GSC: You've said
that having a nuclear power program will give Iran bargaining leverage. Is that because" once they have such a
program and can easily convert this nuclear capability into weapons--is that the
fear that Americans would have?
Like Japan, for
example" they could convert all of their nuclear facilities into
weapons-producing facilities" and rather quickly!
GP:
The nuclear facilities that enrich uranium give a country the ability to enrich
that to a weapons-grade level. That has
always been the argument that the US and Israel have used to say that Iran must
not be allowed to have a nuclear program.
All that is true, and, at the same time, irrelevant because many other
countries, as you've indicated, have had nuclear programs that have not gone to
nuclear weapons; and, it is the absolute right of any member of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty; or, indeed, as is the case with Israel--a non-member
of the NPT--to have a nuclear program. The
Israelis have not only had a nuclear program, but have had nuclear weapons as
well. So, it is, a legal right; and what
the US has been doing for 30 years--intervening politically and diplomatically, and
threatening to use military force--is illegal under international law.
GSC: Doesn't this
all go back to the old question of the balance of power--maintaining this old
equation about the way Imperialism works?
It's not really a balance of power so much as it is a much-skewed
equilibrium favoring the imperialist power, whose major check against
aggression is the cost such aggression would incur. We're simply repeating this old dynamic about
maintaining our power in that part of the world, like the British before us--and
Israel's power, too--and we don't want to see Iran coming up and challenging
that.
GP:
This is the issue that I think is behind this: the US desire to keep Iran from
achieving its full potential as a regional power; and, also because the US has
a strong animosity towards Iran and, as the National Security State, has profited
by having Iran as an enemy. Of course,
as you suggest, Israel's part in this is to maintain their hegemony as the
dominant military power in the Middle East.
From the Israeli point of view, they don't want Iran to have the
knowledge that would make it capable of challenging them.
GSC: Maybe you
address this in your book, maybe not: Last
time that we talked--five years ago--you predicted that a Democrat would be
sitting in the White House as a result of the next election, and you said that
that Democrat would continue Bush's policies. " Thinking back on that, you were
very prescient--this is exactly what we have with Barack Obama. " Now, let's see
if you can be just as prescient--and we won't know for another five years,
perhaps--but, ah, where are we going?
Does your book address any questions like this?
GP:
No, the book does not. It doesn't
attempt to peer into the future with respect to US policy towards Iran--except
in so far as it has an analysis of the way in which the US has made policy and,
to some extent, that does serve as a guideline for what to expect. In that regard, we face the daunting prospect
of more years of US-Iranian animosity, of a continuation of maneuvering, and a
failure to resolve this problem through diplomacy. I would say, based on the past, that the
interests that have been built around the animosity between these two
countries--as well as Iran's relationship with Israel and the charge that Iran
is a state sponsor of terrorism--all those things are vested interests in the
political elite and in the National Security State of this country. And that's why I say that it's most likely
that this policy will continue.
GSC: We have a Cold
War with Iran. And that will continue to
be our reality!
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