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I was also lucky enough to catch a few minutes of a regional meeting, and to participate in an encounter between some of the central leadership and two of the human rights organizations that were in Tegucigalpa for the inauguration and the demonstration that happened across town. My contact in both cases was relatively brief, but I
could see that this movement is being run by mature, experienced individuals.
The number of people who are prepared to demonstrate their support for the resistance is astonishing. On Wednesday, January 27, Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo was installed as president. The stadium downtown was filled with dignitaries, including representatives of the United States and various clients, such as Israel, Columbia, Panama, etc. In another part of town there was an immense march, several kilometers long, ending at the airport where President Zelaya was scheduled to fly away to the Dominican Republic, accompanied by the president of that country.
It would be difficult to estimate the number of marchers with any scientific accuracy, but many observers put it at around a quarter of a million. I was somewhere in the first half, and whenever we got to one of the various high spots along the route all I saw was a thick stream of people stretching out as far as I could see ahead and behind. After marching for the better part of an hour someone nearby called on their cellphone to a couple of journalists who had stayed back at the beginning to record people as they left, and they said that people were still leaving.
The next day I looked at every page of one of the big daily newspapers, El Heraldo. There was lavishcoverage of the inauguration, but not a single word about the far larger event that was going on at the same time in another part of the city. In arecent demonstration a new chant has been raised: "No somos conco, no somos cien, prensa vendida cuentanos bien." ("We are not five, we are not a hundred, sold out press, count us right!")
Unlike most of the other large demonstrations since the coup, there was no repression along the route. (This was anticipated, because Lobo was stressing "reconciliation," and it might look bad if people were being beaten simultaneously with his speech.) Later I learned that there were roadblocks on the roads coming into the city, and that people trying to get to town for the march were turned back. There were police and soldiers along the route, but they were just standing and watching with their clubs and shields. As we were passing along in front of the central portion of the airport I saw several people looking up and gesturing with their middle fingers. When I asked what they were doing they said to look up at the control tower. A couple of soldiers were standing there, leaning against the wall. "Not them. Look closer." A friend had a powerful telephoto lens on his camera and he showed me the image on his camera's screen. There were sharpshooters lying in a prone position on the walkway around the control tower, watching us through their telescopic sights. This had a chilling significance, because just such a sniper had killed a young man in one of the first demonstrations after the coup.
Strategy of the Resistance
The newly-installed government of Pepe Lobo presents itself as a government of reconciliation. Lobo has appointed ministers from opposition parties, and has begun to set up a "truth commission" to be led by a former vice-president of Guatemala. The United States is leading an effort to get other countries to restore diplomatic
relations, and a few of its clients, such as Israel and Colombia have done so. South Korea and Taiwan have an interest in the cheap labor available in Honduras, so they too are falling into line.
But the resistance is not accepting any of these moves. Whatever credibility the newly appointed ministers may have had evaporated as soon as they accepted positions in a government that owes its existence to an election held under conditions of violent repression and censorship. The "truth commission" includes not a single
representative of those who have been repressed, and is therefore seen as a sham, a "whitewash commission." Since it is generally assumed that the United States was complicit in the coup in some way, any international recognition that the Lobo government achieves will not add anything to its credibility in Honduras.
The hollowness of Lobo's statements about "reconciliation" and "truth" was demonstrated on February 4, with the discovery of the body of 29 year old mother of three, Vanessa Zepeda, an activist of the Union of Workers of the Honduran Social Security Institute, and an emerging leader of the Resistance. On the same day a report came that two young cameramen working for the opposition TV Globo had been kidnapped and tortured by men who claimed to be police. As usual, these crimes are "unsolved," and no disciplinary action is contemplated against the police.
The Honduran armed forces have 20,000 members on active duty, and there are about 8,000 police. There are also about 60,000 private security guards. You see these guards all over, armed with shotguns, not just in front of banks, but guarding supermarkets, hotels, pizza places, etc. Developers, mining concerns, factories, and other corporate interests have their own armed security forces. Given all of these armed men serving the interests of the oligarchy, there is clearly the possibility of another coup if a truly legitimate government were to be elected. I asked several people whether elements within the army might develop some kind of patriotic rebellion, but this was dismissed as impossible. The answer I got was variations of, "The only thing we can hope for with the army is that it would disappear," since the only function the Honduran army has is to repress the Honduran people.
Given the massive forces of repression ready to crush any kind of armed resistance, this route is rarely mentioned. The Resistance has been resolutely non-violent, apart from some spontaneous responses to police violence very early in the struggle.
Honduras is the third poorest country in the Americas. The economic problems of the United States affect Honduras intensely, since the United States imports 70 % of Honduras's exports, and also because remittances from Hondurans living in North America have fallen off. The turmoil that has accompanied the coup and its aftermath has had a very negative effect on Honduran business. Recognition by the United States and a few other countries will probably lead to some increase in business activity, but the overall prospect seems bleak.
The Resistance expects the struggle to go on for years, hoping to build a movement that brings in many people who have not been active in the past. Communication is a big concern, with community radio stations playing a role, especially if the anti-coup commercial radio stations that depend on advertising revenue are not able to continue providing the solid support that they have given the movement in the past. The internet will also be useful. Political education will be important, as well as a democratic organization solidly based on broad participation of all popular sectors.
