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By Kathlyn Stone (about the author)
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Hollis-Eden, along with dozens of other pharmaceutical companies, aims to tap into additional Project Bioshield funds and has used extensive lobbying and public relations strategies to bring its case before lawmakers and the general public. Since passage of Project Bioshield in 2004, the US government has distributed about $1 billion of the $5.6 billion it allocated for the stockpiling of drugs and vaccines for combating injuries sustained from terrorist attacks.
Competition for the Bioshield funds extends beyond industry to academia and to government research institutions. The Bush administration is also using the funds to develop its bioweapons program in at least three government and university labs-the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah has developed anthrax for use in testing biological defense systems; the CDC in Atlanta handles live smallpox, and research is ongoing at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and in Hamilton, Montana.
The federal government gave final approval in February to Boston University's bid to build a high-security research laboratory that will work with some of the deadliest viruses and bacteria, such as Ebola, anthrax, and plague. The $128 million center is expected to be completed in 2008.
Kentucky and Tennessee are currently competing for a $451 million federal bioterrorism research lab project. Funded by the Department of Homeland Security, the lab would also be another highly secure site with a Biosafety Level 4 designation and be among a growing number of institutions researching bioterrorist threats, foreign animal diseases, and other emerging public health threats.
Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Council for Responsible Genetics, and the National Academy of Sciences are among the scientific groups that have expressed concerns about the United States' research and development of weapons-grade germs. Some have warned that the initiative could be perceived as "development" of biological weapons, in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. Others question the safety of such facilities and the impact on public safety, should any of the deadly toxins escape from laboratories.
The Council for Responsible Genetics lists 30 incidents involving environmental releases, containment and security breaches, missing samples, and exposure and infection of personnel occurring at bioresearch labs since 1985. The mistakes include the disappearance of anthrax and Ebola viruses from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in the 1990s. The 2001 anthrax attacks are believed by the FBI to have been caused by a scientist with access to a government laboratory.
PLANNING FOR ATTACK
Leaders in neurology are striving to make preparedness workshops and training widely available and easily accessible. For example, Johns Hopkins University offers an online bioterrorism training module, and the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center hosts Webcasts on current immunizations for smallpox and anthrax and on recognizing chemical exposure.
Considering the many threats from abroad and domestically, the risk of an NBCE attack or unintentional outbreak should be of grave concern. "It's not a matter of if it will occur, it's a matter of when and where," said Dr. Prockup.
Suggested Reading
Beane J. A look behind the scenes: bioterrorism, smallpox, and public health policy. J Biolaw Bus. 2004;7:40-53.
Originally published by Neurology Reviews.
Become a Fan (1 fan) -- Page 3 of 3 page(s)
Competition for the Bioshield funds extends beyond industry to academia and to government research institutions. The Bush administration is also using the funds to develop its bioweapons program in at least three government and university labs-the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah has developed anthrax for use in testing biological defense systems; the CDC in Atlanta handles live smallpox, and research is ongoing at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and in Hamilton, Montana.
The federal government gave final approval in February to Boston University's bid to build a high-security research laboratory that will work with some of the deadliest viruses and bacteria, such as Ebola, anthrax, and plague. The $128 million center is expected to be completed in 2008.
Kentucky and Tennessee are currently competing for a $451 million federal bioterrorism research lab project. Funded by the Department of Homeland Security, the lab would also be another highly secure site with a Biosafety Level 4 designation and be among a growing number of institutions researching bioterrorist threats, foreign animal diseases, and other emerging public health threats.
Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Council for Responsible Genetics, and the National Academy of Sciences are among the scientific groups that have expressed concerns about the United States' research and development of weapons-grade germs. Some have warned that the initiative could be perceived as "development" of biological weapons, in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. Others question the safety of such facilities and the impact on public safety, should any of the deadly toxins escape from laboratories.
The Council for Responsible Genetics lists 30 incidents involving environmental releases, containment and security breaches, missing samples, and exposure and infection of personnel occurring at bioresearch labs since 1985. The mistakes include the disappearance of anthrax and Ebola viruses from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in the 1990s. The 2001 anthrax attacks are believed by the FBI to have been caused by a scientist with access to a government laboratory.
PLANNING FOR ATTACK
Leaders in neurology are striving to make preparedness workshops and training widely available and easily accessible. For example, Johns Hopkins University offers an online bioterrorism training module, and the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center hosts Webcasts on current immunizations for smallpox and anthrax and on recognizing chemical exposure.
Considering the many threats from abroad and domestically, the risk of an NBCE attack or unintentional outbreak should be of grave concern. "It's not a matter of if it will occur, it's a matter of when and where," said Dr. Prockup.
Suggested Reading
Beane J. A look behind the scenes: bioterrorism, smallpox, and public health policy. J Biolaw Bus. 2004;7:40-53.
Originally published by Neurology Reviews.
Kathlyn Stone is a Minnesota-based writer covering science and medicine, health care and related policies.-She publishes www.fleshandstone.net, a health and science news site.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of this website or its editors.
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