"Within 30 days of the date of this document, the vendor must develop and submit to the Secretary of State for approval, a plan and procedures for timely identification of required security updates (e.g., operating system security patches, security software updates, etc), vendor testing of the updates, and secure distribution and application of vendor-approved security updates."
[WDNC]: Why should we have confidence in the machines in their newly approved form when the expectation is that more security flaws will be found? Avi Rubin makes a similar observation. This page also inexplicably allows for networking, though it does have the modem prohibition. It also makes reference to the two-person rule which I believe goes back to the Feb. 2006 VSTAAB report, which recommends that optical scanners and memory cards never be in anyone's sole possession. This would seem to preclude sleepovers, however, page 9 seems to allow poll workers to take home machines prior to Election Day.
Page 8
"Upon request, members of the public must be permitted to observe and inspect, without physical contact, the integrity of all externally visible security seals used to secure voting equipment in a time and manner that does not interfere with the conduct of the election or the privacy of any voter."
[WDNC]: This is looks great on paper but we've seen Registrars plainly obstruct the access of citizens to their Democracy. This should carry a severe criminal penalty. Page 8 also requires posting of poll tapes, another apparent victory that in reality carries no weight. As the VCC learned last November, precinct poll tapes are useless when the County never provides as a basis for comparison raw precinct scanner data that has not been combined with absentee or other ballots not cast on the scanner in the precinct on Election Day.
Page 8
"Any post-election auditing requirements imposed as a condition of this certification shall be paid for by the vendor. Jurisdiction users are required to conduct the audits and the vendor is required to reimburse the jurisdiction."
[WDNC]: I'm getting near the end now. Just a few more stray notes, such as page 9 continuing the requirement (begun under McPherson?) that counties submit a post-election problem report to the SoS. Page 10 describes how to deal with machines whose security has been compromised, and also machines that have been rebooted or which have rebooted themselves. The bottom of page 11 and the top of page 12 is a bit troublesome. It attempts to put vendors on the hook for warrantying their equipment, but all it really does is say they have to stand by their word and repair equipment at their expense when they have been caught lying again. This is not nearly strict enough. Finally, page 12 expands the requirement for vendors to give the SoS a copy of the source code, in addition to placing a copy in escrow.
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