Within minutes of President Reagan's Inauguration on Jan. 20, 1981, the American hostages finally were freed.
In the following weeks, the new administration put in
place discreet channels to Middle East powers, as Haig flew to the region for a
round of high-level consultations. The trim silver-haired former four-star
general met with Iraq's chief allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and with Israel,
which was secretly supporting Iran as a counter-weight to Iraq and the Arab
states.
On April 8, 1981, Haig ended his first round of meetings in
Riyadh and issued a diplomatic statement lauding Saudi Arabia's "dedication to
building a better world and the wisdom of your leaders." More to the point, he
announced that "the foundation has been laid during this trip for the
strengthening of U.S.-Saudi relations."
After Haig's return to
Washington, his top secret Talking Points fleshed out for President Reagan the
actual agreements that were reached at the private sessions in Saudi Arabia, as
well as at other meetings in Egypt and Israel.
"As we discussed before
my Middle East trip," Haig explained to President Reagan, "I proposed to
President Sadat, [Israel's] Prime Minister [Menachem] Begin and Crown Prince
Fahd that we establish a private channel for the consideration of particularly
sensitive matters of concern to you. Each of the three picked up on the proposal
and asked for early meetings."
Haig wrote that on his return, he
immediately dispatched his counselor, Robert "Bud" McFarlane, to Cairo and
Riyadh to formalize those channels. "He held extremely useful meetings with both
Sadat and Fahd," Haig boasted. "In fact, Sadat kept Ed Muskie [President
Carter's secretary of state] waiting for an hour and a half while he [Sadat]
extended the meeting."
Those early contacts with Fahd, Sadat and Begin
solidified their three countries as the cornerstones of the Reagan
administration's clandestine foreign policy of the 1980s: the Saudis as the
moneymen, the Israelis as the middlemen, and the Egyptians as a ready source for
Soviet-made equipment.
Although President Carter had brokered a historic
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Sadat, Begin and Fahd had all been
alarmed at signs of U.S. weakness, especially Washington's inability to protect
the Shah of Iran from ouster in 1979. Haig's Talking Points captured that relief
at Carter's removal from office.
"It is clear that your policies of
firmness toward the Soviets has restored Saudi and Egyptian confidence in the
leadership of the U.S.," Haig wrote for the presentation to his boss. "Both
[Fahd and Sadat] went much further than ever before in offering to be
supportive."
Haig said "Sadat offered to host a forward headquarters for
the Rapid Deployment Force, including a full-time presence of U.S military
personnel." Sadat also outlined his strategy for invading Libya to disrupt
Moammar Khadafy's intervention in Chad.
"Frankly," observed Haig, "I believe he [Sadat] could easily get overextended in such an undertaking and [I] will try to moderate his ambitions on this score."
'Special Status,' Money and Guns
Haig reported that Prince Fahd was "also very enthusiastic" about President Reagan's foreign policy. Fahd had agreed "in principle to fund arms sales to the Pakistanis and other states in the region," Haig wrote.
The Saudi leader was promising, too, to help the U.S.
economy by committing his oil-rich nation to a position of "no drop in
production" of petroleum.
"These channels promise to be extremely useful
in forging compatible policies with the Saudis and Egyptians," Haig continued.
"Both men value the 'special status' you have conferred on them and both value
confidentiality. I will follow up with [Defense Secretary] Cap Weinberger and
[CIA Director] Bill Casey. ...The larger message emerging from these exchanges,
however, is that your policies are correct and are already eliciting the
enthusiastic support of important leaders abroad."
In the following
years, the Reagan administration would exploit the "special status" with all
three countries to skirt Constitutional restrictions on Executive war-making
powers. Secretly, the administration would tilt back and forth in the Iran-Iraq
War, between aiding the Iranians with missiles and spare parts and helping the
Iraqis with intelligence and indirect military shipments.
