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Crisis in Ukraine: Ukraine and Russia Beyond Crimean Secession

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The difference is, of course, that there was significant bloodshed against the Serbian population, the minority, in Kosovo around and after that time, and, as far as I know, there has been very little bloodshed in this whole Crimean situation. That's point number one.

Point number two is the idea that we have to see this as a sequence of events. In Crimea, while there has been, as far as I know, some discontent with the Russian majority of about 60 percent in Crimea, over time it really was the events in Kiev that set this secessionist movement in motion. We cannot see this in total isolation.

The third point, on your point about what Russia wants, the idea that Russia is massing forces on Ukraine's borders and is ready to follow up Crimea with a move into eastern Ukraine does not seem to be a plausible outcome at this point.

Do you agree with these footnotes?

NICOLAI PETRO: Could you repeat that second point?

DAVID SPEEDIE: Just that we can't see Crimea as a sudden, unexpected, or impulsive--

NICOLAI PETRO: Right. In fact, I was reading a very interesting article by a Crimean official in Rossiskaya Gazeta, one of the leading Russian state papers. He said--and he, of course, was giving his personal perspective on this--it's important for people to realize that throughout the entire crisis of state that was taking place while Yanukovych was still in office, Crimeans were trying to hold the country together. Up until the very end, they were saying, "We need to restore law and order throughout all of Ukraine."

What's happening in the western regions--people tend to forget this now, even though it has been just a month or so--the western regions disbanded their parliaments, removed their governors, refused to pay taxes. They, in fact, effectively seceded from the Ukrainian central government. They said, "We do not recognize the authority of Kiev."

Crimea and the eastern regions at this time were saying, "If we're going to keep the country together, we need to have a common government together."

As soon as Yanukovych was removed by the Maidan and the new political forces in Kiev, they tried to meet in Kharkiv, and they actually held an assembly of all of the heads of local government in Kharkiv and tried to, again, invite the representatives of the western region. But they did not come.

At which point the entire process became one of: "Well, what's happening in Kiev is not something that we in Crimea recognize as legitimate. This puts into question our autonomy, because how do we know that if they are willing to undermine the constitution with such ease that they will respect our autonomy?"

The entire process of tit-for-tat, with the government in Crimea rejecting the authority of the government in Kiev, and the government in Kiev then trying to reimpose its authority by replacing personnel in Crimea, began to escalate.

Even at that point, however, there was only talk of the first referendum. The referendum question, as you'll recall, only asked if the population was willing to vote for greater autonomy, a return to the 1992 constitution within Ukraine. But when that was rejected, they went and added a second option, which was to join Russia. So indeed, it is in the context of how quickly things can deteriorate when the sides refuse to talk to each other.

The question now becomes: How does this affect the situation in the other regions of the east and the south?

There are protests going on pretty much daily, I can say even here in Odessa, which is a quiet region where there haven't been any casualties, thank God, so far. There are daily protests, with people protesting and asking for a referendum.

As a matter of fact, I got a leaflet today that was handed to me walking down the street with the demands of what they call "the people's alternative." The people's alternative has six basic demands:

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Nicolai N. Petro is professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island. He has served as special assistant for policy in the U.S. State Department and as civic affairs advisor to the mayor of the Russian city of Novgorod the Great. His books include: The Rebirth of Russian Democracy (Harvard,1995), Russian Foreign Policy (Longman, 1997), and (more...)
 

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