OpEdNews - Page 3 of Article: Democracy's Battle Joined, Again

These tensions led Reagan and Bush to take some of their initiatives underground to avoid congressional objections to policies, such as military aid to Nicaraguan contra rebels and arms-for-hostage trades with the Islamic fundamentalist government of Iran.

In effect, Reagan and Bush were asserting again that the Imperial Presidency held intrinsic powers over foreign policy that allowed the White House to ignore laws that barred arming the Nicaraguan contras and shipping weapons to states, like Iran, designated as supporters of terrorism.

After the administration 's Iran-Contra operations were exposed in fall 1986, the constitutional tug of war resumed. Initially, the White House retreated under a barrage of negative publicity focused on the wacky scheme of funneling some profits off the Iran arms sales to the Nicaraguan contras.

'Protect the President '

To protect the president, chief of staff Don Regan cobbled together a "plan of action " shortly before the Iran-Contra diversion was announced on Nov. 25, 1986. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North and his colleagues on the National Security Council staff were to take most of the blame.

"Tough as it seems, blame must be put at NSC's door rouge operation, going on without President's knowledge or sanction, " Regan wrote. "When suspicions arose he [Reagan] took charge, ordered investigation, had meeting with top advisers to get at facts, and find out who knew what. ... Anticipate charges of 'out of control, ' 'President doesn't know what's going on, ' 'Who's in charge? ' "

Suggesting that Reagan was a deficient leader wasn 't a pretty option, but it was the best the White House could do at that moment. The other option was to admit that Reagan had authorized much of the illegal operation, including arms shipments to Iran through Israel in 1985 that some senior administration officials had warned not only were illegal but possibly amounted to an impeachable offense.

So, North was fired and his boss, national security adviser John Poindexter, resigned. The White House press office spun the scandal as a case of a few "men of zeal " operating outside the authority of Reagan and Bush.

By February 1987, this containment strategy was making progress. A presidential commission headed by former Sen. John Tower, R-Texas, wrote a report that found no serious wrongdoing, though it criticized Reagan's management style.

The Tower Board said the scandal had been a "failure of responsibility " and chastised Reagan for putting "the principal responsibility for policy review and implementation on the shoulders of his advisers. "

Cheney to the Rescue

When the Iran-Contra investigation switched to Congress in mid-1987, the White House got a strong helping hand from Cheney, then a Wyoming congressman and an emerging Republican star. He aggressively defended Reagan, Bush and other party leaders.

North received congressional immunity for his testimony and described the White House cover-up that had followed the Iran-Contra disclosures. He called it a "fall guy plan " with him as the fall guy.

But congressional Democrats were faced with a tough choice, especially when the Cheney-led Republicans made clear they would fight the investigation every step of the way and pro-Reagan activists across the country rallied to North 's defense.

In effect, the Democrats, who then controlled both houses of Congress, had three options: one, they could get to the truth, show that Reagan had authorized illegal operations and seek his impeachment; two, they could reveal Reagan 's central role and take no action, thus creating precedents for circumventing Congress in the future; or three, they could blame Oliver North and a few other "men of zeal. "

The Democrats led by accommodating figures such as Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana picked option three, largely ignoring evidence pointing toward Reagan, Bush and the CIA. By accepting North as the fall guy, Congress put a fig leaf over its prerogatives, even as those powers shrank.

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