In multi-precinct polling places, voters could vote on machines located in other precincts. Accordingly, ballots from a number of precincts appeared on the same VVPAT tape. VVPAT ballots, however, lack a header identifying the precinct. Without this information, it is not possible to conduct a precinct-level tally of the VVPAT ballots.
Consider that each machine has a printer and potentially multiple rolls of paper. Paper records of votes (the official records) may be lost without voters' awareness because of paper jams, paper not being loaded properly, ink issues, and other problems.
Lack of a standardized proven manual count process is likely to result in recount error and inefficiency.
Out of 467 touch-screen machines assigned to 145 precincts that ESI audited, officials could not locate 29 machines after the election, despite days of searching. And 24 machines that were found had no data on them. "All their paperwork says (the machines) were deployed to polling locations but we can't figure out why there's no election data on them," says ESI founder Steve Hertzberg. Cuyahoga County Board of Elections Director Michael Vu provided no explanation for the missing machines.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2005, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf Voting system vulnerabilities and problems found include:
• Cast ballots, ballot definition files, and audit logs could be modified; • Supervisor functions were protected with weak or easily guessed passwords; • Systems had easily picked locks and power switches that were exposed and unprotected; • Local jurisdictions misconfigured their electronic voting systems, leading to election day problems; • Voting systems experienced operational failures during elections; • Vendors installed uncertified software; • Some electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast ballots or system audit logs, and it was possible to alter both without being detected; • It was possible to alter the files that define how a ballot looks and works so that the votes for one candidate could be recorded for a different candidate.
HARRY HURSTI, BLACK BOX REPORT Security Alert: July 4, 2005 Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design (1.94w), 2005, http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf Some of the key findings include:
With this design, the functionality – the critical element to be certified during the certification process -- can be modified every time an election is prepared. Functionality is downloaded separately into each and every machine, via memory card, for every election. With this design, there is no way to verify that the certified or even standard functionality is maintained from one voting machine to the next.
Paper trail falsification – Ability to modify the election results reports so that they do not match the actual vote data 1.1) Production of false optical scan reports to facilitate checks and balances (matching the optical scan report to the central tabulator report), in order to conceal attacks like redistribution of the votes or Trojan horse scripts such as those designed by Dr. Herbert Thompson.(19)
Removal of information about pre-loaded votes 2.1) Ability to hide pre-loaded votes 2.2) Ability to hide a pre-arranged integer overflow
The exploits demonstrated in the false optical scan machine reports ("poll tapes") shown on page 16 do not change the votes, only the report of the votes. When combined with the Trojan horse attack demonstrated by Dr. Thompson, this attack vector maintains an illusion of integrity by producing false reports to match the contaminated central tabulator report. The exploit demonstrated in the poll tape with a true report containing false votes, example pre-stuffs the ballot box in such a way as to produce an integer overflow.
In this exploit, a small number of votes is loaded for one candidate, offset by a large number of votes for the opposing candidate such that the sum of the numbers, because of the overflow, will be zero. The large number is designed to trigger an integer overflow such that after a certain number of votes is received it will flip the vote counter over to begin counting from zero for that candidate.
INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY UNION, Free & Fair Elections, 2006, p. 157 presents a summary of the theory behind an observable vote count, and describes the benefits of a parallel election. http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/Free&Fair06-e.pdf
Finally, there is the count and, in appropriate cases, the transfer of power to the successful party in the election. Complementary to the principle of secret ballot is the integrity of the count, which looks both to ensure that the expressed wish of the elector is taken into account, and that the result declared corresponds with the totality of the votes cast.
Sometimes, the ballots will be counted on the spot, and at others, the ballot boxes are transported to central or regional counting stations. In either case, transparency of process is as valuable as accuracy in counting.
In 2004, Rady Ananda joined the growing community of citizen journalists. Focused mainly on elections, her blogs also address religious, gender, sexual and racial equality, as well as environmental issues; and are sprinkled with book and film reviews on various topics. She spent most of her working life as a legal investigator for private lawyers, and five years as an editor. She currently serves as a senior editor at OpEdNews.
All material offered here is the property of Rady Ananda, copyright 2006, 2007, 2008. Permission is granted to repost, with proper attribution including the original link.
In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. Tell the truth anyway. Sign this petition: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/ny_levers_petition
This is an excellent list of resources. Your solution about precinct hand-counting of paper ballots with public observation is, in fact, the only way we will be able to regain honest elections in this technological age. Thanks much for this good work you have done.
by
Michael Richardson (81 articles, 15 quicklinks, 0 diaries, 36 comments)
on Thursday, January 18, 2007 at 3:56:08 PM
Any active or passive involvement in the intentional disenfranchisement of a U.S. Citizen should be a Class A felony FOR EACH INSTANCE.
If this crime is committed by anyone holding ANY government position, they should lose all their estate and they and their progeny should be denied ANY government funds in perpetuity.
If more than 100 counts are involved, the death penalty should be an option.
I think THAT would get a few Republican Secretaries of State or Electoral Commissioner's attention. I'm thinking of people like Ken Blackwell or the Republicans in Warren County or in the FL-13 or just about ANYWHERE where Republicans are allowed anywhere near the registration or voting process.
Most of the corrupt LOCAL, REGIONAL and NATIONAL Republicans who have conspired (and acted solely) to cheat and steal votes have done so believing that they were "fighting a moral battle against evil." But I wonder how many would do it again if they thought they could go to jail, lose everything, sentence their children to destruction, or even DIE for it. Sure, some would, but many would wimp out if they thought it wasn't going to be as easy as we've made it.
Time to change the rules of the game and make cheating a LOT harder.
CharlieL
Portland, OR
by
Charlie L (2 articles, 3 quicklinks, 1 diaries, 676 comments)
on Thursday, January 18, 2007 at 6:20:23 PM
2 comments
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