Little Knowledge
In 1991, when facing confirmation hearings to be CIA director, Gates denied knowing much about the Iran-Contra activities though they involved officials immediately above and below him. Gates said:
"As Deputy Director for Intelligence, I was not informed of the full scope of the Iran initiative until late January/early February 1986; I had no role in the November 1985 shipment of arms; I played no part in preparing any of the Findings; I had little knowledge of CIA's operational role."
Note the weasel words: "not informed of the full scope" and "little knowledge of CIA's operational role.."
Left out of the denial was what exactly did Gates know about the Iran
initiative prior to January 1986, particularly about several 1985
shipments that violated the Arms Export Control Act.
Nor did he make clear at his Senate confirmation hearings in 1991 whether he exerted any influence over the production of Iran-related intelligence reports, including the ones that downplayed Iran's support for terrorism and another that exaggerated Soviet influence in Iran.
In a Nov. 21, 2006, article for the Los Angeles Times, former CIA analyst Jennifer Glaudemans charged that a special National Intelligence Estimate reversed the professional judgment of CIA Soviet specialists who saw little chance of Moscow making inroads with Tehran.
"When we received the draft NIE, we were shocked to find that our contribution on Soviet relations with Iran had been completely reversed," Glaudemans wrote. "Rather than stating that the prospects for improved Soviet-Iranian relations were negligible, the document indicated that Moscow assessed those prospects as quite good.
"What's more, the national intelligence officer responsible for coordinating the estimate had already sent a personal memo to the White House stating that the race between the U.S. and USSR "for Tehran is on, and whoever gets there first wins all.'
"No one in my office believed this Cold War hyperbole. There was simply no evidence to support the notion that Moscow was optimistic about its prospects for improved relations with Iran. "
"We protested the conclusions of the NIE, citing evidence such as the Iranian government's repression of the communist Tudeh Party, the expulsion of all Soviet economic advisors " and a continuing public rhetoric that chastised the "godless' communist regime as the "Second Satan' after the United States.
"Despite overwhelming evidence, our analysis was suppressed. At a coordinating meeting, we were told that Gates wanted the language to stay in as it was, presumably to help justify "improving' our strained relations with Tehran through the Iran-Contra weapons sales." [LAT, Nov. 21, 2006]
Entering the Scandal
Bolstered by this NIE, Ronald Reagan's national security adviser Robert McFarlane began circulating a draft presidential order in June 1985 proposing an overture to Iran.
After reading the draft, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger scribbled in the margins, "this is almost too absurd to comment on." The plan also contradicted President Reagan's public policy to "never make concessions to terrorists."
Still, in July 1985, Weinberger, McFarlane and Weinberger's military assistant, Gen. Colin Powell, met to discuss details for doing just that. Iran wanted 100 anti-tank TOW missiles that would be delivered through Israel, according to Weinberger's notes.
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