OpEdNews - Page 3 of Article: Five Years On, How to Leave Iraq

The historical record on partitions illuminates dos and don’ts for any soft partition of Iraq into a loose confederation—the most important of which is that the Iraqis must do the dividing themselves for it to have crucial legitimacy in their eyes.

In 1947, in partitioning India and Pakistan, Britain found out the hard way that the location of the partition line is vitally important and that an outside power drawing such a border arbitrarily can have disastrous and violent consequences.

Thus, the United States should avoid getting involved in the details of creating borders between regions, but some general lessons can be learned from past partitions.

First, regional boundaries don’t have to exactly mirror ethno-sectarian areas, but they should come as close as possible.

The case of Northern Ireland shows that a large minority (Catholics), which could be perceived as a threat by the majority (Protestants), should not be stranded on the other side of the borderline. A small minority on the other side of the line will probably experience little violence (Protestants in Ireland).

Second, the case of Kosovo demonstrates that boundaries must consider ethno-sectarian or tribal shrines and sites.

Third, although drawing borders along ethno-sectarian divides should minimize population movements, some migration will likely be necessary. Such movements must be voluntary, can be encouraged through incentives and must be protected (as the violence in Indian-Pakistan in 1947 showed).

Although a U.S. withdrawal and soft partition is not a perfect solution, Iraq is in some sense already partitioned, with forces primarily loyal to ethno-sectarian groups providing security.

U.S. policy training of such armed organizations is merely reinforcing this de facto partition. Such an unratified partition is very dangerous and will likely lead to a full-blown civil war.

Only a new American president signaling a rapid U.S. withdrawal could motivate the parties to formalize, adjust and make permanent the decentralized Iraq that already exists.

Ivan Eland is Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland has spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. His books include The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, and Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense Policy. [This story first appeared in the San Diego Union-Tribune.]

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