Since its founding in 1996, Adalah has been chipping at Israel's glass wall, advocating in the Territories, and its 1999 annual report showed what it's up against: racism, relentless discrimination, futile battles for justice without end, bucking stone walls in court, and violations against Arabs of everything imaginable - rights relating to language, religion, education, land, housing, women, prisoners, political and social issues, and economic and employment ones. In all these matters and more, Israel grossly discriminates against Arabs and gets away with it.
Still, Adalah persists, and Cook cites examples of its struggles for justice. Most often, they're hopeless, small victories are relished, but even then they turn out hollow after court rulings favor Arabs, state authorities ignore them, things get worse, and courts won't intervene.
On its web site, Adalah states its advocacy mission as follows: Its "legal actions include filing petitions to the Supreme Court of Israel; filing appeals and lawsuits to the District, Magistrate and Labor Courts; submitting pre-petitions to the Attorney General's Office; filing complaints with Mahash (the Ministry of Justice Police Investigation Unit) about police brutality; and sending letters to government ministries and agencies, detail legal claims, and demanding compliance with the law." Adalah is also involved in "providing legal commentary on proposed and pending Knesset bills to NGO advocacy coalitions and staff of Arab MKs." In addition, it "provides legal consultation to numerous Arab public institutions, NGOs, student committees and individuals."
Adalah and Jabareen drew public attention in February 2001. At the time, the Or Commission began investigating 13 unarmed Arab demonstrators Israeli security force killings at the start of the second Intifada. They were wanton acts demanding justice, but try getting it for Palestinians, and that was evident early on under Supreme Court Justice Orr.
He denied an Adalah lawyer official standing before the Commission so he could prepare a proper defense. As a result, he couldn't issue subpoenas, cross-examine witnesses, see most state evidence, or get advance word of issues to be raised. At the same time, the Israeli public got a steady commentary diet about Arafat-led fifth column Arabs.
Israeli police prepared in advance of the Intifada, and Adalah got details of their tactics. They included preparatory exercises as part of operation "Magic Tune" - a code name for a full-scale military operation involving special anti-riot training and more. It established protocols for snipers and excessive force to disperse protesters, even those doing it peacefully. It assumed trouble was coming, security forces would exacerbate it, harsh responses would follow, so civilians would be targeted with live ammunition to subdue it.
In September 2003, the Commission report was issued, and hopes for justice were dashed. It was a "sore disappointment to the families (of victims) and Adalah." In session for two and a half years, it called 350 witnesses, yet its conclusions were "tepid and lack(ed) teeth." The report criticized police for "substantial professional failures," several officers got minor punishment, other senior ones were reprimanded, but no prosecutions followed because no policemen responsible for the killings were identified. For petitioners, it was a crushing defeat.
In addition, the report said nothing about the Justice Ministry's failure to investigate killings, its conspiracy of silence about using live ammunition and snipers, and a final comment added insult to injury. The Commission unjustly described street protests as "unprecendented riots" and accused three leading Arab figures of incitement. In all, it was a painful conclusion to lengthy hearings and a lesson for Arab petitioners - expecting justice in Israel is futile because the state denies it to them no matter what the circumstances.
The Battle of Numbers
In 2003, the Knesset passed a temporary amendment to the landmark 1952 Nationality Law - the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law. It denies Israeli Arabs a residency permit for a Palestinian spouse living outside Israel or the right to bring that spouse into Israel.
International and human rights groups were outraged, and B'Tselem called the legislation a violation Israel's Basic Law on Human Rights and Liberty. Still, it's the law, it supercedes previous ones, and Shin Bet's (Israel's internal security service) Avi Dichter claimed it was "vital for Israel's security." Others were more forthright about its true purpose - to prevent Palestinian applications for citizenship through marriage from eroding the country's Jewish majority. That was Ariel Sharon's view in these public comments: "The Jews have one small country, Israel, and must do everything so that this state remains a Jewish state in the future...."
Haaretz later reported that there was "broad agreement in the government and academia (for a strict policy to) make it hard for non-Jews to obtain citizenship in Israel" or even residency. Moreover, children of an Israeli and a non-Jew would henceforth be ineligible for citizenship rights.
These measures reflect Israel's growing concern about its demographic problem, and it led to Sharon's "sudden conversion to the cause of 'unilateral separation.' " It became his "Gaza Disengagement Plan," first announced in February 2004, then implemented in August and September 2005. It was a small price to pay for a big benefit. It let Israel dispose of an unwanted population, now around 1.5 million, and tried to defuse world opinion (if unconvincingly) that Israel governed like apartheid South Africa. It also squarely aimed at the threat of two populations approaching parity with Israeli Jews about to be overtaken by a higher Palestinian birth rate.
Removing Gaza bought time for a more permanent solution to the core issue - Israel's growing Arab minority that's more pressing than Palestinians in the Territories. The small 150,000 Israeli Arab population in 1948 now numbers 1.5 million, and historian Benny Morris calls it a "time bomb" needing decisive action to defuse. His solution is mass expulsion. Israelis call it "transfer." World ethicists call it "ethnic cleansing." International law experts call it illegal.
Israel's founders foresaw the problem and planned accordingly. When Israel became a state in May 1948, the leadership attacked demography three ways:
I am a 72 year old, retired, progressive small businessman concerned about all the major national and world issues, committed to speak out and write about them.
