Due to limits in the data, software computational abnormality contributing to the count inaccuracies cannot be ruled out. Computational abnormality could be the result of a failure to adequately test the voting equipment before the election or to manage the various databases appropriately.
A lack of inventory controls and gaps in the chain of custody of mission critical assets, such as DRE memory cards, DRE units, and VVPAT cartridges, resulted in a significant amount of missing data. Because of the missing data, ESI is unable to give a definitive opinion of the accuracy of the Diebold TSX system.
In multi-precinct polling places, voters could vote on machines located in other precincts. Accordingly, ballots from a number of precincts appeared on the same VVPAT tape. VVPAT ballots, however, lack a header identifying the precinct. Without this information, it is not possible to conduct a precinct-level tally of the VVPAT ballots.
Consider that each machine has a printer and potentially multiple rolls of paper. Paper records of votes (the official records) may be lost without voters' awareness because of paper jams, paper not being loaded properly, ink issues, and other problems.
Lack of a standardized proven manual count process is likely to result in recount error and inefficiency.
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PRINCETON STUDY: Feldman, Ariel J., J.A. Halderman, and E.W. Felten, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," Center for Information Technology Policy and Dept. of Computer Science, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2006. http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting Link to video: http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/videos.html
The Diebold AccuVote-TS and its newer relative the AccuVote-TSx are together the most widely deployed electronic voting platform in the United States [8]. In the November 2006 general election, these machines are scheduled to be used in 357 counties representing nearly 10% of registered voters (~ 15 million).
All of Maryland and Georgia-will employ the AccuVote-TS model. More than 33,000 of the TS machines are in service nationwide.
The machine is vulnerable to a number of extremely serious attacks that undermine the accuracy and credibility of the vote counts it produces.
1. Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss. We have constructed demonstration software that carries out this vote-stealing attack.
2. Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.
3. AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine viruses-computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- and post-election activity. We have constructed a demonstration virus that spreads in this way, installing our demonstration vote-stealing program on every machine it infects.
4. While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines' hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure security.
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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 2005, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf Voting system vulnerabilities and problems found include:
In 2004, Rady Ananda began contributing to the Web, as part of the growing community of citizen journalists. Focusing mainly on elections, her blogs also address religious, gender, sexual and racial equality, as well as environmental issues; and are sprinkled with book and film reviews on various topics. She spent most of her working life as a legal investigator for lawfirms, and about 5 years as an editor. She currently serves as a senior editor at OpEdNews.
All material offered here is the property of Rady Ananda, copyright 2006, 2007, 2008. Permission is granted to repost, with proper attribution including the original link.
In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. Tell the truth anyway. Sign this petition: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/ny_levers_petition
This is an exceedingly useful resource. I hope that you will be able to update it soon with the latest NIST Draft, and then its bastard brother, the amended follow up report. And other reports as they come in.
by
Nancy Tobi (69 articles, 4 quicklinks, 0 diaries, 53 comments)
on Wednesday, January 3, 2007 at 3:24:50 PM
