That humiliating NATO "draw" (i.e. loss) becomes President Vladimir Putin's ample gain. It puts him and Russia back on the superpower map. With Russia increasingly flexing its muscles after two decades of embarrassing sub-super power status, Putin's desire is to opportunistically reassert and reclaim Russian influence and power on the world stage. What better way than to face down NATO before the eyes of the world, in an action with limited if any military downside? The PR factor would be ENORMOUS. Indeed a huge political coup for him.
2. It (military intervention) is a bluff:
The objective of the threat (bluff?) is to force the issue vis-à-vis global opinion, to the U.N. Security Council where China and Russia can than play veto games galore in front of the world, and formally send hard, threatening messaging to other potential separatist states – "Don't even think about it".
Recalling the days of famous boxer Muhammad Ali, might this then be akin to a Russian "rope a dope" strategy? With NATO/EU the dope? It's not clear NATO has really thought this through, as have the Russians. Based on the political rhetoric, this Analyst would argue NATO/EU has not thought this through and maybe rushing into a Russian bear trap either on the battlefield or in the U.N, or both.
If the Russian "localized" military threat is sincere (i.e. no bluff), and no tangible reason at this particular point to believe it is not, particularly with Russia now formally boxing itself and its rhetoric credibility into the belligerent corner with its "brute military force" statement, Kosovo may soon make even greater history. That is, achieving that which was never achieved during the entire Cold War I – NATO and Russian troops in direct military combat, briefly but never the less directly engaged. If that occurs, and the Russians receiving the PR bonanza predicted from such an engagement, another global chain reaction more devastating than mere alignment will likely begin to quickly work its way, including the predicted, albeit now accelerated, onset for real Commulism driven economic warfare.
This is where NATO/EU needs "smarter", not "F' Putin game playing" heads, to avoid that (Russian sought) mushrooming flare-up; very easy to happen in such a delicate situation. Putin is very clever, cunning and dangerous. A very potent and disturbing combination for someone itching for a confrontation. The prudent choice then is don't give him one, much less deliver it on a silver platter. The military engagement, if there is one, and perhaps being inevitable barring a change in NATO/EU direction, should however remain local, quick and intense, as the Russians strategize, again with Russia benefiting as previously outlined.
If Russia remains firm on making a stand on Kosovo, the global (re)alignment dominoes will likely begin to rapidly fall into place, not unlike they did in 1914, when there was no choice but to take one side or the other. Those nations teetering on aligning with NATO or Russia et al may sway toward Russia with such a huge PR victory. The Russian PR machine will champion "after two decades, Russia is back". The differences in this Cold War versus the first will be striking, not only by the final team make-ups but too that it will be driven over the longer term by (lots of) butter, not guns, made worse if NATO/EU leaders don't quickly wake up and stay-off the ropes. In fact, Cold War II may kick off with not just alignment commitments but too some real fireworks; a brief, yet disastrous localized NATO/Russia military standoff and/or conflict.
Cold War I was built upon pure military standoff. Cold War II will instead be built upon integrated economic standoff (domination/leverage/hostage), spearheaded by the newfound, resurgent and robust economic power of former, pure communist states, now embracing the next generation of Communism. Unlike the first generation however, this next generation of Communism is a potent and sustainable one - Commulism.
In conclusion:
Unfortunately, it may now take NATO/Russia military confrontation, however short, before NATO realizes that while Kosovo independence is certainly important and deserving given its horribly poor treatment by its parent nation Serbia, it should have instead been pursued through tough, deliberate, and appropriate UN diplomacy and negotiations rather than with polarizing, cavalier, intentionally antagonizing blanket approvals.
Afterall, the U.N. is where the issue ultimately will most likely end up anyway, given the clever Russian chess-like moves. Unfortunately now, an ugly, bloody U.N. fight versus just tough U.N. diplomacy/negotiations, seems unavoidable.
In retrospect, NATO/EU will come to realize it could have done (much) better by pro-actively pursing proper U.N. protocols in presenting Kosovo independence to the U.N. as a unique "sympathy play", rather than now having U.N. involvement/action forced upon NATO/EU by the Russians in a "they stole my baby" manner.
NATO/EU could have leveraged both the need and existence of the Kosovoian U.N. presence already, with its in place Kosovo peacekeeper force, as the core component of the argument/case for full independence. Indeed, a legitimate independence case could have been structured and brought to the U.N., with NATO/EU on the offensive (i.e. position of (moral) strength), rather than now when the matter ultimately appears at the U.N., with NATO/EU on the defensive.
That independence case development and positioning which never happened, should have been prudently built off and leveraging language in both the UN Resolution 1244 and principles laid out and agreed to by the G8 (including Russia) as follows:
1. UN Resolution 1244 para 10 which states: Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;
2. Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 – Annex 2 para 5, which states: "Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo".
