OpEdNews - Page 4 of Article: Color Revolutions, Old and New

Advisor to Gerald Ford and GHW Bush, told Al Jazeera television that
"of course" Washington "has agents working inside Iran" even though
America hasn't had formal relations with the Islamic Republic for 30
years.

Another prominent incident is being used against Iran, much like a
similar one on October 10, 1990. In the run-up to Operation Desert
Storm, the Hill & Knowlton PR firm established the Citizens for a Free
Kuwait (CFK) front group to sell war to a reluctant US public. Its
most effective stunt involved a 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl known only as
Nayirah to keep her identity secret.

Teary eyed before a congressional committee, she described her
eye-witness account of Iraqi soldiers "tak(ing) babies out of
incubators and leav(ing) them on the cold floor to die." The dominant
media featured her account prominently enough to get one observer to
conclude that nothing had greater impact on swaying US public opinion
for war, still ongoing after over 18 years.

Later it was learned that Nayirah was the daughter of Saud Nasir
al-Sabah, a member of Kuwait's royal family and ambassador to the US.
Her story was a PR fabrication, but it worked.

Neda (meaning "voice" in Farsi) Agha Soltani is today's Nayirah -
young, beautiful, slain on a Tehran street by an unknown assassin,
she's now the martyred face of opposition protesters and called "The
Angel of Iran" by a supportive Facebook group. Close-up video captured
her lying on the street in her father's arms. The incident and her
image captured world attention. It was transmitted online and repeated
round-the-clock by the Western media to blame the government and
enlist support to bring it down. In life, Nayirah was instrumental in
Iraq's destruction and occupation. Will Neda's death be as effective
against Iran and give America another Middle East conquest?

Issues in Iran's Election

Despite being militant and anti-Western as Iran's former Prime
Minister, Mousavi is portrayed as a reformer. Yet his support comes
from Iranian elitist elements, the urban middle class, and students
and youths favoring better relations with America. Ahmadinejad, in
contrast, is called hardline. Yet he has popular support among the
nation's urban and rural poor for providing vitally needed social
services even though doing it is harder given the global economic
crisis and lower oil prices.

Is it surprising then that he won? A Mousavi victory was clearly
unexpected, especially as an independent candidate who became
politically active again after a 20 year hiatus and campaigned only in
Iran's major cities. Ahmadinejad made a concerted effort with over 60
nationwide trips in less than three months.

Then, there's the economy under Article 44 of Iran's constitution that
says it must consist of three sectors - state-owned, cooperative, and
private with "all large-scale and mother industries" entirely
state-controlled, including oil and gas that provides the main source
of revenue.

In 2004, Article 44 was amended to allow more privatizations, but how
much is a source of contention. During his campaign, Mousavi called
for moving away from an "alms-based" economy - meaning Ahmadinejad's
policy of providing social services to the poor. He also promised to
speed up privatizations without elaborating on if he has oil, gas, and
other "mother industries" in mind. If so, drawing support from

Washington and the West is hardly surprising. On the other hand, as
long as Iran's Guardian Council holds supreme power, an Ahmadinejad
victory was needed as a pretext for all the events that followed. At
this stage, they suspiciously appear to be US-orchestrated for regime
change. Thus far, Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Basij militia, and other
security forces have prevailed on the streets to prevent it, but it's
way too early to declare victory.

George Friedman runs the private intelligence agency called Stratfor.
On June 23 he wrote:

"While street protests in Iran appear to be diminishing, the electoral
crisis continues to unfold, with reports of a planned nationwide
strike and efforts by the regime's second most powerful cleric
(Rafsanjani) to mobilize opposition against (Ahmadinejad) from within
the system. In so doing he could stifle (his) ability to effect
significant policy changes (in his second term), which would play into
the hands of the United States."

Ahmadinejad will be sworn in on July 26 to be followed by his cabinet
by August 19, but according to Stratfor it doesn't mean the crisis is
fading. It sees a Rafsanjani-led "rift within the ruling establishment
(that) will continue to haunt the Islamic Republic for the foreseeable
future."

"What this means is that....Ahmadinejad's second term will see even
greater infighting among the rival conservative factions that
constitute the political establishment....Iran will find it harder to
achieve the internal unity necessary to complicate US policy," and the
Obama administration will try to capitalize on it to its advantage.
Its efforts to make Iran into another US puppet state are very much
ongoing, and for sure, Tehran's ruling government knows it. How it
will continue to react remains to be seen.

"Swarming" to Produce Regime Change

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