(4) As noted, this paper does not deal in detail with the issue of security of the ballots. However, it is recommended that research be done concerning the cost of manufacturing ballot boxes with the characteristics described for Hudson, MA and Rockport, MA.
Additional Recommendations
The present author has been involved with voting rights for the last five years. Based on her previous work,[11] she also further expands the use of HCPB to include the following recommendations:
(1) In addition to the four recommendations presented above, it is recommended that an HCPB protocol also have the following characteristics: (a) Ballots would be counted at the precinct by registered voters in that precinct. (b) The counting would be done in full view of the public. (c) The counting would be videotaped. (d) The results would be posted at the precinct immediately after the count. (e) To be manageable, precincts would be no larger than 1000 registered voters. (Because the concept of HCPB operates at the precinct level, even large communities can adopt such a system.) (f) In each precinct there would be at least 10 teams of two counters each (a Democrat and a Republican).[12] These teams would count the ballots, one counter reading the name and the other counter making the mark on the tally sheet. For the second counting, the counters on each team would switch roles. (g) Whether or not there would be observers as part of the team of counters, and if so, how many, needs more research and is beyond the scope of this paper.
(2) This paper recommends that poll workers who participate in the process of HCPB be paid at a rate that will be respected by the community. This will be possible because a large amount of money will be saved with the elimination of electronic voting machines. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) paid states hundreds of millions of dollars to buy electronic voting machines, both DRE’S and/or op scans.[13] One machine can cost anywhere from $3,000 - $5,000[14] and that amount does not include storing, maintenance, and upgrade. In contrast, for an HCPB election, the cost for the counting could be $2400.00 per precinct for each election, with ten teams of two workers each, as described above, and paying each worker $20/hour for six hours ($120). HCPB by registered voters from the precinct would also keep the money in the community. As is true for op scan electronic voting machines, money would also have to be spent for the cost of printing the ballots.[15] If hundreds of millions of dollars had not been spent for the purchase, storage and upgrade of electronic voting machines, imagine the money our communities could have used for health care and education.
EPILOGUE
On January 4, 2006, I had the good fortune to watch on TV the voting in Congress for Speaker of the House. One at a time, each representative called out orally her/his choice for Speaker, and that vote was tallied by hand. This hand counting of oral votes was done by two Republicans and two Democrats, all of whom had been appointed by the Clerk of the House. The Electronic Board that usually counts the votes of the Representatives was not used for this count; the official vote was tallied by hand. I could not help but wonder how the Representatives would have felt had their votes not been recorded accurately, or not at all, as voters throughout the USA experienced in recent elections. For voters in each precinct in the USA, hand-counting of paper ballots would assure that each of our votes is counted as intended and as cast, as the oral votes of our Representatives, were hand-counted, as intended and as cast, in the House of Representatives.
ENDNOTES
[1] For a beginning discussion of chain of custody, see the present author’s paper Hand-Counted Paper Ballots Now. A version of this article first appeared in the April 2006 issue of Tikkun, http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/specials/article.2006-04-10.1693298872, retrieved from the Web February 28, 2007. An updated version can be found at http://electionfraudnews.com/News/HCPBNow.htm, retrieved from the Web February 28, 2007. “Ballot boxes must be clearly marked and visible in plain view. Ballot boxes will be sealed and locked whenever they contain ballots and are not being actively used. Ballot boxes are secured from the beginning of voting until the end of counting by a chain of custody procedure. Ballot boxes never leave the polling place until after the vote is counted, audited and certified. Each time ballot boxes move from the physical control of or visual contact from one person to another, a duplicate record signed by all counters and observers must be made relinquishing and gaining control. There will be a documentation process wherein each ballot box will have a record of its handling from the beginning of the day to the end of counting. On the web site of computer science expert Professor Douglas W. Jones, there is a very clear and detailed protocol for “Ballot and Ballot Box Transportation” and “Ballot Storage.” The reader is referred specifically to these two sections (the last two on this link): http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/paper.html
