Merck Litigation Strategy - Destroy Expert Witnesses

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By Evelyn Pringle (about the author) Page 7 of 11 page(s)

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But then he went on to discuss how he only gets involved if other Merck department heads are unsuccessful in their attempts to "balance" critics. "I will only get involved when our representatives... regional medical directors, Merck research lab physicians... or key individuals in the therapeutic business group have felt frustrated by their inability to reach out or to 'balance' selected individuals," he wrote.

And he boasted about his own importance in dealing with officials at Universities. "Without trying to appear immodest," Dr Sherwood wrote, "I believe I am the most respected physician in the pharmaceutical industry among academic chairs and deans..."

"Therefore," he continued, "when I call them on a matter of urgent concern, they generally take it seriously... This has been a source of strength ... as I have been able to exert balanced leverage in some difficult situations."

This slew of internal documents have become a real problem for Merck's legal team. In fact, in the first Vioxx jury trial decided on August 19, 2005, where a Texas jury awarded the widow of a Vioxx user $253.5 million, the plaintiff's attorney, Mark Lanier, used many of them to show jurors how hard Merck worked to silence doctors like Dr Singh and the back and forth letters between Merck's CEO and Dr Fries were very effective in accomplishing that task.

Prior to the trial, in June 2005, Merck's legal team filed a motion with the court in a feeble attempt to suppress the leaked documents claiming a story in the "national media" had revealed a privileged attorney-client communication that could prejudice a jury against Merck after the Associated Press reported that Merck scientists had contacted company lawyers in 2000 about reformulating Vioxx over concerns it could cause cardiovascular problems.

So anyways, on November 18, 2004, when Dr Singh told the Senate committee, "I learnt that this was a persistent pattern of intimidation by Dr. Sherwood," he obviously did not yet know the half of it.

But he did say that the harassment stopped after Dr Fries wrote to Merck's CEO.

Dr Singh told the committee that he had objected to the way Merck published the results of the VIGOR study in the New England Journal of Medicine, because it minimized the significance of heart attacks, but prominently discussed the reduction of stomach bleeds in patients taking Vioxx.

He pointed out how Merck did not mention that patients on Vioxx had more serious adverse events, and more hospitalizations than patients on Naproxen.

But Merck's misdeeds included more than omissions. Company documents obtained during the congressional investigation, show that in April 2000 Merck developed a "Cardiovascular Card," and Merck's sales reps were instructed to refer doctors who raised questions about cardiovascular risks to the card, which claimed that Vioxx was eight to 11 times safer than other similar painkillers.

The card made no reference to the VIGOR study and even though an FDA advisory committee had voted that doctors should be informed of the finding of the VIGOR study in 2001, Merck subsequently sent a memo to sales reps that stated, "Do not initiate discussions of the FDA arthritis committee ... or the results of the ... VIGOR study."

In addition, sales reps were told to respond to doctors' questions about the study by saying, "I cannot discuss the study with you"

In closing his testimony, Dr Singh said, he was especially annoyed when a few weeks before the November 18, hearing, "Merck announced that the published VIGOR data was preliminary and that the final data was presented to the FDA."

"To the best of my knowledge," he said, "the VIGOR paper did not indicate anywhere that the data were preliminary or incomplete."

"Nor, did I ever see a correction or erratum indicating this fact," he advised the panel, "up until a few weeks ago, almost 4 years later."

He also criticized the fact that it took the FDA 2 years to add the heart attack risks to the Vioxx label, and noted that even then, the change supported mostly Merck's position, not the one advanced by FDA's own reviewers in public hearings.

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Evelyn Pringle is a columnist for OpEd News and investigative journalist focused on exposing corruption in government and corporate America.

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