April 14, 2008 at 05:41:25

Peter Hallward's "Damming the Flood"

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By Stephen Lendman (about the author) Page 5 of 10 page(s)

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By September 1991, the military understood that to contain Lavalas it had to terrorize its base in the slums. Late in the month as trouble was brewing, crowds gathered to defend the government, the army attacked them, and "shot everything in sight." On the night of the coup, general Cedras took power, and at least 300 people were killed. It was the beginning of a three year reign of terror that would take about 5000 Lavalas lives.

The real power in Haiti at the time was Michel Francois, a longtime CIA asset, as well as the notorious "Anti-Gang" attache, Marcel Morissaint. A new "Haitian Resistance League" emerged as well to "balance the Aristide movement" and conduct "intelligence work against it." Emmanuel "Toto" Constant was part of it, the notorious founder of FRAPH (in 1993) that terrorized Lavalas supporters.

The repression was so intense, the movement never fully recovered after the 1991 coup. Thousands were killed and many thousands more forced into exile or hiding for their safety, including the most visible Lavalas leaders.

Yet, post-coup conditions enabled Aristide to return to power in October 1994, but his critics say he compromised too much to do it. The evidence, however, shows otherwise even though, on return, Aristide was more diplomatic than confrontational.

Key to understanding his position was his dependence on America for help. Only Washington could end the military dictatorship, restore a democratically elected leader, and provide the kind of aid Haiti needed and/or allow international lending agencies to supply it. It meant sacrificing plenty in preference to getting nothing at all.

Here's what Aristide agreed to:

-- accepting the coup regime as co-equal and a "legitimate party" to negotiations,

-- according its leaders an unconditional amnesty,

-- and replacing (Prime Minister) Preval with an (elitist) acceptable alternative.

On July 3, 1993, Aristide signed the so-called Governors Island Accord that gave Cedras nearly everything he wanted. Nonetheless, he ignored the deal, conditions through mid-1994 worsened, and Washington proposed a new arrangement.

Lavalas was in tatters, Haiti's military wasn't needed, and the Clinton administration agreed to bring Aristide back but keep a tight grip on him. Why do it? As long as he needed US aid, he offered hope for a more stable business climate. He also agreed to US demands to share power, grant amnesty to coup-plotters, and let Washington develop, train and control a new police force. Most important, he agreed to structural adjustment terms and to be no deterrent to the country's elite and international investors.

Aristide returned on October 12, 1994, took over as President, and served out his term until February 7, 1996. About 20,000 Marines came with him, cooperated closely with pro-coup families, protected FRAPH paramilitaries, and contained Haiti's popular movement. The occupation's damage was considerable, yet Aristide had no choice. Accomplishing anything was preferable to nothing in exile.

Nonetheless, on April 28, 1995, he took a major step. He dissolved the hated army altogether. Its significance was considerable and was done despite determined US and elite opposition. In all other respects, Aristide's position was weaker than in 1991. Haiti's administrative structures were in ruins and would take at least months to repair. In addition, his enemies "were neither marginalized nor disarmed....divisions had emerged among some of his supporters," US troops had total control of the country's security, and he had to administer neoliberal measures forced on him that were sure to provoke popular resentment.

Aristide's only choice was to unconditionally agree to harsh economic measures or "insist on a combination of compliance and compensation." He and Fanmi Lavalas (FL) chose the second option. His prime minister and others around him took the first. It showed Aristide acted as independently as possible, stood up for his people, yet, nonetheless, made painful concessions forced on him.

In exchange for $770 million in promised aid, he agreed to drastic tariff cuts, freeze wages, lay off about half (22,000) the civil service, and privatize all nine remaining public utilities. At the same time, he got concessions:

-- new "rice sector support package" investment to improve water management, drainage, provision of fertilizers, pesticides, tools, financial services, and more;

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