[2] Listed here are some of the outstanding articles about the fraud and error resulting from electronic voting machines; some are from the mainstream media, others from scholarly sources, and yet others from technical groups: (1) The public hacking of electronic voting machines by Harri Hursti, working with Black Box Voting, http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/2197/6847.html, retrieved from the Web February 21, 2007. (2) The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its nonpartisan September 2005 report on elections states in its conclusions: “Numerous recent studies and reports have highlighted problems with the security and reliability of electronic voting systems … the concerns they raise have the potential to affect election outcomes … Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, But Key Activities Need to be Completed.”, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf, retrieved from the Web March 7, 2007. (3) Article by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. in Rolling Stone (Issue 1002, June 15, 2006), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/11717105/robert_f_kennedy_jr__will_the_next_election_be_hacked/print, retrieved from the Web February 21, 2007. (4) Report of the Brennan Center Task Force of NYU, on June 27, 2006, http://www.brennancenter.org/press_detail.asp?key=100&subkey=36345, retrieved from the Web February 21, 2007 and http://brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_38150.pdf, retrieved from the Web February 22, 2007. (5) Papers by Ed Felton et al. from Princeton University in Sept. 2006, http://dubiousprofundity.com/hackthevote.pdf, retrieved from the Web February 21, 2007. (6) Problems that occurred with electronic voting machines in many states in the General Election on November 7, 2006, especially the 18,000 undervotes in Sarasota County, FL, http://www.nytimes.com/cq/2006/12/20/cq_2056.html, retrieved from the Web February 20, 2007. (7) NIST discussion draft, December 1, 2006, http://vote.nist.gov/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf, retrieved from the Web February 22, 2007. (8) The annotated bibliography by Rady Ananda, http://tinyurl.com/2gwlve, retrieved from the Web May 11, 2007.
[3] On August 4, 2006, Nancy Tobi posted this article about HCPB in NH, http://www.opednews.com/articles/genera_nancy_to_060804_the_granite_state_de.htm, retrieved from the Web March 12, 2007. An editorial first carried in the Ketchikan Daily News, December 1, 2006, written by Editor Terry Miller, called for HCPB for the president and vice president, http://www.ketchikandailynews.com/, retrieved from the Web January 12, 2007. (Thanks to John Gideon of Daily Voting News for pointing out the Ketchikan editorial.) On December 7, 2006, the editorial was then picked up by the Juneau Empire, http://juneauempire.com/smart_search/, retrieved from the Web January 12, 2007. Rady Ananda wrote an HCPB Implementation Strategy for 2007 on January 3, 2007, http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_rady_ana_070102_evoting_exit_strateg.htm, retrieved from the Web March 13, 2005. In February 2007, in Missouri (MO), Show Me The Vote, led by Phil Lindsey, introduced an initiative to go on the ballot that, if passed, would mean that MO would not use electronic voting machines in their elections, but would use HCPB. This initiative must first get enough votes from the public to appear on the ballot, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0702/S00271.htm, by Michael Collins, retrieved from the Web March 12, 2007. (To contact Show Me The Vote, email Phil at galloglas@sbcglobal.net.) Another HCPB initiative, led by Kathleen Wynne, is in the form of a petition from the American People to Congress, urging Congress to reintroduce the Paper Ballot Bill of 2006, http://hcpbnow.org/petition.html, retrieved from the Web July 13, 2007. In June 2007, at The DFA (Democracy for America) Democracy Fest in New Hampshire, in a telephone call to the attendees, Representative Dennis Kucinich stated that he will introduce The Paper Ballot Bill of 2007, mandating HCPB for all federal offices. Kucinich has changed the bill from his 2006 version, H.R. 6200, which had mandated HCPB for the offices of president and vice-president only, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h6200ih.txt.pdf, retrieved from the Web, March 30, 2007.
[5] “Warden” is the name used in Massachusetts for the poll worker in charge of the election in that precinct. Different names are used in different states. The person is not an elected official
[6] In April 2004, Teresa Hommel described some hand-counting methods used in Canada and New York City, http://wheresthepaper.org/CountPaperBallots.htm , retrieved from the Web January 13, 2007.
[8] The ballot box said “Town of Rockport, Precinct 2” and was dated 1922.
[9] The ballot box was made by S. Ralph Cross and Sons, Inc., 120 Mayfield Street, Worcester 2, MA, now out of business. The box was dated 1971.
[10] Joanne Karasak has recommended a first count followed by “an immediate second ‘blind’ count (blind count meaning that the second team of counters do not know the total on the first count).” Email posted June 26, 2007. Based on my observations in Maine, I think it would be too confusing to change counters.
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