18 Florian Strasser, Zivilgesellschaftliche Einflusse auf die Orange Revolution: Die gewaltlose Massenbewegung und die ukrainische Wahlkrise 2004. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 29 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag 2006).
19 Ingmar Bredies, Institutionenwandel ohne Elitenwechsel? Das ukrainische Parlament im Kontext des politischen Systemwechsels 1990-2006. Osteuropa: Geschichte, Wirtschaft, Politik 41 (Munster: LIT, 2007).
20 Helmut Kurth and Iris Kempe, eds., Presidential Election and Orange Revolution: Implications for Ukraine's TransitionZur Anatomie der Orange Revolution in der Ukraine: Wechsel des Elitenregimes oder Triumph des Parlamentarismus? Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 13 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag 2005); Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 2006); Taras Kuzio, ed., "Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution," The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 23, 1(Special Issue) (2007): 1-179; Iurii Shapoval, ed., U kol'orakh 'pomaranchevoÃ¯ revoliutsiÃ¯' (KyÃ¯v: EksOb 2007); David Lane and Stephen White, eds., "Rethinking the 'Coloured Revolutions'," The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25, 2-3(Special Issue) (2009): 111-412. (Kyiv: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2005); Ingmar Bredies, ed.,
21 E.g.: Lucan Way, "Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 2 (2005): 131-145; Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution: The Opposition's Road to Success," Journal of Democracy, vol. 16, no. 2 (2005): 117-130; idem, "Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Elections, and 'Orange Revolution'," Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 2 (2005): 29-44; idem, "The Orange Revolution at the Crossroads," Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14, no. 4 (2006): 477-493; idem, "Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy Since the Orange Revolution," The International Spectator, no. 4 (2006): 1-18; Ararat L. Osipian and Alexander L. Osipian, "Why Donbass Votes for Yanukovich: Confronting the Orange Revolution," Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14, no. 4 (2006): 495-518; Olena Yatsunska, "Mythmaking and Its Discontents in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Campaign," Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14, no. 4 (2006): 519-534; Bohdan Klid, "Rock, Pop and Politics in Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Campaign," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 23, no. 1 (2007): 139-158; Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," Perspectives on Politics, vol. 5, no. 2 (2007): 259-276; Michael McFaul, "Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution," International Security, vol. 32, no. 2 (2007): 45-83; Theodor Tudoroiu, 'Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions,' Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 40, no. 3 (2007): 315-342; Alexandra Hrycak, "Seeing Orange: Women's Activism and Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Women's Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3/4 (2007): 208-225.
22 Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism. See also Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competative Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2 (2002): 51-65.
23 Wilson, Virtual Politics.
24 See Andreas Umland, "Elektoral'nyi avtorytaryzm postsovets'koÃ¯ demokratiÃ¯ [-- a self-contradictory title formulated by the editors of the journal]," Krytyka, no. 9 (2007), http://www.krytyka.kiev.ua/articles/s.1_9_2007.html; idem, "Elektoral'nyi avtoritarizm na postsovetskom prostranstve," Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, no. 1(62) (2008), click here
25 Wilson's Virtual Politics is of additional value because of the astonishing amount of -- partly, little-known -- facts, dates and names that he has amassed here, and the variety of large events and small affairs that his narrative chronicles. Russian or Ukrainian political scientists may find Wilson's emphasis on the role of "political technology" not very original, and be, at best, intrigued by the relative novelty of these phenomena to the comparative study of democracy. Even they will, however, be impressed by, and able to learn from, Wilson's book because it is such a dense and well-researched description. Sometimes, to be sure, certain small facts are wrong, a Russian or Ukrainian word is misspelled, or an interesting event is missing in the story. For instance, Wilson, in his description of Zhirinovskii's activities in 1990-1991, does not mention the LDP-leader's meeting with Vice-President Gennadii Yanayev shortly before the August Coup of 1991. See Andreas Umland, "Zhirinovsky Enters Politics: A Chronology of the Emergence of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 1990-1991," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 (2005): 15-30. But such minor errors or omissions seem unavoidable in as wide-ranging a narrative as Wilson's clearly is. Rather, one is left overwhelmed by the amount of empirical data provided here.
26 Andreas Umland, "Kremlin Overkill: Why Putin's entry into party politics is the beginning of the end of Russian faÃ§ade democracy," Zerkalo nedeli, 13-19 October 2007, http://www.mw.ua/1000/1550/60798/.
27 On the idea of Russia's special path, see Leonid Luks, Der russische "Sonderweg"? AufsÃ¤tze zur neuesten Geschichte Russlands im europÃ¤ischen Kontext. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 16 (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag 2005).
28 The other partial exception is, of course, Georgia that was playing the role of a model for Ukraine in 2004. It appears, however, that the Georgian democratization is encountering difficulties, more recently. See, on Georgia's difference from Ukraine, Taras Kuzio, "Georgia and Ukraine: Similar Revolutions, Different Trajectories," Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 4, no. 211 (2007), click here Moldova and the Baltic republics were annexed to the Soviet Union only later.