Pakistan in the US "war on terrorism"

Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahri immediately condemned the raid in a videotape. Then in September, another videotape was released consisting of a montage of old video, including footage of bin Laden, who is heard in the beginning reciting verses from the Quran before another voice narrates what is purportedly a message from bin Laden likewise condemning Musharraf as a “traitor” and calling for his overthrow.

Recognizing that Musharraf’s grip on power was slipping and not wanting to risk the possibility that he might actually lose in the October election, Washington orchestrated an agreement between Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who planned to return from self-imposed exile. Under the agreement, Musharraf would grant amnesty to Bhutto, who had been convicted on charges of corruption in 1999, and allow her to return to the country, possibly to share power with Musharraf in a return to her former post. In return, Bhutto, still a popular leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), would support Musharraf’s reelection as President.

In October, the Supreme Court ruled that Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister Musharraf had ousted in a bloodless coup in 1999, and who had also been charged with corruption, would likewise be allowed to return to the country. Both former leaders, despite charges of mismanagement and corruption, still maintained substantial support among the public, and were viewed as a potential threat to Musharraf’s rule.

On November 3, Musharraf issued a “Proclamation of emergency”, which used the increasing threat of militancy and terrorism as a pretext for suspending the constitution, while clearly being directed primarily against the judiciary that was, according to the proclamation, “working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature in the fight against terrorism,” apparently by threatening Musharraf’s grip on power and challenging his authority as dictator.

If there was any ambiguity about the purpose for the declaration of martial law, it was cleared up in the immediate aftermath, during which time the government arrested thousands of political opponents and peaceful demonstrators, including lawyers and human rights activists. Independent media outlets were shut down and only state-run channels were allowed to broadcast.  Journalists who refused to agree to demands not to criticize the government were arrested under counterterrorism laws and hence, according to human rights groups, put in danger of adding their number to the disappeared, of being subjected to torture, of being tried before military courts, or of being rendered to the US.

While Pakistan’s constitution was suspended under the declaration, Musharraf proclaimed a Provisional Constitutional Order that effectively prohibited the Supreme Court from ruling against him and ordering members of the judiciary to swear an oath of loyalty to him, rather than to the constitution. Twelve of the seventeen Justices of the Supreme Court refused to do so and were placed under house arrest and replaced by judges hand-picked by Musharraf who would agree to his order. The Supreme Court then proceeded to affirm his reelection in an attempt to grant the vote an air of legality.

Bhutto, whose credibility had suffered with the public as a result of her deal with Musharraf, was forced to renege and issue a strong statement against the state of emergency and to call for him to quit his office.

Sharif, who had attempted to return in September only to be prevented by Musharraf, who had the returning exile flown off to Saudi Arabia, welcomed Bhutto’s change of heart and said his Pakistan Muslim League (PLM) was ready to cooperate with Bhutto’s PPP to bring an end to Musharraf’s dictatorship.

Musharraf responded by placing Bhutto under house arrest and cracking down further on his opposition. Criticized for its muted response to situation in Pakistan, which was contrasted with the Bush administration’s strong condemnation for the government of Burma’s recent oppression of its opposition, the White House made a series of statements and dispatched John Negroponte to urge Musharraf to end the state of emergency, to resign from his army post, and to allow upcoming elections to be held without interference. At the same time, it was made clear in administration statements that there would be no consequences, such as a scaling back in the extensive US aid to Pakistan’s regime, were Musharraf to decide to ignore Washington’s rhetorical urgings.

Musharraf did just that, rebuffing Washington’s requests. The Bush administration returned to defending him and his rule. President Bush asserted that Musharraf had “advanced democracy in Pakistan” and that he was “a man of his word”. When asked if there was a line Musharraf would have to cross before the US withdrew its diplomatic support and financial and military aid for the dictator, Bush responded that “he hasn’t crossed the line…. I think he truly is somebody who believes in democracy.”

Tom Malinowski, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch, observed that “Almost everyone in Pakistan who believes in George Bush’s vision of democracy is in prison today. Calling the man who put them in prison a great democrat will only discredit America among moderate Pakistanis…” Numerous other commentators made similar observations on the ludicrously untenable position of the White House. As former Pakistan Supreme Court justice Wajihuudin Ahmed noted, “None of these things would happen without a wink from the United States administration.” The White House acknowledged that it had been notified in advance that Musharraf intended to declare martial law, but insisted that “There was never a green light.”

Sharif made a successful return to Pakistan at the end of November and was greeted by jubilant supporters who defied martial law by gathering in public to cheer for him. Several days later, and a day before he was to be sworn in as President after his controversial reelection, Musharraf finally bowed to pressure from home and abroad and resigned from the army. His resignation was followed by a declaration that elections would be held on time on January 8 and that “no one will be allowed to obstruct the democratic process.”

Sharif was subsequently barred from participating in the upcoming elections by Pakistan’s election authorities on the basis that he had a criminal record for “hijacking” a plane in 1999. This was a reference to Sharif’s attempt to prevent Musharraf’s planned coup by not allowing his plane to land on a return flight to the country. Musharraf contacted his supporters in the army from the plane, however, and by the time he reached the ground, Sharif had been deposed and Musharraf announced himself Pakistan’s new leader.

The struggle for democratic reform has been in many cases waged Pakistan’s lawyers. There been a growing push from lawyers across the country to reinstate the judiciary, and one means by which they are working to accomplish this is by pressuring candidates and parties likely to participate in the upcoming elections to come out strong in condemnation of the declaration of emergency and vow to restore the constitution and the Supreme Court. Bhutto has lost further credibility among Pakistanis for failing to come out with a strong statement in favor of doing so, possibly because she fears a return of the legitimate judiciary might be willing to hear challenges to her amnesty agreement with Musharraf.

The people of Pakistan have an unappealing array of choices in the coming election. There’s no simple solution to the problems the country is faced with today, which include among other things the issues of spreading radical militancy and how to best ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal remains secure. But allowing democratic processes to take place, rather than rejecting and suppressing them, would be a good first step towards a solution by helping empower the Pakistani people to take action out of their own self interest to turn back the tide of extremism and ensure that their nation’s nuclear arsenal remain in safe storage.

There’s no silver-bullet solution and the task of building peace, stability, and democracy in Pakistan is certain to be a long and arduous one. The most elementary step towards a solution would be to stop engaging in policies that have largely caused and which continue to escalate the problem. The different options and opportunities that would manifest themselves as a result of making that choice are impossible to predict, and there is no way to preclude the possibility that negative consequences could also arise as the result of any change in policy. But the result of persisting in policies which have demonstrably served only to increase war and terrorism, instability, and the threat of proliferation, and which have served only to setback the stated goal of achieving democracy are not so difficult to foresee. The results will continue to be as they have been—the opposite of the sane and rational objectives nearly universally agreed upon.

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