In support of the earlier polarity comments, as for India, the country currently struggles whether to go with “Team U.S.” or “Team China”. While China and India have had their differences and even wars in the past, most recently in 1962, there exists a mutual respect and recognition that each can maintain a rival relationship yet still help each other. Whereas China excels in manufacturing and infrastructure, India is dominant in information technology and services. Both currently complement each other, noting each however, gaining ground on the other in their respective current dominant areas. There too exists very strong historical ties, on many fronts, which weigh heavily. The recent opening of the highest border pass control (customs) point in the world is symbolic of a growing bond and embracement process between the two.  

Further evidence of increasing collaboration and partnership between the two in the wake of a competitive if not often adversarial past, is the energy area, where both countries are energy deficient. With India importing 70% and China 50% of their respective domestic oil needs and demand rapidly growing, clearly the competition for foreign energy (oil) sourcing becomes intense. That rivalry, built upon the concept of “equity oil”, led to the January 2006 Sino-Indian agreement between the two governments to put the rivalry aside and instead partner to secure mutually beneficial energy resource projects. Thus the groundbreaking agreement between India Oil & Natural Gas Co. (ONGC) and China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC).  Of interest and concern from U.S. national security perspective, these two entities (India the concern) recently exercised the power of this newfound collaboration with a supply sourcing contract from Venezuela.  See “Divorce Venezuela, Marry Brazil” article below.  

While much positive (from China/India’s own point of view) is going on between India and China, there too are inherent weaknesses to be exploited in terms of both lack of mutual trust and a key strategic regional issue – Burma/Myanmar. Which name this common entity is referred to depends on the party discussing it, noting the U.S. tends to go with Burma, since it was the antagonist military junta (the State Peace and Development Council – SPDC), that changed it to Myanmar. On Myanmar, China supports the SPDC military junta while India does not. This is a major friction point, and one the U.S. can and should exploit with a “wedge to leverage” strategy. 

The U.S. and WEAST would therefore be well served by doing a much better job courting India to join WEAST. Exploiting the weaknesses above, coupled with sharing of nuclear power plant technology and a new allowance for U.S. arms sales being big steps in that (right) direction. Further inclusion into the G8 should also be seriously considered (see “What To Do” - Strategic Partnerships section – a coming Part in this series).  

However, the continued growth in the Delhi/Tehran relationship collectively on the military, political and economic fronts is causing many in Washington to reconsider the tentative nuclear deal with India. Is Russia, in its de facto capacity here as China’s enforcer, leveraging its relationship with Iran to drive Iran toward disturbing an India/U.S. strategic alliance? This interference effort being orchestrated by Iran preys/leverages (to China’s favor) upon the historic, productive relationship between India and Iran, which India views fondly and of great importance. In so doing then, is Russia/Iran trying to help indirectly tilt India to “Team China”?  

Adding even more complexity to courting India, is the extremely difficult and delicate balancing process required regarding the local powder keg geo-political climate. That effort must be expertly navigated, balanced and choreographed in order to still maintain and continue to seek even better relations with another current and long term desired ally - Pakistan, both from a WEAST participation and too anti-terror perspective. China too would welcome Pakistan into its fold and precisely why an aggressive, expert, yet delicate handling of the India/Pakistan situation by the U.S. is so critically important. Therefore, given its dual strategic importance (War on Terror and Commulism) to the U.S. and WEAST, a few relevant thoughts and recommendations on Pakistan. The Pakistan article link below highlights what is going on. Note it was written just “prior” to the Bhutto assassination.

http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_brock_no_071128_pakistan_crisis_and_.htm 

Analyst Note: The theme in the article of Presidential (evolving to Dictatorial if Musharraf feels cornered – again pure dictatorship is an option within his overall survival agenda) power being a function and/or degree of linkage to the powerful Military, however remains, even in the post assassination chaos, as do the article’s other conclusions and recommendations. Bottom line, in Pakistan, whoever owns the military, owns the power. That said, as a matter of fact, that power remains (and accordingly will almost certainly remain) solidly with Musharraf, not his opposition.

Al Qaeda has clearly shifted its geographical strategy from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The latter a true prize of significant strategic significance to all sides. It’s escalating efforts now re-focused and targeted at destabilizing Pakistan and toppling the Musharraf government. The result of this shift in Al Qaeda emphasis being both the U.S. and Musharraf (will) need each other even more. Expect Musharraf and Military Chief Gen. Kiyani then to allow a more (unofficially) relaxed yet still publicly tempered use of U.S. Special Ops forces, particularly in the Al Qaeda strongholds in the northwest tribal areas. Until the U.S. friendly Frontier Forces in that region are able to take on a true counter-terrorism/insurgency role, and it won’t be anytime soon, Musharraf and the U.S. know the U.S. will need to fill the gap. The trick of course, to creatively minimize the public’s expected backlash on the Musharraf government for doing so.  

On that last comment, the recent public visit by several top CIA officials with Mr. Musharraf to discuss greater coordinated actions, including U.S. combat troops on Pakistani soil, is of keen interest. The “public” aspect of what intuitively should have been a covert meeting is key. Clearly, both parties wanted the meeting to be known to the public as well as Mr. Musharraf’s official  “no way” public statement to the CIA. It provides the needed appearance that Mr.Musharraf does not publicly support foreign troops on Pakistani soil, something the public desperately wanted to hear. While that’s the public statement, designed/orchestrated to quell anti-government public opinion, was there perhaps a non-public, unofficial wink wink, with the Mission Impossible-like denial statement by Mr. Musharraf, “off the record, do what you must, but I’ll deny ever having any knowledge of your actions if problems arise?” Perhaps the old “it’s easier (for both parties) to ask for forgiveness than ask for permission” approach to bypass the public opinion obstacle. 

Of note too, “officially” however, there was seemingly positive discussion on “non-troop” collaborations such as greater use of Predator drones and sharing of intelligence.  

Anyway, indeed a fluid situation and only time will tell.    

On Brazil (and Latin America), it represents the major power in Latin America. Venezuela has emerged as an arrogant bully and key access point for China (and Russia) into Latin America. The Brazil/Venezuela article link below highlights what is going on:

http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_brock_no_071202_u_s__national_securi.htm 

A strategic alignment with Brazil keeps that in check to some if not large degree. Adding even greater impetus to a more comprehensive strategic alignment with Latin America is China’s aggressive probing for access not only in and through Venezuela but direct too. Under the premise that any China foothold in the western hemisphere increases the threat to U.S. national security - dramatically, the recent stunning announcement by Ecuador that it was terminating the long held U.S. air base lease near the port city of at Manta, is cause for great concern. It not only provides China a key strategic shipping and distribution point on the west coast of South America but too potential strategic hemispheric military positioning as well.

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