Latin America perspective, Brazil is strategically (very) significant, if not pivotal, and the U.S. needs to promptly SWOOP in.
The Results (Wins):
With the increasing hostility directed toward the U.S. by Venezuela, and the new Chavez political framework to ensure the regime continues in perpetuity and spreads Chavez style socialism throughout Latin America, the time to terminate the Venezuelan relationship for maximum impact, is NOW – "with or without" a long term Brazil oil supply deal. Officially shifting oil supply from Venezuela to Brazil (consider this the first piece of a broader Brazil SWOOP Plan) in one significant action incurs some short term pain as noted above but too it gets the U.S. six big wins:
1) The U.S. gets the "more" stable and valued long term oil supply partner (Brazil) it would rather have for a variety of geo-political strategic block reasons.
2) The U.S. and Brazil can leverage this new agreement as well as the March 2, 2007 Biofuels development agreement as underpinnings to new cooperation into other areas of mutual development and cooperation – e.g. ethanol, minerals and water supplies (note below).
3) The U.S. (immediately) rids itself of an adversarial, hostile trading partner (Venezuela), bent on holding it economic/energy hostage (at best).
4) In quickly ridding itself of this trading partner, Venezuela promptly loses its major revenue source, thereby destabilizing, if not derailing Chavez ambitious political perpetuity and grandiose socialism plans. It also takes him down a few notches with his ally triad – China, Russia and number one friend Iran.
5) De-leveraging Venezuela's political influence (and noise) in Latin America and on the world stage.
6) Brazil SWOOP - Strategically blocks China from accessing Brazil's coveted resources and aligning militarily with Brazil.
Note a): Decades since Brazil retreated from military rule (dictatorship) to civilian rule, the Brazilian military is showing increased vitality and visibility in terms of driving political direction and change. Leveraging the argument that the major global powers want Brazil's resources and will use force to get them, the Brazil military leadership wants a significantly greater presence and defense budget. In a Nov. 26, 2007 article by Bill Van Auken for Brazzil Magazine, he notes Barros Moreira, who is presently a senior official in Brazil's Ministry of Defense, in charge of formulating the country's military strategy, stating "Brazil's resources made it a "target" for foreign aggression. "The world lacks water, energy, food and minerals," he said. "Brazil is rich in all of these. For this reason we must put a strong lock on our door."
By the way, that "lock" he refers to is developing nuclear weapons. That too being added incentive to create a stronger alliance with Brazil.
Too, as Christovam Buarque notes in a Brazzil Magazine article dated Nov. 30, 2007, "the Brazil of today is pre-Chávez Venezuela". President Lula clearly is struggling and has his hands full with the disappointing trends in both the political and military arenas acting against him in terms of naturally moving Brazil in a more democratic direction. His is a difficult and delicate relationship balancing act within Brazil and one if the U.S. does not act fast to help change direction, may instead find itself with an undesired hybrid or equivalent Venezuela situation. "If" that ever happened, it would dwarf the Venezuelan threat. Clearly incentive then to aggressively ensure it doesn't.
The U.S. must factor these weakening political and military dynamics into its Brazil SWOOP initiative to help create political successes for Lula, so as to effectively strengthen civilian rule which he is solely at the vanguard now, given the re-emergence of the military. And to ease the Brazil military's fears that the U.S. is not to fear, rather should be seen as an ally, not threat. The result from doing so will be enhanced strategic partnering discussions, and by default enhanced U.S. National Security. The result for not doing so, Venezuela II?
Note b): Brazil is rich in natural resources the U.S. increasingly needs. The added strategic benefit of aligning closer with Brazil is that these too can be exploited with this broadened relationship. Specifically, Brazil is literally awash in fresh water. It is not only "water rich" but also "ethanol rich" too, two resources the U.S. will increasingly need and crave.
As for water needs, climate changes are bringing severe drought conditions to parts of the U.S., a trend expected to continue and get worse. The U.S. is already incurring unique and troubling drought conditions in the Southeast. Brazil provides a future, strategic source of water, the same as it does now for oil. Brazil too is advanced in ethanol production which displaces oil demand. In fact, as a credit to its world class efforts with this alternative fuel, the majority of its transportation sector now is fueled by ethanol. This could be strategically significant to the U.S. too as it seeks to become more independent of imported oil.
Note c): The added benefit of strategically aligning with Brazil is that coupled with the U.S. principal South American ally Columbia, Brazil provides the U.S. a geographic ring fence and/or barrier around Venezuela separating Venezuela from the predominant rest of South America.
NSS Conclusion:
In conclusion, from a U.S. National Security perspective, Latin America is and will continue to be a key and growing underpinning. The U.S. needs to therefore "optimally" position itself accordingly. A strategic relationship (of any kind) with Venezuela is all negative, whereas one with Brazil can be constructively positive. With these two South American giants likely to be the dominant Latin America political and economic influencers of the future, it's time then to make a sensible and prudent strategic decision regarding the two. One is a bully, aggressively, wildly, irrationally and irresponsibly vocalizing U.S. downfall; the other can be interested into constructive collaboration (strategic synergy) with the U.S..
The question then posed to the NSS: Does the U.S. continue in an abusive relationship (with Venezuela)? The answer seems clear as a question. Should anyone?
With authority, the U.S. should "promptly" deal with the bully (immediately and completely disengage) and embrace the new collaborative, albeit it a complex, difficult and challenging, partner.
In other words, make the tough, but "no other choice" decisions, "Divorce Venezuela, Marry Brazil".
