April 17, 2008 at 05:39:38

Peter Hallward's "Damming the Flood" - Part II

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By Stephen Lendman (about the author) Page 4 of 9 page(s)

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By late February, Aristide was severely weakened, his position tenuous, and his government only controlled greater Port-au-Prince. On the night of February 28 into the early morning February 29 hours, it ended. The Franco-US alliance falsely claimed he resigned. Aristide vehemently denied it. In fact, insurgents couldn't unseat him, so US Marines were sent to do it.

Throughout February, Aristide repeatedly insisted he'd serve out his term and had no intention of resigning. In CNN February 26 and 27 interviews, he again reaffirmed his intention to stay and would only step down when his term expired on February 7, 2006. As late as 1AM February 29, he told no close allies he'd leave office - not his chief legal counsel, his press secretary or even his wife.

US claims that it was voluntary are false and consider the circumstances. The scheme:

-- was arranged in total secrecy;

-- it happened in the middle of the night into the early morning pre-daybreak Sunday hours;

-- there were no cameras, reporters or independent witnesses; and

-- it's inconceivable Aristide would choose the Central African Republic (CAR) as his refuge location; it's a repressive police state closely aligned to France, and on arrival he was held under house arrest and denied access to the media, telephone and all contact outside the country;

-- - numerous other inconsistencies also went unanswered and the dominant media didn't asked.

When he finally got a chance to explain, Aristide told CNN and others he was "taken by force by US military." They and Haitian security forces surrounded his home and threatened him with massive and immediate violence "to push me out and (against his will) sign a letter stating that "I have been forced to leave to avoid bloodshed." To his disgrace (post-coup) in mid-April, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan produced a Report on Haiti to endorse the official Franco-American storyline in every respect.

It was false and deceptive. For one thing, Aristide wasn't threatened by Haitian rebels. They were at least a week away from assaulting Port-au-Prince, and with mass FL support, they knew it might be impossible to succeed if they tried. Rebel commander Philippe, in fact, told reporters that at best they hoped to blockade the city, then "wait for the right time." He later admitted that the "rebellion" was largely a made-for-media bluff to scare Aristide into thinking their small force (around 300 in total) was strong and unstoppable.

In contrast, Aristide's real threat was from US Ambassador Foley and French Ambassador Burkard. They likely knew what Hallward explained - that if Aristide held on for another week or so "his government might well have been able to regain control of the situation. There was no popular revolution (or) crisis of leadership."

US and French hawks knew time was running out and they had to act. They tried threatening phone calls into the early February 29 hours. They didn't work. "Aristide wouldn't budge, and Foley (ran) out of options....Time was desperately short." It was harder concealing "the obvious links between the political and military wings of the US-backed opposition," and some sources said "the French in particular were starting to panic, and were now determined to force the issue at all costs."

Foley apparently agreed and "settle(d) for plan B: direct US abduction." At the same time, with time running out, no one else could be relied on, so orders went out for US Marines to finish the job and do it fast. With Aristide's commitment to non-violence, their job was easier. But Hallward believes his choice was strategically sound. Had he chosen to stay and fight, there'd have been a bloodbath, and Aristide would have committed suicide. By leaving and avoiding it, he exposed his conspirators and gave Lavalas a chance to "regroup and prevail in a longer-term struggle."

Even so, things got ugly. When word got out about his abduction, supporters took to the streets and vented their rage. Gas stations and banks were torched and USAID and CARE property stolen. Downtown shops were also looted. At the same time, opposition forces struck back and in the first few post-coup days killed between 300 and 1000 persons. They and Bel Air, La Saline and Cite Soleil residents (Lavalas loyalists) were the real coup targets, and their suffering had only begun.

2004: Revenge of the Haitian Elite

In the short term, the coup succeeded, but getting rid of Aristide was a diversion. The real aim was "to break once and for all the movement sustained by many dozens of pro-Lavalas 'organisations populaires.' " To prevent another Lavalas president, it would require:

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