The result of this became apparent only much later, when Hamas assumed power in the isolated Gaza Strip, while Fatah clung to in the West Bank. It was "divide et impera" at its best (or worst).
In the agreements following Oslo, the occupied West Bank was divided into temporary zones, A, B and C. Area C was to remain for the time being under complete Israeli control. Soon enough it became clear that Israeli military planners had devised the map carefully: Area C included all the main roads and the sites earmarked for Israeli settlements.
The people who devised all these things did not have peace on their mind.
The picture is not altogether one-sided. During the Oslo period Palestinian armed attacks on Israelis did not cease. Arafat did not initiate them, but neither did he go out of his way to prevent them. He probably thought that they would needle the Israelis into going ahead with implementing the agreement. They had the opposite effect.
THE ASSASSINATIONS of Rabin and Arafat put an end to Oslo for all practical purposes. But reality has not changed.
The considerations which led Arafat by the end of 1973 to conclude that he must negotiate with Israel, and which led Rabin in 1993 to talk with the Palestinians, have not changed.
There are two nations in this country, and they must choose: to live together or to die together. I hope they choose life.
Some day, public squares in Tel Aviv and Ramallah will be named for this agreement. And in Oslo, too, of course.
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