Musharraf, vis-vis both his carefully selected replacement (Kiyani) and selected military leadership corps, will still be pulling the military strings and with that underpinning military support, remaining the big time political player in Pakistan for a long time to come. Interestingly, and further to that point and again evidencing Musharraf's continued close military ties is a Nov. 27, 2007 New York Times article comment following his military leadership turnover ceremonies that "After 46 years in the army, Mr. Musharraf admitted it was wrenching to give up his military role.....Although I am taking off the uniform the army will always be in heart." Clearly, that comment is telling, wearing the military on his sleeve and therefore impossible for him to simply walk away from that which he stated is most important in his heart. Too, the article reinforced the the important Musharraf/Kiyani connection. It highlighted the close, long term personal relationship between the two, coupled with Musharraf's public endorsement, noting Musharraf during the same ceremonies "commending General Kiyani as an excellent commander who he had known for 20 years."

Anyway, to the point of forcing him to (officially) step down from the Army, publicly anyway, backfires on his opposition in two respects:

1) They now have lost one of their principal populace rallying points, and
2) In taking away one of his two jobs, Musharraf "officially" has no fallback and makes him that much more determined to remain in the other – President; the job Bhutto and Sharif would rather him be removed from.

Musharraf astutely recognized this and albeit missing his ideal time window to step down as Army Chief, did quickly recognize his error and then opportunistically acted upon it, at no tangible loss to his military power base.

Be that as it may, the situation today is what it is. From that difficult start point then, a solution to the crisis must be salvaged. Many are calling for painful U.S. sanctions/aid (military/economic) restrictions to leverage Musharraf to back down from Emergency Rule. This is a dangerous game, as it runs the risk of backing him even tighter into a corner and tilting/pushing Musharraf to China/Russia, both eagerly waiting in the wings.

Too, it would not be surprising (better yet, expected) for Musharraf to dismiss Emergency Rule and restore other democrartic features before the January elections in the form of public appeal (good guy) conciliatory "givebacks".  Afterall, he took alot of heat since early November for his "takeaways". Now he's positioned to reap the benefits from giving them back, to the people's grudging applause and Bhutto's/Sharif's detriment.

While the U.S. may rightfully disagree with Musharraf's recent actions from the standpoint of pure democratic principles, it would be making a grave strategic national security interest mistake if it strictly pursues the usual damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead self righteous path, and abandons Musharraf as a viable, if not the preferred Pakistani leader option. This becomes crystal clear when one does the due diligence to determine who beyond Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif exist on the "other option list". Anyone who does that due diligence quickly comes to the realization that that list is empty. In the final tally, the longer term winner will therefore be one of these three players, with the heavy odds on favorite, if not victory a fait accompli for the reasons cited below, being Musharraf. The U.S. continues to struggle with that outcome and therefore seen as not doing that important due diligence. It needs to, in a hurry.

Rather, the U.S. should more importantly view this situation solely as U.S. national security in play and act accordingly. National security needs to be the primary concern and motivation in the way the U.S. addresses this crisis, and Musharraf, whether the U.S. likes it or not is and will remain the significant and substantive function/factor of that national security (whether he's President or in the highly unlikely event at some point in the future he's not) focus/outcome.

Therefore, rather than force feeding and demanding "Instant" U.S. style Democracy from him, the U.S. might consider this crisis as the catalyst to begin a new approach with all (other) countries, beginning first with Pakistan (and Iraq?). That is to deal with them with a newfound understanding that they have their own cultures, governing protocols and histories separate and distinct from the U.S. They think, act and behave differently and therefore "one size fits all Democracy" is not likely to work everywhere or even anywhere. Perhaps then, some "derivative" country-specific version of U.S. style Democracy is therefore more appropriate to start with and then gradually build from there over time.

The quintessential U.S. attitude of immediate gratification and/or results in everything, including NASCAR like "Zero to Democracy" in 4.8 seconds wherever it decides to install it, is fundamentally flawed. In countries and/or cultures with centuries if not millenniums of their own history and governing protocols, many the antithesis of true democracy, it simply won't happen and should therefore not be the strategy/goal. True Democracy, like anything else, if forced in a manner akin to sticking a fire hose in one's mouth, and turning on the hydrant, is simply just to much to fast.

It's therefore critically important to admit and recognize that Pakistan is not the U.S. now or even the equivalent to the situation the U.S. was in on July 4, 1776 when Democracy was born and immediately took root. Therefore, the situation must be treated differently. It is illogical to think or assume from a pure democracy perspective that Pakistan will be like the U.S. any time soon, if ever. As the popular saying goes in Pakistan (and never in the U.S.), "Power in Pakistan flows from the uniform". Its leadership (and governing) legacy has not been one that embraced and practiced democratic constitution and principles but rather what it is traditionally accustomed to - military rule. And keep in mind, Pakistan is just 60 years old, yet military rule has been the norm since its independence from British India. Whereas the benchmark U.S. has never had military rule - neither in its first 60 years nor its last 231 plus years since Independence.

Adding further support for factoring in the military piece in this crisis, and needing to be a part of any solution, is a statement from a noted Pakistani. In a Nov. 21, 2007 Washington Post article, Emily Wax quotes Shireen M. Mazari of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad as saying "to understand the power of Pakistan, you have to understand that it's the military that matters. And they are kingmakers here".

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